Theorising the Rainbow? The Puzzle of the Public-private Divide

Two influential approaches to conceptualising the relationship between public and private law have suggested that the distinction between them should be abandoned. The first, as exemplified by Oliver, suggests that the distinction should be abandoned in favour of fusion based on the notion of commonality. The second, as exemplified by Teubner, rejects fusion, arguing for the replacement of the distinction with a concept capturing the multi-dimensional complexity of law in multiple social contexts: `polycontexturality'. This article focuses primarily on exploring conceptual puzzles presented by Oliver's `commonality thesis', and argues for a reconceptualisation of the relationship between public and private law as multi-layered. Monolithic and rigidly binary concepts alike should be replaced by a complex set of relationships – a position broadly supportive of Teubner's. However, it is argued that the relationships between public and private law are to be seen as existing on a spectrum, or even on an overarching meta-spectrum, in which the existence of distinctive `archetypal conceptual paradigms' influence as `meta-spectrum extremities'. This presents a limited caveat to Teubner's thesis. I suggest that explicit theoretical attention to both the implications of polycontexturality and the existence of the archetypal conceptual paradigms as meta-spectrum extremities might avoid occluding important distinctions and nuances within a fusion that tends illegitimately to subsume private law within a public law paradigm. Such an analysis, I argue, could enhance the coherence of the law in complex, multi-dimensional cases at the troubled borderline between public and private law. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why Can't Psychology Get a Stamp?

In the latter half of the 1980s as the centennial of the American Psychological Association approached, the APA organized an effort to persuade the United States Postal Service to issue a stamp recognizing the contributions of psychology to the quality of life in America. That effort failed. The history of psychology and psychologists represented on stamps worldwide is described, as is a recent attempt to create a United States stamp focused on mental health. The failure of psychology to achieve recognition on a U. S. stamp is discussed in the context of the stigma of mental illness and the public image of psychology.     

现代西方善恶评价理论述评

善恶评价的性质和善恶评价的真理性问题是伦理学研究的难点问题。现代西方伦理学界对此问题也多有探讨。对现代西方善恶评价理论的主要观点的介绍,有助于我们深化善恶评价问题的研究。     

公共行政伦理价值定位与规范体系

加强公共行政伦理建设,是加强政风建设、建设廉洁勤政务实高故政府、建设高素质公务员队伍的基本途径。因此,必须对公共行政伦理进行价值定位,借鉴国外公共行政伦理建设的经验,建构中国当代公共行政伦理的规范体系。     

诚信的道德价值

信用是市场经济运行的道德基础;信誉是企业良性发展的基石;诚信不仅是人际交往的基础,也是个人自我完善的要求。     

柏拉图和亚里士多德的经济伦理思想比较

经济是城邦的基础,德性却是引导经济运行和发展的必要条件,这是柏拉图和亚里士多德的共同点。然而,私有制和公有制是两实现经济与道德和谐关系的不同手段,这种差别在某种意义上是其平等现不同的结果。     

孟子对传统天命报应论的创造性转化--兼论性善论的价值合理性

在建立以性善论为核心的道德天命观过程中,文化根基的问题观照和传统文化的资源借续是孟子的理论立足点。通过以性善言天善、以心性的价值合理性印证天命的价值理性和“德福合一”的新解释,孟子重建了人的道德信仰,完成了对天命报应论的全新构想。心性的价值合理性与天命的价值理性之间的相互印证,是孟子性善论及其天命观中最有创意的理论运思。     

Can Robert Adams Survive Moral Twin Earth?

Richard Boyd and Robert Adams have both developed semantic accounts of moral terms based on Hilary Putnam's causal regulation theory for natural kind terms, according to which the terms in question refer to the properties which predominantly causally regulated the terms. However, Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have mounted an objection to Boyd's semantics—their Moral Twin Earth argument. If this argument is successful against Boyd then it might be thought that it should also be successful against Adams, given the similarity between their semantic accounts. I will argue in this essay that Adams's semantics is sufficiently different from Boyd's to enable him to survive Moral Twin Earth, but that he is vulnerable to a modified version of Moral Twin Earth that I describe.     

BEFORE THE ORIGINAL POSITION: The Neo-Orthodox Theology of the Young John Rawls

This paper examines a remarkable document that has escaped critical attention within the vast literature on John Rawls, religion, and liberalism: Rawls's undergraduate thesis, “A Brief Inquiry into the Meaning of Sin and Faith: An Interpretation Based on the Concept of Community” (1942). The thesis shows the extent to which a once regnant version of Protestant theology has retreated into seminaries and divinity schools where it now also meets resistance. Ironically, the young Rawls rejected social contract liberalism for reasons that anticipate many of the claims later made against him by secular and religious critics. The thesis and Rawls's late unpublished remarks on religion and World War II offer a new dimension to his intellectual biography. They show the significance of his humanist response to the moral impossibility of political theology. Moreover, they also reveal a kind of Rawlsian piety marginalized by contemporary debates over religion and liberalism.     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.