The role of negative features in joint and separate evaluation

Separate and joint evaluations differ in the manner in which attribute information is processed. We propose that negative attributes weigh more in separate compared to joint ratings. To assess the relative weights of positive and negative attributes, stimuli were employed containing mixed attribute valence, with good and poor attributes. In three experiments it was demonstrated empirically that, using such mixed valence options, the negative attributes indeed weighed more than the positive ones in separate compared to joint ratings. Direct evidence for the increased weight of negative attributes in separate ratings was provided by showing preference shifts between joint and separate ratings for options with mixed attribute valence. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The lure of choice

We report three studies demonstrating the ‘lure of choice’ people prefer options that allow them to take further choices over those that do not, even when the extra choices cannot improve the ultimate outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, participants chose between two options: one solitary item, and a pair of items between which they would then make a further choice. Consistent with the lure of choice, a given item was more likely to be the ultimate choice when it was initially part of a choice pair than when it was offered on its own. We also demonstrate the lure of choice in a four‐door version of the Monty Hall problem, in which participants could either stick with their original choice or switch to one of two unopened doors. Participants were more likely to switch if they could first ‘choose to choose’ between the two unopened doors (without immediately specifying which) than if they had to choose one door straightaway. We conclude by suggesting that the lure of choice is due to a choice heuristic that is very reliable in the natural world, but much less so in a world created by marketers. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rational Thought And Rational Behavior: A Review Of Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox.

Standard economic theory says that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions and then to select the one with the highest weight. Such a procedure would maximize subjective expected utility. But, because of constraints on time and available information, people and other animals often bypass this process by using “fast and frugal” heuristics to make decisions. Rationality is thus said to be “bounded” by time and information constraints. The articles in this book describe and organize common heuristics. They show that use of such heuristics is generally the best approach to many real world problems and therefore not irrational. Heuristics evolved, they say, not as deviations from rationality but as aids to rationality in cases where the standard model would have proved to be too slow or inefficient. Although the approach of almost all of the authors of these papers is that of cognitive psychology—a focus on internal cognitive mechanisms—their findings and even their theories may be interpreted in terms of reinforcement and punishment acting on behavioral patterns.     

Choice, Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities

Is choice necessary for moral responsibility? And does choice imply alternative possibilities of some significant sort? This paper will relate these questions to the argument initiated by Harry Frankfurt that alternative possibilities are not required for moral responsibility, and to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's extension of that argument in terms of guidance control in a causally determined world. I argue that attending to Frankfurt's core conceptual distinction between the circumstances that make an action unavoidable and those that bring it about that the action is performed – a distinction emphasised in his recent restatement – provides a new route into an analysis of Frankfurt's argument by showing how it depends on a person's ‘decision to act’ involving the exercise of choice. The implicit reliance of Frankfurt's argument on this notion of choice, however, undermines his claim that the example of the counterfactual intervener strengthens the compatibilist case by providing a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities. I also argue that Frankfurt's reliance on the exercise of choice for moral responsibility is also evident in the Fischer/Ravizza argument, and that a close analysis of both arguments shows that such exercise of choice is not available if causal determinism is true.     

法律心理学研究的新热点--儿童目击证人研究

为满足获取儿童目击证人准确证词的司法需求,大量西方法律心理学家涉足这一领域,使儿童目击证人研究成为近十多年来法律心理学研究的新热点。鉴于我国法律还没有对儿童作为目击证人作明文规定,西方心理学家的研究成果值得我国法律心理学界关注。     

Using narratives to explore other-directed occupational choice and academic success

The construct of “other-directed versus self-directed career choice” has existed for quite some time. The current focus of vocational psychologists and counselors has made them question the relevance of this construct for contemporary American society. Many counselors today challenge the assumption that a career choice based on others’ expectations is problematic. This longitudinal study utilized a logistic regression analysis to determine whether self-directed or other-directed status, as measured by the Thematic Apperception Test related to success with which individuals enacted career choices. The sample consisted of 433 BS/MD students enrolled in a Bachelor of Science-Doctor of Medicine (BS/MD) degree program at a Midwestern medical college. The findings showed that self-directed or other-directed career choice did not predict academic success.     

Philosophy: what is to be done?

The isolation and professionalization of philosophy is detrimental to it. The most interesting philosophical activity is conducted at the interface of philosophy and other disciplines. Thus philosophy must continue to cross boundaries and avoid fretting about what is and is not philosophy proper.     

Comparisons of women with high and low trait impulsivity using behavioral models of response-disinhibition and reward-choice

Two types of behavioral models of impulsive behavior, response-disinhibition/attentional and reward-choice response models, were used to compare women grouped by high (Impulse+, n=43) and low (Impulse−, n=43) self-reported impulsive behavior on the Eysenck I₇ Questionnaire. Two of the four different tasks tested were response-disinhibition/attentional models; these included the Immediate and Delayed Memory Task and the GoStop Task. The other two tasks were based on the reward-choice model of impulsivity and included the Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm and the Two-Choice Reward Task. Of particular interest was whether commission errors (response-disinhibition/attentional paradigms) or a preference for smaller–sooner rewards over larger–later rewards (reward-choice) would differ between the groups. Participants completed one session of each task in a single day. The most significant findings were that the Impulse+ group had: (1) elevated commission errors; (2) lower stimulus discriminability (between target and catch stimuli); and (3) poorer response inhibition to a stop signal. Responding on the response-disinhibition/attentional tasks distinguished between the impulsivity groups while the reward-choice tasks did not. These results demonstrate that women who report higher levels of trait impulsivity respond in a manner consistent with previous studies examining impulsive behavior.