Eating Behavior—Choice or Reconstruction of Past Experience? A Randomized Clinical Trial of Changing Eating Intentions of Healthy Adults Through Hypnotic Suggestions

Recent meta-analyses have shown that psychological interventions have a small to medium effect on weight loss. We propose here a different approach to changing eating intentions. According to the Free Will literature, people decide to act before they acknowledge it, and they decide based on the reconstruction of previous experiences. The action can thus be inhibited immediately (max 100 ms) after awareness. We wanted to test if intervention based on this model, using hypnotic suggestions, can effectively change the intentions of eating. This study aims to identify which format of hypnotic suggestion can be more effective in changing eating intentions regarding high-calorie foods. Therefore, 88 healthy adult participants randomized in four groups received one session of hypnotic induction and suggestions or placebo. We measured the eating intentions through a computer task in which participants could choose pictures of low and high caloric food before, during, and after hypnosis. For the within-subject effect, results showed that two types of hypnotic suggestions significantly impacted the intentions of eating on high-calorie foods with large-effect, namely Cognitive Rehearsal (d = 0.81, p < .001) and Memory Substitution (d = 0.82, p < .001). After controlling for pretest ratings, we found a significant between-effect: the Cognitive Rehearsal group differed significantly from the Control in terms of intentions of eating (d = 0.85, p < .05). We conclude that hypnosis with Cognitive Rehearsal suggestions can help to positively impact the intentions of eating.     

Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility.     

A Strawsonian look at desert

P.F. Strawson famously argued that reactive attitudes and ordinary moral practices justify moral assessments of blame, praise, and punishment. Here we consider whether Strawson's approach can illuminate the concept of desert. After reviewing standard attempts to analyze this concept and finding them lacking, we suggest that to deserve something is to justifiably receive a moral assessment in light of certain criteria – in particular, eligibility criteria (a subject's properties that make the subject principally eligible for moral assessments) and assignment criteria (particulars about the subject, act, and circumstances that justify assessments such as blame in a particular case). Strawson's analysis of the ordinary attitudes and practices of moral assessment hints at these criteria but does not unequivocally ground a notion of desert. Following Strawson's general naturalistic approach, we show that recent psychological research on folk concepts and practices regarding freedom, moral responsibility, and blame illuminates how people actually arrive at moral assessments, thus revealing the very eligibility criteria and assignment criteria we suggest ground a concept of desert. By pushing the Strawsonian line even further than Strawson did, by empirically investigating actual moral practice and folk understandings, we can illuminate desert and lend credence to Strawson's general anti-metaphysical position.     

Acceptance as a Positive Attitude

Abstract

We argue in favor of the adaptive value of acceptance and that it deserves a definite status within the ‘positive paradigm’. Acceptance currently suffers from ambiguous connotations because of its lack of optimistic biases and its similarity to resignation. We endeavor to show that acceptance and resignation are distinct attitudes by exploring their relationships with various phenomena–frustration, disappointment, expectation, positive thinking, replanning, and accuracy. The resulting distinguishing features of acceptance–thriving versus returning to baseline; realistic optimism versus hopelessness; persistence and flexible replanning versus disengagement–are crucial for adaptive coping, and appear to be in keeping with the positive paradigm.     

Nietzsche's Naturalized Aestheticism

This essay seeks to overcome the divide that has emerged in recent scholarship between Alexander Nehamas’s reading of Nietzsche as an aestheticist who eschews the dogmatism implicit in the scientific project and Brian Leiter's reading of Nietzsche as a hard-nosed naturalist whose project is continuous with the natural sciences. It is argued that Nietzsche turns to the natural sciences to justify a relationalist ontology that not only eliminates metaphysical concepts such as ‘being’ and ‘things-in-themselves’, but also can be linked to key components of the aestheticist reading. As a result, Nietzsche's naturalism should not be understood as opposing important features of his aestheticism. Instead, Nietzsche's project should be understood in terms of a naturalized aestheticism that rejects the metaphysical-moral interpretation of existence espoused by philosophers such as Plato, Kant, and Schopenhauer.     

Priming Effects and Free Will

Abstract

I argue that the empirical literature on priming effects does not warrant nor suggest the conclusion, drawn by prominent psychologists such as J. A. Bargh, that we have no free will or less free will than we might think. I focus on a particular experiment by Bargh – the ‘elderly’ stereotype case in which subjects that have been primed with words that remind them of the stereotype of the elderly walk on average slower out of the experiment’s room than control subjects – and I show that we cannot say that subjects cannot help walking slower or that they are not free in doing do. I then illustrate how these cases can be reconciled and normalized within a Davidsonian theory of action to show that, in walking slower, subjects are acting intentionally. My argument applies across various experiments, including those of goal priming. In the final section I argue that the only cases in which priming effects are efficacious are so-called Buridan cases.     

Happy Danes and Deep Incarnation

The new Copenhagen School of Deep Incarnation posits that, in Jesus Christ, God has become incarnate and therefore present “in, with, and under” all physical and biological processes. This claim raises the issue of “compatibilism,” according to which divine action and creaturely action are compatible, and “incompatibilism,” according to which divine action must be absent to allow for free creaturely action. Niels Henrik Gregersen, representing the Copenhagen School, affirms both compatibilism at the quantum level of physical activity and incompatibilism at the level of nature's self‐organization. This article points out the incoherence of this position along with the positions proffered by process theologians and kenotic theologians.     

Neuronal correlates of decisions to speak and act: Spontaneous emergence and dynamic topographies in a computational model of frontal and temporal areas

The neural mechanisms underlying the spontaneous, stimulus-independent emergence of intentions and decisions to act are poorly understood. Using a neurobiologically realistic model of frontal and temporal areas of the brain, we simulated the learning of perception–action circuits for speech and hand-related actions and subsequently observed their spontaneous behaviour. Noise-driven accumulation of reverberant activity in these circuits leads to their spontaneous ignition and partial-to-full activation, which we interpret, respectively, as model correlates of action intention emergence and action decision-and-execution. Importantly, activity emerged first in higher-association prefrontal and temporal cortices, subsequently spreading to secondary and finally primary sensorimotor model-areas, hence reproducing the dynamics of cortical correlates of voluntary action revealed by readiness-potential and verb-generation experiments. This model for the first time explains the cortical origins and topography of endogenous action decisions, and the natural emergence of functional specialisation in the cortex, as mechanistic consequences of neurobiological principles, anatomical structure and sensorimotor experience.     

A critique of Vihvelin's Three-fold Classification

In this essay, I argue for the rejection of Vihvelin's ‘Three-fold Classification’ (3-FC), a nonstandard taxonomy of free-will compatibilism, incompatibilism, and impossibilism. Vihvelin is right that the standard taxonomy of these views is inadequate, and that a new taxonomy is needed to clarify the free-will debate. Significantly, Vihvelin notes that the standard formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ does not capture the historically popular view that deterministic laws pose a threat to free will. Vihvelin's proposed solution is to redefine ‘incompatibilism.’ However, Vihvelin's formal definition of ‘incompatibilism’ is flawed according to her own arguments. In addition, Vihvelin's characterization of ‘compatibilism’ is (at best) incomplete, and at least two important free-will views are missing from her proposed taxonomy. Given the problems with Vihvelin's arguments for 3-FC, her novel view of the dialectic between the major free-will views lacks support.