Ethos and Habituation in Aristotle

This paper is concerned with Aristotle’s theory of habituation, focusing on the following three issues: (1) the relation between habit and reason, (2) human nature and habituation, and (3) the roles of family and politics in habituation. Aristotle’s theory of habituation has been a topic of interest recently. Yet so far, most debates about this topic are about the first issue. This paper will bring in the second and the third issues, in order to provide a complete picture of the theory. To be more specific, the paper seeks to better understand the following three claims of Aristotle, corresponding to the three issues mentioned above: (1) “We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE 1103a34–b1) . (2) “We are adapted by nature to receive virtues, and are made perfect by habit” (teleuioumenois de dia tou ethous) (1103a25–26). (3) “One’s own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government” (1142a9–11).     

Applied Logic without Psychologism

Logic is a celebrated representation language because of its formal generality. But there are two senses in which a logic may be considered general, one that concerns a technical ability to discriminate between different types of individuals, and another that concerns constitutive norms for reasoning as such. This essay embraces the former, permutation-invariance conception of logic and rejects the latter, Fregean conception of logic. The question of how to apply logic under this pure invariantist view is addressed, and a methodology is given. The pure invariantist view is contrasted with logical pluralism, and a methodology for applied logic is demonstrated in remarks on a variety of issues concerning non-monotonic logic and non-monotonic inference, including Charles Morgan’s impossibility results for non-monotonic logic, David Makinson’s normative constraints for non-monotonic inference, and Igor Douven and Timothy Williamson’s proposed formal constraints on rational acceptance.     

康德实践理性的事实概念及其对自由的证明

康德实践理性的事实概念指的是道德律或道德律的意识,而道德律本身实际上是道德律的意识。道德律是某种自身肯定的东西,它作为事实肯定了纯粹实践理性的客观实在性,并通过理性的这一积极的概念,证明了它自身在实践上的客观实在性。正是通过道德律这一事实,在思辨哲学那里只具有消极性的自由的原因性的概念,在实践哲学中获得了积极的规定,也成为了一个“事实”。     

发展:从“硬道理”、“第一要务”到“科学发展”

改革开放的三十年所取得的成功的经验之一,就是找到一个适合中国国情的发展观,即从“发展是硬道理”到“发展是第一要务”从而确立了科学发展观。“发展是硬道理”向我们表明,在发展过程中,“软道理”要服从“硬道理”,无论在何种情况下,我们都是坚持马克思主义历史观,把经济发展看作是社会发展的基础,同时在经济发展中兼顾其他各个方面的发展。     

康德哲学与企业文化

本文分析了中国当前企业文化的三种类型即官商、儒商和佛商,指出佛商流行于华南一带,是目前最有生机活力的一种企业文化,但这种生机活力是由于解构一切规范带来的,具有投机性,不具有积极建设性,对市场经济规律没有自觉意识,尤其对于赚钱的目的性不明确,背后受本能欲望的支配;康德哲学和西方基督教文化在这方面的启示是能够提供一种终极关怀,实践理性的道德自律为人的生存指明了一种理想目标。因此,当代企业文化的发展前景依赖于个人自由意志的确立和建立理性的规范,赚钱的目的应归结到完成自由人格。     

关于高校的实验与实践教学：基于教育心理学理论的思考

对于高校教育,运算学习方法多指实验、实践和学生科研活动,学生通过从事的实验、实践和科研活动来实现陈述性知识向程序性知识的转化,学习评价应着重考核学生对知识的理解和运用所学知识去解决问题的能力。本文阐述了突出实验／实践训练的高校教学设计的设想,并强调了应将各种教学实验类型有机地组合,给予学生先进、实用的实验技术的训练,以及在实验／实践教学中运用交互式的教学方法。     

医疗纠纷泛化原因多视角分析

随着社会的发展,医疗纠纷日趋增多,成为各卫生部门的最大难题,是继医疗改革之后的又一备受社会各界关注的热门话题,医患关系成为社会最不和谐的声音。医患关系是在社会政治、经济、文化、法律等因素共同作用,围绕“治病”所形成的道德、诚信、契约、经济利益关系,通过分析现代医患关系的变化,探讨医疗纠纷增多的原因。     

大学生的自立人格与现实问题解决

为了探讨大学生的自立人格能否影响其现实问题解决的质量,对个人/人际高低分组的共30名大学生进行了现实问题解决访谈,结果发现:个人/人际自立高分组被试在访谈中解决个人/人际问题的质量显著高于低分组。为了探索自立人格与现实问题解决能力的关系,使用《青少年学生自立人格量表》和《大学生日常问题解决能力调查问卷》对101名有效被试进行了调查,结果发现:自立人格的多个维度都与日常问题解决能力的维度有显著相关,自立人格的多个相关维度是日常问题解决相关能力的有效预测变量。两个研究的结果支持了研究假设:自立人格利于个体对现实生活问题的解决;自立人格包含或涉及个体解决现实问题的能力因素。此外,自立人格影响现实生活问题解决的具体特点和机制还值得进一步研究。     

Acting for reasons: Reply to Dancy

This paper argues that we need to distinguish between two different ideas of a reason: first, the idea of a premise or assumption, from which a person’s action or deliberation can proceed; second, the idea of a fact by which a person can be guided, when he modifies his thought or behaviour in some way. It argues further that if we have the first idea in mind, one can act for the reason that p regardless of whether it is the case that p, and regardless of whether one believes that p. But if we have the second idea in mind, one cannot act for the reason that p unless one knows that p. The last part of the paper briefly indicates how the second idea of a reason can contribute to a larger argument, showing that it is better to conceive of knowledge as a kind of ability than as a kind of belief.     

Temptation and Deliberation

There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M₁, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M₁. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases. My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on an important source of frustration in collective decision-making.