Transformations of the Concept of Reason

This outline of the transformations of the concept of reason is based on the idea that this can be presented/illustrated by means of a historical sketch of the criticism of reason, because all essential differentiations in that concept can be understood as consequences of critical arguments. In Kant's work, the Critique of Speculative Reason reaches its first conclusion; it was followed by a Critique of Critical Reason by Hegel and his followers, and Schopenhauer established a new type of critical argument: the Critique of Functional Reason which dominates the radical criticism of reason in our time. This radical criticism is the great challenge for the philosophy of reason today.     

Rawls's Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough

Res Publica - What sorts of reasons are i) required and ii) morally acceptable when citizens in a pluralist liberal democracy undertake to resolve pressing political issues? This paper presents and...     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.     

All on the Same Side: Reflections on the Dialogue Between Science and Religion

The 'war' between religion and science is winding down, creating new opportunities for fruitful dialogue. The foundations of indirect religion-science dialogue, where the perspectives of the two disciplines illuminate some third subject, are not well established. A detailed comparison of the Roman Catholic bishops' dialogues and a similar program within the American Association for the Advancement of Science illustrates the variety in formalscience-religion interactions and reveals much about the promise, achievements, and limitations of different approaches. Success depends in large part on controlling the diversity of the dialogue group, choosing topics carefully, and adopting positive and cooperative attitudes.     

Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.     

The Enlightenment That Won't Go Away: Modernity's Crux

The Critical Process unleashed by the Enlightenment and endlessly resharpening itself to this day has mortally wounded the God of Deism, maybe also of theism, even of Christianity. A temptation of Christian theology is to retreat in denial into an updated version of Deism, seemingly granting full license to modern science but only so long as it does not impugn God's love. The alternative here proposed is to ride out The Critical Process, in fact to encourage it, all the way into modernity's crux: How can a design that is not benign still be divine? The Christian reply is: through a real death of God and of ourselves as well, and through resurrections beginning now, thus freeing The Critical Process from the illusion of insuring our survival and, instead, for the honest Enlightenment task of merely telling the truth.     

突破现代理性之限——生态伦理的困境与出路

生态伦理以追求人与自然关系的和谐相处为目的,但人与自然关系的恶化主要是现代社会的一个现象,而其深层原因则在于人类思维方式的变化———现代理性的产生,所以,真正的生态伦理就必须从思维方式入手,来解决人与自然的矛盾。     

Methodological Challenges in the Study of Emotions in Politics and How to Deal With Them

This introductory article to the special issue zooms in on the literature on political emotions with a specific focus on methodological questions of “how to study” political emotions. To the extent that methodological matters are addressed in the extant literature, the associated challenges are often portrayed as a clash between social science and natural science disciplines, a clash frequently illustrated by the meeting between political science and neuroscience. Rather than being a clash between academic disciplines, this article argues that many of the methodological challenges facing emotional research have their origin in scholars' diverse views on the relationship between themselves as researchers and political emotions as a research object. In the light of this acknowledgment, the article encircles and discusses the methodological challenges associated with three key conceptual distinctions between: (1) individual and collective emotions, (2) emotions and reason, and between (3) involuntary political emotions and the strategic usage of political emotions. Using the contributions to this special issue as illustrations, the article argues in favor of moving beyond mutually exclusive dichotomies regarding these conceptual distinctions and offers pathways for dealing with current methodological challenges to emotional research. It points to methodological pluralism, transparency, and context‐sensitive research strategies.     

Portraying reflection: the contents of student teachers’ reflection on personal practical theories and practicum experience*

This research focused on personal practical theories of Finnish student teachers, on how they argued for them and what they contained, and the data were analysed using Korthagen’s ‘onion’ model of reflection (e.g. 2004). The framework of this research consists of reflection and personal practical theories (PPTs). Personal practical theories are viewed as important for a teacher’s identity: they guide the teacher’s work, action, and reactions before, during, and after a teaching event. Reflecting on teaching, then again, has been one of the most significant issues and focus of numerous studies for several decades. This is a case study of six elementary school student teachers, who had constructed their PPTs before the practicum. We examined their reflections using the onion model of reflection, according to which a person reflects on different levels. The data were collected by interviewing the student teachers after their final practicum. The results show that most of their reflection focused on Environment and Behaviour, so it was located mostly in the outer layers of the onion model. The categorization of the reflection also showed that Competence was the smallest category.     

Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.