Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.     

The Effect of Researchers' Focus on Interpretation of Diversity Data

Abstract

The tendency for intercultural researchers to focus primarily on cultural differences instead of both differences and similarities may reflect the emphasis of current statistical methodology toward cultural distance instead of cultural overlap. The authors proposed the cultural similarity index as a way of assessing the extent of communalities between 2 groups. The authors (a) analyzed research (T. Cox, S. Lobel, & P. L. McLeod, 1991; Y. F. Niemann & J. Dovidio, 1998) that placed a primary emphasis on differences, (b) presented alternative insights gained from a focus on similarities, and (c) explored the implications of a research focus on both cultural differences and similarities.     

Priority and Time

There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its critics.     

Four tasks for forward-looking global ethics

Our challenge for the twenty-first century consists in showing how to construct a global ethics and in trying to discover a rational foundation for it, which may be used as guidance for action and as a norm for the criticism of specific situations. I argue that four tasks must be accomplished to construct a global ethics: (1) Construct that global governance or that world government that makes cosmopolitan citizenship possible. (2) Foster the joint work of bioethics, economic and business ethics, and development ethics – areas of applied ethics, each one of which on its own has reached the global level. (3) Discover a rational basis for a global ethics, which has a universal normative force, but assumes cultural differences. (4) Develop and promote a dilaogical ethics of cordial reason, which renders one capable of compassion and care.     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.     

Sacred space: function and mission from a sociological and theological perspective

Drawing on interviews with 21 individuals who attend religious services mainly for religious holidays and rites of passage and case studies with a Christian and Missionary Alliance congregation and a Roman Catholic congregation, we offer a sociological and theological discussion of ‘sacred space’. Sociologically, we argue that sacred space is an important reason for why annual attenders attend religious services when they do, mainly because sacred space helps to centre them with some semblance of meaning and direction, transition and transformation in life. Theologically, we show that church leaders, when thinking about and creating sacred space relative to the mission of their church, give importance to individuals' religious journeys and transformation. However, they appear to give greater ascendancy to the missional belief that sacred space should facilitate horizontal relationships between humans more so than vertical relationships between humans and God.     

TheoArtistry: practical perspectives on ‘theologically informed art’

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the TheoArtistry Composers’ Scheme (2016–2018), in light of the developing concept of ‘theologically informed art’. Based at the Institute for Theology, Imagination, and the Arts (ITIA) (University of St Andrews), the scheme partnered emerging theologians and composers to create six new choral settings of Hebrew Bible ‘annunciations’. In addition to producing new music, the project became a practical touchstone for reinvigorating dialogues between theologians and practising artists, as well as Christians and non-Christians. First, the author assesses the scheme’s contributions to the study and practice of theologically informed art in the future. Second, she outlines some methodological issues associated with the scheme’s unique breadth of participants. Finally, she assesses ecclesiological and theological ambiguities within the scheme. The author argues that clarifying these ambiguities expands horizons for future collaborations in theologically informed art.     

Facing the third millennium: An evolutionary crisis

We are witnessing the birth of the first global civilization on our planet earth due to the accelerative progress of science and technology. This is also accompanied by a crisis in health care, pollution and other environmental disasters, a rising wave of violence and crime, stresses due to globalization, and so on. Recently, we formulated “An Action Plan for Human Survival” (Reference 24).

This article explores in depth the challenges in bringing about a peaceful transition to a global civilization. It explores global civilization, environmental crisis and population. It reveals that the stresses generated by globalization and environmental crisis cannot be resolved by dualistic thought, or concepts, or ideals, or intellectual constructions; as these are sterile in bringing mutation in the human psyche. We see that the emergence of global consciousness is not keeping pace with the globalization, and it is feared that globalization may turn out to be abortive and ultimately self‐destructive.

The crisis is not political, or economic, or social. It is evolutionary in character. We have to explore nature's evolutionary impulse. The challenge is to resolve the “crisis of perception,” or to allow the mutation to happen in the mind‐brain system. The only technology for radical transformation or mutation of human psyche is purification or deconditioning of the human psyche. This leads to new relationship between man and man, and between man and environment. It ends all pain, sorrow and travails and ushers a new era of freedom, peace and bliss. This is the key to human survival, progress and fulfillment.     

The Moral-Psychology of the Common Agent – A Reply to Ido Geiger

Ido Geiger's paper ‘What it is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?’ is part of a growing trend in Kant scholarship, which stresses the significance of the rational competence of ordinary human beings. I argue that this approach needs to take into account that the common agent is an active reasoner who has the means to find out what she ought to do. The purpose of my paper is to show how universality already figures in the active reasoning of pre-theoretical agents in the form of a common universalization test. I present textual evidence for this test, and argue that this conception does not present pre-theoretical moral cognition in an overly intellectualistic or mechanistic way. Finally, I discuss how, on the pre-theoretical level, universalization relates to humanity or a rational agent's special status. Universalization is present to common agents in the form of procedures or questions that we ask ourselves, humanity as an awareness of certain particularly blatant violations of duty. These two different modes of cognition of duty are reflected in two different formulae of the Categorical Imperative.     

A reason to be rational

This essay argues that in spite of the powerful arguments by Kolodny and Broome there is a reason to be rational. The suggested reason to be rational is that if an agent complies with rational requirements the people around him, as well as he himself, will be able to explain and predict his attitudes. Rationality allows us to make sense of an agent’s attitudes in terms of his other attitudes. This form of explainability is valuable, because it provides us with greater comprehension as regards an agent’s attitudes. Thus, I argue that there is an instrumental reason to be rational.