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61.
Yasuo Deguchi 《Topoi》2006,25(1-2):33-38
This paper contrasts and illustrates two types of breakthroughs in philosophy; i.e., external and internal ones. Both are
made possible through its application to a newfield. In the external breakthrough, a new field is discovered by such factors
without philosophy as
encounters with different traditions of thought and advance in technology. In the internal one, a new field is brought into
attention by critical examination of one or another assumption within philosophy that has once dismissed the field as too
trivial or insignificant to be its proper subject. Based on this distinction, a research guideline for philosophy is proposed
that one must always seek the possibility of its internal breakthrough. It is also suggested that the philosophy of science
and epistemology can be innovated internally when they are applied to a new field, that is, statistics. Finally the distinction
between pure and applied philosophy is reinterpreted in the light of the internal breakthrough. 相似文献
62.
Allen Wood 《Topoi》2006,25(1-2):133-136
Philosophical thinking, in the historically original sense, is simply the human mind in operation, unaided by anything supernatural
and unfettered by any human authority or any procedure for reaching some pre-given end. This means that “philosophy” originally
included far more than it does now, including all the natural sciences, as well as rational reflection on society, history,
and art. What this means for us now is that philosophy must be an essentially outward-facing discipline, open to others. Most
importantly, it needs now to be open to the sciences, to practical social reflection, and to its own history. But what philosophy
brings to all its reflections is above all a spirit of critical reflection, respect for evidence and argument, and a ruthless
honesty that demands of people that they form their beliefs and views of life according to the best reasons and information
they have, rather than forming their views according to their wishes or prejudices, or letting them be dictated by authorities
or social traditions. In this sense, we are living in an unphilosophical, or even anti-philosophical, age, but this makes
it all the more important for philosophy to continue to do its work. 相似文献
63.
Slavoj Žižek 《Topoi》2006,25(1-2):137-142
There are not only true or false solutions, there are also false questions. The task of philosophy is not to provide answers
or solutions, but to submit to critical analysis the questions themselves, to make us see how the very way we perceive a problem
is an obstacle to its solution. This holds especially for today’s public debates on ecological threats, on lack of faith,
on democracy and the “war on terror”, in which the “unknown knowns”, the silent presuppositions we are not aware of, determine
our acts. 相似文献
64.
Andrew Reisner 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):257-272
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e.
the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative,
but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons
for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view
in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the
view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
相似文献
Andrew ReisnerEmail: |
65.
Jennie Louise 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(4):345-364
The ‘Wrong Kind of Reason’ problem for buck-passing theories (theories which hold that the normative is explanatorily or conceptually
prior to the evaluative) is to explain why the existence of pragmatic or strategic reasons for some response to an object
does not suffice to ground evaluative claims about that object. The only workable reply seems to be to deny that there are reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ for responses, and to argue that these are really reasons for wanting, trying, or intending to
have that response. In support of this, it is pointed out that awareness of pragmatic or strategic considerations, unlike
awareness of reasons of the ‘right kind’, are never sufficient by themselves to produce the responses for which they are reasons.
I argue that this phenomenon cannot be used as a criterion for distinguishing reasons-for-a-response from reasons-for-wanting-to-have-a-response.
I subsequently investigate the possibility of basing this distinction on a claim that the responses in question (e.g. admiration
or desire) are themselves inherently normative; I conclude that this approach is also unsuccessful. Hence, the ‘direct response’
phenomenon cannot be used to rule out the possibility of pragmatic or strategic reasons for responses; and the rejection of
such reasons therefore cannot be used to circumvent the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem.
相似文献
Jennie LouiseEmail: |
66.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(2):169-179
Practical reasons, roughly, are reasons to have our desires and goals, and to do what might secure these goals. I argue for
the view that lack of freedom to do otherwise undermines the truth of judgments of practical reason. Thus, assuming that determinism
expunges alternative possibilities, determinism undercuts the truth of such judgments. I propose, in addition, that if practical
reason is associated with various values in a specified way, then determinism precludes such values owing to determinism's
imperiling practical reason.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
67.
Vaughn E. Huckfeldt 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):23-41
The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized
as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the
distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a
case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case
study demonstrates first, the possibility of categorical agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility
has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans.
相似文献
Vaughn E. HuckfeldtEmail: |
68.
This paper focuses on recent debates over the nature ofliberalism and its central feature of reason, both inside and outside ofeducational philosophy. Central ideas from Jonathan and Hirst contributeas do those from Rawls, Gadamer, Wittgenstein, Taylor, and Ackermantoward a less traditional contextualized and contingent view. 相似文献
69.
人与人的和谐是和谐社会的“底线要求”,人与社会的和谐是和谐社会的核心所在,而人与自然的和谐是和谐社会的基本前提。人与自然和谐集中体现为环境公正。它首先是指人与自然物种之间的种际公正,具体体现为两个维度的公正:在空间维度上,要促进国际公正、族际公正、域际公正、群际公正;在时间维度上具有代际公正意识。 相似文献
70.
Jon Moran 《The Journal of religious ethics》2006,34(3):421-437
In Evangelium Vitae Pope John Paul II calls for a renewal of culture to combat the culture of death. He criticizes various aspects of a pluralistic, liberal society—a type of society that he claims is based on moral relativism and a view of democracy that becomes a substitute for moral law. He maintains that such a view trivializes moral choice. In this essay I argue that John Rawls's notion of a liberal society as an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines can avoid relativism while allowing for reasonable debate among opposed positions. While Rawls maintains that comprehensive doctrines, including religions, should employ a form of public reason that is not a unique feature of any one comprehensive doctrine, I argue that this requirement is too strong. One is often justified in appealing to features of comprehensive doctrines other than one's own, features that are unique to the doctrines themselves. Such an appeal does not pretend to be neutral as public reason would seem to be. In the final section of the paper I discuss some suggestions made by the Pope regarding actions in civil society that are independent of debates about legal change and suggest some ways in which they might contribute to desired cultural transformation. 相似文献