BEWILDERMENT AND THEREAFTER: Some Reflections in Response to Lee Yearley

The following reflections were originally an oral response to issues raised in Lee Yearley's presentation in May 2009 at Harvard Divinity School. As written here, they follow upon his oral and now written comments, highlighting key issues and points for development, drawing on this respondent's expertise in comparative and Hindu studies.     

Teaching business ethics to professional engineers

Without question “business ethics” is one of the hot topics of the day. Over the past months we have seen business after business charged with improper practices that violate commonly-accepted ethical norms. This has led to a loss of confidence in corporate management, and has had severe economic consequences. From many quarters business educators have heard the call to put more emphasis on ethical practices in their business courses and curricula. Engineering educators are also heeding this call, since the practice of engineering usually involves working for (or leading) a business and/or engaging in business transactions. In the summer of 2002, Auburn University’s Engineering Professional Development program made the decision to produce—based on the author’s Executive MBA course in Business Ethics—a distance-delivered continuing education program for professional engineers and surveyors. Participants across the USA now may use the course to satisfy continuing education requirements with respect to professional licensing and certification. This paper outlines the purpose and content of the course and describes its production, distribution, application, and evaluation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Ethics and Social Responsibility in Engineering and Technology” meeting, New Orleans, 2003.     

Private-Sector Research Ethics: Marketing or Good Conflicts Management? The 2005 John J. Conley Lecture on Medical Ethics

Pharmaceutical companies are major sponsors of biomedical research. Most scholars and policymakers focus their attention on government and academic oversight activities, however. In this article, I consider the role of pharmaceutical companies’ internal ethics statements in guiding decisions about corporate research and development (R&D). I review materials from drug company websites and contributions from the business and medical ethics literature that address ethical responsibilities of businesses in general and pharmaceutical companies in particular. I discuss positive and negative uses of pharmaceutical companies’ ethics materials and describe shortcomings in the companies’ existing ethics programs. To guide employees and reassure outsiders, companies must add rigor, independence, and transparency to their R&D ethics programs.     

Human and Animal Subjects of Research: The Moral Significance of Respect versus Welfare

Human beings with diminished decision-making capacities are usually thought to require greater protections from the potential harms of research than fully autonomous persons. Animal subjects of research receive lesser protections than any human beings regardless of decision-making capacity. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely animals’ lack of some characteristic human capacities that is commonly invoked to justify using them for human purposes. In other words, for humans lesser capacities correspond to greater protections but for animals the opposite is true. Without explicit justification, it is not clear why or whether this should be the case. Ethics regulations guiding human subject research include principles such as respect for persons—and related duties—that are required as a matter of justice while regulations guiding animal subject research attend only to highly circumscribed considerations of welfare. Further, the regulations guiding research on animals discount any consideration of animal welfare relative to comparable human welfare. This paper explores two of the most promising justifications for these differences␣between the two sets of regulations. The first potential justification points to lesser moral status for animals on the basis of their lesser capacities. The second potential justification relies on a claim about the permissibility of moral partiality as␣found in common morality. While neither potential justification is sufficient to justify the regulatory difference as it stands, there is possible common ground between supporters of some regulatory difference and those rejecting the current difference.     

The Politics of Teaching of Indigenous Traditions in Aotearoa/New Zealand

Reflecting on two study abroad trips to New Zealand in 2005 and 2007, I suggest in this essay that it is possible to mitigate the risk of (American or European) students recapitulating imperial attitudes through development of a rigorous curriculum focusing on the legacies of colonialism, institutional racism, and the somewhat dubious phenomenon of “post‐colonialism.” Readings, I argue, should be in continual play during cultural and social activities, operating in a dialectal move toward an “ethics of respect.” Such an ethics remains aporetic, or uncertain, insofar as no code of behavior can render us immune to the political and polemical effects of past and present forms of imperialism. However, a cultivated respect for distance and difference, including regarding questions of “authenticity,” can help to actualize the transformative promise of studying (indigenous) religion abroad. This essay is published alongside of six other essays, including a response from John Barbour, comprising a special section of the journal (see Teaching Theology and Religion 18:1, January 2015).     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. Both Roger Shinn and Robert Stivers ask whether technology has a momentum of its own that is difficult if not impossible to control (“autonomous technology” or “technological inevitability”). I reply that the difficulty in controlling technology is a product of economic and political institutions (such as corporate lobbying and campaign contributions) rather than of any inherent characteristics of technology. Against Stivers's assertion that the ecosystem should be the center of value in environmental ethics, I defend the process view that all beings are valuable, but they are not equally valuable in their richness of experience or their contribution to the experience of others. I also consider his caveats about ambiguities in the concept of sustainability. Two questions raised by Mary Gerhart are taken up: the difficulties of interdisciplinary writing and the role of theological ethics in discussions of public policy. In dialogue with Frederick Ferre I explore the role of alternative visions of the good life as a source of social change. In the face of diminished concern about social justice and environmental sustainability among citizens and in Congress since the book was written, I express long-range hope, but not optimism about the short-term prospects for change.     

Introduction and overview: Global information ethics

This is an introduction to a set of papers on Computer Ethics from the conference ETHICOMP95. Taken as a whole, the collection of papers provides arguments and concepts to launch a new development in computer ethics: ‘Global Information Ethics’. A rationale for globalization is provided, as well as some early efforts which move in that direction. ETHICOMP95, an international conference on Computer Ethics, was held 28–30 March 1995 at De Montfort University, Leicester, UK. Co-directors were Terrell Ward Bynum and Simon Rogerson.     

The Structure of Max Weber's Ethic of Responsibility

Max Weber's distinction in Politics as a Vocation between the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility is best understood as a distinction between mutually exclusive ethical worldviews. Interpretations that correlate the two ethics with Weber's distinction between value-rational social action and instrumental-rational social action are misleading since Weber assumes that both types of rational social action are present in both ethics. The ethic of conviction recognizes a given hierarchy of values as the context for moral endeavor. The ethic of responsibility acknowledges value obligations, but assumes the absence of any given hierarchy of values and the inevitability of value conflict as the context for moral endeavor. When interpreted in the context of his multilayered understanding of value conflict, Weber's ethic of responsibility emerges as a coherent ethical perspective.     

Molecular geneticists and moral responsibility: “maybe if we were working on the atom bomb I would have a different argument”

Senior molecular geneticists were interviewed about their perceptions of the ethical and social implications of genetic knowledge. Inductive analysis of these interviews identified a number of strategies through which the scientists negotiated their moral responsibilities as they participated in generating knowledge that presents difficult ethical questions. These strategies included: further analysis and application of scientific method; clarification of multiple roles; negotiation with the public through public debate, institutional processes of funding, ethics committees and legislation; and personal responsibility.     

Why are there no objective values?

Using the mathematical frameworks of economic preference ranking, subjective probability, and rational learning through empirical evidence, the epistemological implications of teleological ethical intuitionism are pointed out to the extent to which the latter is based on cognitivist and objectivist concepts of value. The notions of objective value and objective norm are critically analysed with reference to epistemological criteria of intersubjectively shared valuative experience. It is concluded that one cannot meaningfully postulate general material theories of morality that could be tested, confirmed or refuted by intersubjective empirical evidence of preferences and values, however loosely the empirical evidence of values may be interpreted. This situation is explained with reference to the ways in which preceived values become systematically influenced by the concomitants of individual valuative experience, but which have nothing to do with contingent subjective interests.