PHONOLOGY IN THE LEXICAL PROCESSING OF CHINESE: PRIMING TONE NEIGHBOURS

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Quantified Propositional Logic and the Number of Lines of Tree-Like Proofs

There is an exponential speed-up in the number of lines of the quantified propositional sequent calculus over Substitution Frege Systems, if one considers proofs as trees. Whether this is true also for the number of symbols, is still an open problem. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Note on Graded Modal Logic

We introduce a notion of bisimulation for graded modal logic. Using this notion, the model theory of graded modal logic can be developed in a uniform manner. We illustrate this by establishing the finite model property and proving invariance and definability results.     

Skepticism and Epistemic Logic

This essay attempts to implement epistemic logic through a non-classical inference relation. Given that relation, an account of '(the individual) a knows that A' is constructed as an unfamiliar non-normal modal logic. One advantage to this approach is a new analysis of the skeptical argument.     

The evidential status of philosophical intuition

Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule.     

Combinator Logics

Combinator logics are a broad family of substructual logics that are formed by extending the basic relevant logic B with axioms that correspond closely to the reduction rules of proper combinators in combinatory logic. In the Routley-Meyer relational semantics for relevant logic each such combinator logic is characterized by the class of frames that meet a first-order condition that also directly corresponds to the same combinator's reduction rule. A second family of logics is also introduced that extends B with the addition of propositional constants that correspond to combinators. These are characterized by relational frames that meet first-order conditions that reflect the structures of the combinators themselves.     

Measuring coherence using LP-models

This paper introduces a technique for measuring the degree of (in)coherence of inconsistent sets of propositional formulas. The coherence of these sets of formulas is calculated using the minimal models of those sets in G. Priest's Logic of Paradox. The compatibility of the information expressed by a set of formulas with the background or domain knowledge can also be measured with this technique. In this way, Hunter's objections to many-valued paraconsistent logics as instruments for measuring (in)coherence are addressed.     

An analytic tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic

A tableau is a refutation-based decision procedure for a related logic, and is among the most popular proof procedures for modal logics. In this paper, we present a labelled tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic called TML⁺, which is obtained by adding a linear-time temporal logic onto a belief logic by the temporalisation method of Finger and Gabbay. We first establish the soundness and the completeness of the labelled tableau calculus based on the soundness and completeness results of its constituent logics. We then sketch a resolution-type proof procedure that complements the tableau calculus and also propose a model checking algorithm for TML⁺ based on the recent results for model checking procedures for temporalised logics. TML⁺ is suitable for formalising trust and agent beliefs and reasoning about their evolution for agent-based systems. Based on the logic TML⁺, the proposed labelled tableau calculus could be used for analysis, design and verification of agent-based systems operating in dynamic environments.     

Proper Semantics for Substructural Logics,from a Stalker Theoretic Point of View

We study filters in residuated structures that are associated with congruence relations (which we call -filters), and develop a semantical theory for general substructural logics based on the notion of primeness for those filters. We first generalize Stone’s sheaf representation theorem to general substructural logics and then define the primeness of -filters as being “points” (or stalkers) of the space, the spectrum, on which the representing sheaf is defined. Prime FL-filters will turn out to coincide with truth sets under various well known semantics for certain substructural logics. We also investigate which structural rules are needed to interpret each connective in terms of prime -filters in the same way as in Kripke or Routley-Meyer semantics. We may consider that the set of the structural rules that each connective needs in this sense reflects the difficulty of giving the meaning of the connective. A surprising discovery is that connectives , ⅋ of linear logic are linearly ordered in terms of the difficulty in this sense. Presented by Wojciech Buszkowski