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251.
Tobias Hoffmann 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1071-1090
Most acts of the will have a complex structure, i.e. wanting A in relation to B (e.g. as a means for an end or as a good for another person or for oneself). Duns Scotus makes the innovative claim that the will itself is responsible for the order of this complex structure. It does this by causing its own will-dependent relations, which he construes as a kind of mind-dependent relations (relationes rationis). By means of these relations, the will can arrange the terms of its will-acts independently of any arrangement proposed by the intellect. This not only allows the structure of one's will-act to diverge from the structure proposed by the intellect's final practical judgement; the structure of the will-act need not even have been considered by the intellect at all. One could, therefore, even will an inconceivable state of affairs. I argue that this theory, which scholars have virtually ignored, is fundamental to Scotus's account of divine, angelic, and human freedom, and that it follows necessarily from his voluntarist understanding of freedom. For Scotus, if the will could not structure its acts independently of the intellect, it would not be free.1 相似文献
252.
Jonathan Hecht 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):196-216
There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion. 相似文献
253.
Eric S. Stein 《Psychoanalytic Social Work》2013,20(2):116-131
This article examines Otto Rank's psychology and its profound implications for social work knowledge-building and practice. The paper begins with a brief biographical portrait, highlighting the significance of Rank's relationship and eventual break with Freud, and contextualizing the ideas that became the basis for the Functional Approach. We discuss Rank's conception of human functioning in the social environment, his influence on later theories, and a contemporary critique of Rank's ideas. The paper concludes with a discussion of Rank's contributions to the Functional Approach and to social work practice in general. 相似文献
254.
《Journal Of Applied School Psychology》2013,29(2):167-183
National education goals, content standards, and national tests are the hot topics of the day in educational reform. Special services personnel eventually will be faced with these issues, and can either be part of the discussion from the beginning, or wait and have to deal with someone else's decisions. In this article, we highlight some recent national and state educational reform activities and their probable implications for students with disabilities. We explain in brief the impetus behind the thrust toward an outcomesbased approach to education, and summarize the response of the National Center on Educational Outcomes for Students with Disabilities to this push. Possible ways in which special service providers can act to influence the focus on outcomes are described. 相似文献
255.
《Cognitive behaviour therapy》2013,42(4):222-234
This study evaluated an Internet-delivered, cognitive behavioral skills training program versus a treatment-as-usual (TAU) control condition targeting depression symptoms in young adults aged 18 to 24 years. Potential participants were mailed a recruitment brochure; if interested, they accessed the study website to complete an online consent and baseline assessment. Intervention participants could access the website at their own pace and at any time. Reminder postcards were mailed periodically to encourage return use of the intervention. The pure self-help intervention was delivered without contact with a live therapist. The primary depression outcome measure was the Patient Health Questionnaire, administered at 0, 5, 10, 16, and 32 weeks after enrollment. A small but significant between-group effect was found from Week 0 to Week 32 for the entire sample (N = 160, d = .20, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.00–0.50), with a moderate effect among women (n = 128, d .42, 95%C1 = 0.09–0.77). Greater depression reduction was associated with two measures of lower website usage, total minutes, and total number of page hits. Although intervention effects were modest, they were observed against a background of substantial TAU depression pharmacotherapy and psychosocial services. Highly disseminable, low-cost, and self-help interventions such as this have the potential to deliver a significant public health benefit. 相似文献
256.
David Svolba 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):219-225
J.S. Swindell has argued that Harry Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is ambiguous and that it fails to do justice to the full range of this psychological phenomenon. Building on her criticism of Frankfurt, Swindell offers an analysis of ambivalence which is supposed to clarify ambiguities in Frankfurt's analysis and reveal varieties of ambivalence that Frankfurt's analysis allegedly overlooks. In this brief reply, I argue that Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is neither ambiguous nor objectionably narrow. I conclude with remarks on Swindell's analysis of the relationship between ambivalence and weakness of the will. 相似文献
257.
Alfred Mele 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):101-111
I will argue that a desert-based justification for treating a person in a certain way is a justification that holds this treatment to be justified simply by what the person is like and what he or she has done, independent of (1) the fact that treating the person in this way will have good effects (or that treating people like him or her in this way will have such effects); (2) the fact that this treatment is called for by some (justified) institution or practice; or (3) the fact that the person could have avoided being subject to this treatment by choosing appropriately, and therefore cannot complain of it. I will explore the implications of this understanding of desert for the role of desert-based justifications of blame, punishment, and economic reward. 相似文献
258.
Nadine Elzein 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):212-225
I examine Manuel Vargas's revisionist justification for continuing with our responsibility-characteristic practices in the absence of basic desert. I query his claim that this justification need not depend on how we settle questions about the content of morality, arguing that it requires us to reject the Kantian principle that prohibits treating anyone merely as a means. I maintain that any convincing argument against this principle would have to be driven by concerns that arise within the sphere of moral theory itself, whereas Vargas's argument draws solely on concerns about the expensive metaphysics involved in a libertarian conception of freedom. I argue that this amounts not just to changing the concept of free will by stipulation, but also (more problematically) to changing our moral principles by stipulation. 相似文献
259.
Christopher Evan Franklin 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):44-58
Libertarianism has, seemingly, always been in disrepute among philosophers. While throughout history philosophers have offered different reasons for their dissatisfaction with libertarianism, one worry is recurring: namely a worry about luck. To many, it seems that if our choices and actions are undetermined, then we cannot control them in a way that allows for freedom and responsibility. My fundamental aim in this paper is to place libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible libertarian theory. I begin by arguing that Robert Kane's influential formulation of libertarianism actually generates an acute worry about luck, showing specifically that Kane's recipe for solving the problem of luck and his attendant conception of the location and role of indeterminism derived from it are deeply problematic. I then offer a reformulation of libertarianism – particularly a new conception of the location and role of indeterminism – that is capable of avoiding the problems that beset Kane's theory and that, I argue, places libertarians on a more promising track for formulating a defensible theory. 相似文献
260.
Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of (supposed) moral luck. 相似文献