Assessing the process of desensitization therapy: Five practical measures

Assessment of phobic behavior has included self-report, physiological, and in vivobehavioral measures. While self-report measures are convenient, they suffer from subject bias and a low predictive validity. Physiological and in vivobehavioral measures are often too cumbersome to implement in standard clinical practice. The current study investigated the validity of five convenient measures of phobic behavior during the process of desensitization therapy. Responses of 14 clinically phobic patients were compared on phobic and neutral scenes presented within the context of systematic desensitization therapy. Phobic scenes resulted in less clarity of scene visualization, a longer latency to clear scene visualization, higher subjective units of discomfort (SUDs) at clear visualization, a longer latency to relaxation, and higher SUDs at relaxation. The measures seemed to reflect accurately the process and stages of desensitization therapy and showed low to high intercorrelations. The pragmatic value of these measures is discussed, as well as suggestions for future validational research.     

Prima facie and seeming duties

Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do.After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.I've been lucky to discuss parts of this project with among others Jeff Horty, Paul McNamara, Alasdair MacIntyre, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Michael Slote. Thanks, too, to Henry Prakken and the reviewers for Studia Logica     

An Unfinished Debate: What Are the Aims of Religion and Science?

I discuss the kinds of fundamental questions that must be addressed by people who develop theories about how religion and science are (or should be) related. After categorizing these questions as axiological, epistemological, ontological, or semantic, I focus on those that concern the goals of religion and science (the axiological issues). By distinguishing between epistemic and practical goals, individual and collective goals, and manifest and latent goals, I identify seven axiological questions. The various answers that religion/science theorists give or presuppose to these axiological questions help to explain why such deep, ongoing differences continue among them.     

SCIENTISM, INTERPRETATION, AND CRITICISM

Abstract. What is the relationship between natural science, social science, and religion? The dominant paradigm in contemporary social science is scientism, the attempt to apply the methods of natural science to the study of society. However, scientism is problematic: it rests on a conception of natural science that cannot be sustained. Natural scientific understanding emerges from an instrumental and objectifying relation to the world; it is oriented toward control and manipulation of the physical world. Social-scientific understanding, by contrast, must begin with a practical and meaningful relation to the world: it is oriented toward the mediation of values and objective possibilities in the social world. Social science is therefore a form of practical reason based on objective claims. But while social-scientific understanding starts with interpretation, its possibilities by no means end there. In particular, by developing abstract and objectified models of society as a system, social science opens existing social organization to critical reflection. Religion, by contrast, is a form of speculative reason about ultimate values, based on subjective claims of religious experience. Social science nevertheless shares with religion an orientation toward values and concern with the “good life.”     

Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

For obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer.     

Hume’s better argument for motivational skepticism

On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate an impulse. This better argument is here developed and defended. Two lines of objection to it can be anticipated: (1) that reason actually can generate impulsive force, based on contents of its normative judgments and (2) that reason neither can nor needs to generate an impulse, since the actions of rational agents are not determined by forceful impulses of desire, as Hume supposed. These objections are answered by pointing out their unsatisfying consequences.     

Argumentation: The Mixed Game

The paper introduces a new model of argumentation, the Mixed Game Model, that no longer separates rule-governed competence from actual performance but starts from human beings and their ability of competence-in-performance. Human beings are able to orientate themselves in ever-changing surroundings and to negotiate diverging views in argumentative action games. Argumentation is thus described as a mixed game played by human beings according to principles of probability. These principles include constitutive, regulative and executive principles. Constitutive Principles focus on the basic components of the game, that is, action, dialogue, and coherence as the interplay of different communicative means. Regulative Principles mediate between correlated human abilities and interests. Executive Principles guide the sequencing of action according to cognitive strategies. The mixed game no longer rests on pre-established harmony but describes performance as a non-equilibrial process of negotiation that mediates between order and disorder and is based on the integration of various parameters such as rationality, reason, persuasion and emotion. How the model works is exemplified by an analysis of part of a debate in the European Parliament.     

History and Method of Charles V. Gerkin’s Pastoral Theology: Toward an Identity-Embodied and Community-Embedded Pastoral Theology,Part II. Method

The purpose of this article is to explore the legacy of Charles V. Gerkin’s pastoral theology and to construct a method of pastoral theology. In Part I, I will trace within a larger context of pastoral theology the history of Gerkin’s pastoral theology since his early clinical praxis. In Part II, I will explore his method of developing pastoral theology and construct a renewed critical and constructive method of pastoral theology, reflecting on the implications of exploring the history and method of his pastoral theology.     

Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously. Arguing for an Institutional Turn. Introduction

Discussions of the relations between religions, society, politics, and the state in recent political philosophy are characterized, firstly, by a strong US American bias focusing on limitations of religious arguments in public debate. Even if the restriction or radical exclusion of religious reasons from public debate has recently been extensively criticized, secularist interpretations of liberal-democratic constitutions still prevail. Here it is argued that both strong secularism and weak or second order secularism are counterproductive for many reasons. Secondly, separationist interpretations of state-church relations are predominant, even if the severe wall of separation is criticized more often nowadays. Here it is argued that there are more and more interesting options than either separationism or accommodationism, that we should not exclusively focus at the constitutional relations between state and churches but address the full reciprocal relationship between society, culture, politics, nation, state and (organized) religions, and that we need more historical and comparative perspectives for the required institutionalist turn in political theory in order to overcome the obstacles inherent in predominant American political philosophy. The articles included in this volume are first, modest steps in this new direction.