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221.
Jonathan Hecht 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):196-216
There has been a recent surge of interest in ancient accounts of free will. It is surprising, then, that there have been virtually no attempts to discuss whether Plato had such an account. Those who have made an attempt quickly deny that such an account is present in the dialogues. I shall argue that if we draw a distinction between two notions of free will, it is plausible that some account of free will is, in fact, present in the dialogues, the Republic in particular. This is the first in depth search into the question and I demonstrate that the defender of a Platonic free will thesis has more resources than she first appears to. It also has the benefit of giving us an obvious source material for Augustine's discussion. 相似文献
222.
Ishtiyaque Haji Stefaan E. Cuypers 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):439-464
It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent’s awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings. 相似文献
223.
Eric S. Stein 《Psychoanalytic Social Work》2013,20(2):116-131
This article examines Otto Rank's psychology and its profound implications for social work knowledge-building and practice. The paper begins with a brief biographical portrait, highlighting the significance of Rank's relationship and eventual break with Freud, and contextualizing the ideas that became the basis for the Functional Approach. We discuss Rank's conception of human functioning in the social environment, his influence on later theories, and a contemporary critique of Rank's ideas. The paper concludes with a discussion of Rank's contributions to the Functional Approach and to social work practice in general. 相似文献
224.
《Journal Of Applied School Psychology》2013,29(2):167-183
National education goals, content standards, and national tests are the hot topics of the day in educational reform. Special services personnel eventually will be faced with these issues, and can either be part of the discussion from the beginning, or wait and have to deal with someone else's decisions. In this article, we highlight some recent national and state educational reform activities and their probable implications for students with disabilities. We explain in brief the impetus behind the thrust toward an outcomesbased approach to education, and summarize the response of the National Center on Educational Outcomes for Students with Disabilities to this push. Possible ways in which special service providers can act to influence the focus on outcomes are described. 相似文献
225.
《Cognitive behaviour therapy》2013,42(4):222-234
This study evaluated an Internet-delivered, cognitive behavioral skills training program versus a treatment-as-usual (TAU) control condition targeting depression symptoms in young adults aged 18 to 24 years. Potential participants were mailed a recruitment brochure; if interested, they accessed the study website to complete an online consent and baseline assessment. Intervention participants could access the website at their own pace and at any time. Reminder postcards were mailed periodically to encourage return use of the intervention. The pure self-help intervention was delivered without contact with a live therapist. The primary depression outcome measure was the Patient Health Questionnaire, administered at 0, 5, 10, 16, and 32 weeks after enrollment. A small but significant between-group effect was found from Week 0 to Week 32 for the entire sample (N = 160, d = .20, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.00–0.50), with a moderate effect among women (n = 128, d .42, 95%C1 = 0.09–0.77). Greater depression reduction was associated with two measures of lower website usage, total minutes, and total number of page hits. Although intervention effects were modest, they were observed against a background of substantial TAU depression pharmacotherapy and psychosocial services. Highly disseminable, low-cost, and self-help interventions such as this have the potential to deliver a significant public health benefit. 相似文献
226.
Jaegwon Kim 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):2-20
Abstract Action explanations that cite dynamic beliefs and desires cannot be modelled as causal explanations. The contents of dynamic psychological states cannot be treated as the causal antecendents to behaviour. Behavioural patterns cannot be explained in virtue of the patterns of operations performed upon the intentional antecedents to behaviour. Dynamic intentional states are persisting regulatory devices for behaviour that provide couplings with the environment. Behavioural patterns emerge from choice couplings rather than being produced by patterns for operating upon intentional antecendents to behaviour in cognition. 相似文献
227.
Markus Ernst Schlosser 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):3-21
According to what I call the reductive standard-causal theory of agency, the exercise of an agent's power to act can be reduced to the causal efficacy of agent-involving mental states and events. According to a non-reductive agent-causal theory, an agent's power to act is irreducible and primitive. Agent-causal theories have been dismissed on the ground that they presuppose a very contentious notion of causation, namely substance-causation. In this paper I will assume, with the proponents of the agent-causal approach, that substance-causation is possible, as I will argue against that theory on the ground that it fails as a theory of agency. I will argue that the non-reductive agent-causal theory fails to account for agency, because it fails to account for agential control: it cannot explain why the stipulated irreducible relation between the agent and an action constitutes the agent's exercise of control over the action. This objection, I will argue, applies to the agent-causal theory in particular, and to the non-reductive approach in general. 相似文献
228.
Situationism is, roughly, the thesis that normatively irrelevant environmental factors have a great impact on our behaviour without our being aware of this influence. Surprisingly, there has been little work done on the connection between situationism and moral luck. Given that it is often a matter of luck what situations we find ourselves in, and that we are greatly influenced by the circumstances we face, it seems also to be a matter of luck whether we are blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions in those circumstances. We argue that such situationist moral luck, as a variety of circumstantial moral luck, exemplifies a distinct and interesting type of moral luck. Further, there is a case to be made that situationist moral luck is perhaps more worrying than some other well-discussed cases of (supposed) moral luck. 相似文献
229.
Robert Francescotti 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):69-81
Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory. 相似文献
230.
David Svolba 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):219-225
J.S. Swindell has argued that Harry Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is ambiguous and that it fails to do justice to the full range of this psychological phenomenon. Building on her criticism of Frankfurt, Swindell offers an analysis of ambivalence which is supposed to clarify ambiguities in Frankfurt's analysis and reveal varieties of ambivalence that Frankfurt's analysis allegedly overlooks. In this brief reply, I argue that Frankfurt's analysis of ambivalence is neither ambiguous nor objectionably narrow. I conclude with remarks on Swindell's analysis of the relationship between ambivalence and weakness of the will. 相似文献