Question–behaviour effect: A randomised controlled trial of asking intention in the interrogative or declarative form

Objective: This study investigated the question–behaviour effect of measuring intention in the interrogative or declarative form combined or not with a measure of moral norm.

Design: A sample of 762 participants was randomised according to a 2?×?2 factorial design.

Main outcome measures: Cognitions were assessed at the baseline, and physical activity behaviour was self-reported three weeks later. Results: At baseline, there were no significant differences on the studied variables. An ANOVA showed a significant interaction effect between the two experimental conditions (p?=?0.04). Post-hoc contrast analyses showed that the interrogative intention-only condition significantly differed from the declarative intention-only (d?=?0.21, p?=?0.03) and interrogative intention?+?moral norm (d?=?0.22, p?=?0.03) conditions.

Conclusion: Results suggest that self-posed questions about a future action increases the likelihood of doing it when these questions are not accompanied by measures of moral norm. This provides support for using introspective self-talk to favour the adoption of behaviour.     

Expressivism,question substitution and evolutionary debunking

Expressivism is a blossoming meta-semantic framework sometimes relying on what Carter and Chrisman call “the core expressivist maneuver.” That is, instead of asking about the nature of a certain kind of value, we should be asking about the nature of the value judgment in question. According to expressivists, this question substitution opens theoretical space for the elegant, economical, and explanatorily powerful expressivist treatment of the relevant domain. I argue, however, that experimental work in cognitive psychology can shed light on how the core expressivist maneuver operates at the cognitive level and that this: (a) raises worries about the aptness of the expressivist question substitution and (b) supports an evolutionary debunking argument against expressivism. Since evolutionary debunking arguments are usually run in favor of expressivism, this creates an obvious puzzle for expressivists. I wrap up by briefly responding to the objection that the debunking argument against expressivism overgeneralizes and, therefore, should be rejected.     

Question order bias in retrospective evaluations of item and associative recognition

Previous research has demonstrated a retrospective memory bias in metacognitive judgments regarding performance on general knowledge questions: Test-takers rate their own performance more optimistically when tests begin with easy questions than when tests begin with hard questions. An anchoring heuristic has been proposed to explain this finding, in which experience with the early questions constrains global performance evaluations of the test. In the current study we report on two experiments using tasks of item recognition and associative recognition to investigate the generality of question order bias. As predicted by an anchoring explanation, participants’ estimates of performance were higher for item recognition tests beginning with easy items. However, the effect was reversed in the associative recognition task: Participants’ estimates of performance were higher for tests beginning with hard items. Specific recollections, if present, may have a greater impact on test performance perception than more general global impressions.     

Avoiding the effect of item wording by means of bipolar instead of unipolar items: An application to social optimism

Scales including positively and negatively worded items usually show an impaired degree of homogeneity. The transformation of unipolar positively and negatively worded items into bipolar items can avoid this disadvantageous effect. The precondition for this transformation is that each pair of items refers to the same topic. It is this topic that serves as the heading of the bipolar item. This scale construction method is demonstrated in the items of the social optimism scale (Schweizer & Schneider, 1997) that comprises unipolar items. The investigation of both the original and the transformed scales in a sample of 808 participants revealed equivalence and a high quality for both scales. Results of an additional sample confirmed the validity of both social optimism scales. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Yet Another Run around the Circle

In a recent article, D. A. Truncellito (2004, ‘Running in Circles about Begging the Question’, Argumentation 18, 325–329) argues that the discussion between Robinson (1971, ‘Begging the Question’, Analysis 31, 113–117), Sorensen (1996, ‘Unbeggable Questions’, Analysis 56, 51–55) and Teng (1997, ‘Sorensen on Begging the Question’, Analysis 57, 220–222) shows that we need to distinguish between logical fallacies, which are mistakes in the form of the argument, and rhetorical fallacies, which are mistakes committed by the arguer. While I basically agree with Truncellito’s line of thinking, I believe this distinction is not tenable and offer a different view. In addition, I will argue that the conclusion to draw from the abovementioned discussion is that validity is not a sufficient criterion of begging the question, and that we should be wary of the containment-metaphor of a deductive argument.     

What's to Fear from Immigrants? Creating an Assimilationist Threat Scale

We argue that cultural threat, stressed in recent studies of anti-immigrant sentiment, is properly measured in the U.S. case as "assimilationist threat": a resentful perception that immigrants are failing to adopt the cultural norms and lifestyle of their new homeland. We explore the meaning and form of assimilationist threat in the minds of Americans through an analysis of four focus groups, two in Los Angeles, CA, and two in Columbus, OH. Using information from the focus groups, we develop and test a set of survey questions covering three dimensions of immigrants' commitment to their new country: language, productivity, and citizenship. We produce a summary scale of assimilationist threat that can be used by other researchers seeking to understand the causes and consequences of anti-immigrant sentiment.     

How to avoid begging the question against evolutionary debunking arguments

Evolutionary debunking arguments aim to undercut the epistemological status of our evaluative beliefs on the basis of the genesis of our belief‐forming tendencies. This paper addresses the issue whether responses to these arguments must be question‐begging. It argues for a pragmatic understanding of question‐beggingness, according to which whether an argument is question‐begging depends on the argumentative context. After laying out the debunking argument, the paper considers a variety of responses. It asks whether metaethical responses, such as Sharon Street’s response that relies on a version of antirealism, can avoid begging the question. It argues that so‐called ‘third‐factor’ responses, which rely on substantive evaluative views, are not question‐begging in all contexts. Similarly, it argues, my own ‘quasi‐tracking’ response is not question‐begging in all contexts. Finally, the paper asks whether responses to the debunking argument can avoid begging the question against someone who is convinced at the outset that the argument is sound.     

SOSA'S MOORE AND THE NEW DOGMATISTS

Abstract: Some seventy years ago, G. E. Moore invoked his own sensory experience (as of a hand before him in the right circumstances), added some philosophical analysis about externality, and took himself to have offered his "Proof" of the existence of an external world. Current neo-Mooreans either reject completely the standard negative assessment of the Proof or qualify it substantially. For Sosa, the Proof can be persuasive, but only when read literally as offering reasons for the conclusion that there is at least one external object—rather than that the prover is justified in believing, or even knowing, that there is at least one external object. Sosa, then, is a neo-Moorean—though not of the sort we might expect in light of the ongoing debate about the Proof. I argue that Sosa needs to say more about the circularity often thought to vitiate the Proof before we can accept his view.     

Question-begging under a non-foundational model of argument

I find (as others have found) that question-begging is formally valid but rationally unpersuasive. More precisely, itought to be unpersuasive, although it can often persuade. Despite its formal validity, question-begging fails to establish its conclusion; in this sense it fails under a classical or foundationalist model of argument. But it does link its conclusion to its premises by means of acceptable rules of inference; in this sense it succeeds under a non-classical, non-foundationalist model of argument which is spelled out in the essay. However, even for the latter model question-begging fails to link the conclusion to premises that the unconvinced would find more acceptable than the conclusion. The essay includes reflections on the conditions under which the circularity of mutually supporting claims can avoid question-begging and legitimately be persuasive.     

Socrates questions Gorgias: The rhetorical vector of Plato's “Gorgias”

This essay argues that Plato's Gorgias, a dialogue lauding dialectic over rhetoric, uses a question-and-answer format as a heuristic of argument. Specific observations are advanced to explain the implications of Plato's techniques and to provide a more sensitive understanding of the process by which sought to gain the adherence of his readers.