Unravelling intention: Distal intentions increase the subjective sense of agency

Experimental studies investigating the contribution of conscious intention to the generation of a sense of agency for one’s own actions tend to rely upon a narrow definition of intention. Often it is operationalized as the conscious sensation of wanting to move right before movement. Existing results and discussion are therefore missing crucial aspects of intentions, namely intention as the conscious sensation of wanting to move in advance of the movement. In the present experiment we used an intentional binding paradigm, in which we distinguished between immediate (proximal) intention, as usually investigated, and longer standing (distal) intention. The results showed that the binding effect was significantly enhanced for distal intentions compared to proximal intentions, indicating that the former leads to stronger sense of agency. Our finding provides empirical support for a crucial distinction between at least two types of intention when addressing the efficacy of conscious intentions.     

Embodied free will beliefs: Some effects of physical states on metaphysical opinions

The present research suggests that people’s bodily states affect their beliefs about free will. People with epilepsy and people with panic disorder, which are disorders characterized by a lack of control over one’s body, reported less belief in free will compared to people without such disorders (Study 1). The more intensely people felt sexual desire, physical tiredness, and the urge to urinate, the less they believed in free will (Study 2). Among non-dieters, the more intensely they felt hunger, the less they believed in free will. However, dieters showed a trend in the opposite direction (Study 3).     

MENTAL FREEDOM AND FREEDOM OF THE LOVING HEART: FREE WILL AND BUDDHIST MEDITATION

In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom, Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path and meditation is better understood as a process of habituation. This not only involves the dis-identification from mental and emotional content that Repetti discusses—and is commonly emphasized in modern presentations of mindfulness or insight (vipassanā) meditation—but also a transformation of the heart that is effected through the complementary psychological and somatic qualities associated with calm abiding (samatha) and concentration (samādhi) and emphasized in the Pali Nikāyas and commentaries.     

从客观决定性到意志自由——论行动哲学研究的方法论变革

如果说心灵哲学是当代西方学术界的“第一哲学”,那么,以“客观决定性VS．意志自由”为核心问题的行动哲学研究,则是这种哲学研究在当今最重要的组成部分和基本发展趋势,因而只有在研究客观决定性和意志自由的相互关系方面取得了根本性突破,行动哲学和心灵哲学研究才有可能取得实质性进展。不过,由于绝大多数研究者都没有通过对惟理智主义研究方法论的深刻批判反思而达到方法论的自觉,所以,只有真正实现了对由基本倾向、思维方式和研究模式构成的研究方法论的彻底变革,这样的突破才是可能的;本文认为,以社会个体生成论彻底扬弃和取代基于抽象个体的预成论,是实现这种变革的富有建设性意义的学术理路。     

Putting the lie on the control condition for moral responsibility

In “Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment” Angela Smith defends her nonvoluntarist theory of moral responsibility against the charge that any such view is shallow because it cannot capture the depth of judgments of responsibility. Only voluntarist positions can do this since only voluntarist positions allow for control. I argue that Smith is able to deflect the voluntarists’ criticism, but only with further resources. As a voluntarist, I also concede that Smith’s thesis has force, and I close with a compromise position, one that allows for direct moral responsibility for the nonvoluntary, but also incorporates a reasonable control condition.

The Last Will and Testament in Literature: Rupture,Rivalry, and Sometimes Rapprochement from Middlemarch to Lemony Snicket

Although the psychological literature on the last will and testament is sparse, authors of fiction and memoir have filled the gap, writing in rich detail about the impact of wills on families. Henry James, George Eliot, J. R. Ackerley, and others reveal that a will is not only a legal document but a microcosm of family life: a coded and nonnegotiable message from the will's writer to its intended readers, the heirs, delivered at a stressful time and driving home the truth that options for discussion between testator and heirs are now gone, all factors which may intensify the ambivalence of grief and stall its resolution. Among the problems the authors chronicle: reinvigorated sibling rivalries, vindictive testators, and the revelation of traumatic family secrets. Writers also demonstrate how contemporary social factors, such as divorce, second families, and geographic distance between family members, may complicate wills and ensuing family relations. Exemplary wills, or will‐like documents, appear in fiction by Maria Katzenbach and Marilynne Robinson, allowing the living to make rapprochements with the dead, and pointing to testamentary strategies clinicians might develop to lead to a resolution of grief. The depth of these writers' accounts allows clinicians to imagine points at which they might productively intervene in matters pertaining to a will.     

Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-compatibilism vs. Anti-fundamentalism

The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons, Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency are then raised and rejected.

论自省

自省具有双重源头:道德感情--或道德志向--和道德智慧.因此,一个人要做到经常且深刻的自省,一方面,必须提高自己的道德认识和道德智慧,树立诸如"美德乃是每个人获得幸福的必要条件"的道德信念;另一方面,必须扩充和强大"做一个有美德的人"的道德欲望、道德感情和道德志向,立志做一个君子、仁人乃至圣人.     

ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND COSMOLOGY: A BUDDHIST PERSPECTIVE

Abstract The ground for a Buddhist environmental ethic is rooted in one of the earliest formulations of Buddhist teaching, the principle of dependent co‐origination. This concept provides an ecological perspective where nothing exists in and of itself but only as a context of relations, a nexus of factors whose peculiar concatenation alone determines the origin, perpetuation, or cessation of that thing. The primacy of dependent co‐origination is consistent with the subsequent development of Mahayana Buddhism and its concept of Tathata (wondrous Being), as understood through the complementary doctrines of the Tathagatagarbha (embryonic consciousness) and the Alayavijnana (Absolute Consciousness). Together, these specify the ontological and epistemological framework for understanding wondrous Being as the movement toward its own self‐revelation: it comes to recognize itself as the essential nature of all things in and through the human mind, which is grounded on and informed by it. Through such a cosmology, coherent with the classical ideals of a bodhisattva, Buddhism reinvigorates the human in an ethic of mindful awareness of, reflection upon, and care for life in its entirety, as the species that can identify the integrity of the whole in the richness of its diverse particularities.