Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of autobiographical event representations

Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g., family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These methods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbelieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and re-experiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6–11). Cueing for “events” vs. “memories” revealed that “memory” cues lead to retrieval of a more homogeneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollection. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection for autobiographical events.     

Abstractness and Messages Describing Consequences Promote Healthier Behavioral Intentions

Many health-risk behaviors present a self-control conflict in which the short-term outcomes of an action conflict with its long-term consequences. Across three studies, we find that an abstract construal level leads people to focus on long-term rather than short-term consequences when both are described in a message (vs. no message). Studies 1 and 2 explore this hypothesis through a risk behavior (snacking on sugary products), and Study 3 does the same through a health behavior (physical exercise). In Study 1, the Behavioral Identification Form scale is used to measure the construal level as a personal disposition; Studies 2 and 3 use a priming task designed by Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope to manipulate the construal level. All these studies show that, under an abstract mindset, people who have read a mixed-outcome message (vs. no message) tend to base their behavioral plans on long-term outcomes. Individually or in small groups (e.g. school class, therapy groups) health messages can be presented along with protocols to change construal level and thus, promote healthier intentions.     

Positional Sequences in Two-Choice Discrimination Problems with Non-Positional Cues

Individuals seem to differ in their ability to maintain consistent performance. This is obviously an important attribute of behavior that has been largely neglected by researchers. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that, in certain types of situations, the behaviors of the mental retardate are characterized by a relatively high degree of variability. Two studies are reported here that deal with some of the developmental implications of intraindividual variability. In one study, involving retardates, reliability and generality of response consistency were examined in reaction time, time estimation, and digit span tasks. It was shown that individual differences in consistency are reliable and that these generalize across tasks. A second experiment was concerned with the developmental aspects of variability. First-, third-, and fifth-grade pupils and college students were given many trials on a reaction-time task. A variety of measures, reflecting typical performance, limit of performance, and variability, were computed for each subject. The ability to react quickly shows a developmental trend not only with respect to overall performance, but also in the efficiency with whichthe individual maintains his optimal level of responding.     

Alief and Explanation

This article critiques the much‐discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief‐desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief‐desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.     

Perceiving others is so simple: Implicit simplicity of personality perceptions in a dyadic design

People judge others on simplified trait structures when evaluating the Big Five, which is referred to as implicit simplicity (IS: Beer & Watson, 2008). The present study investigated IS in minimally acquainted informal dyads. Hundred and eighty-six participants interacted for a short time on a task, and then provided self- and peer-ratings on the IASR-B5 (Trapnell & Wiggins, 1990). IS manifested in a global evaluative “halo-factor” with some accuracy and was related to perceivers’ interpersonal attraction ratings and personality traits. The driving forces behind IS are discussed.     

Empathy,morality and psychopathic traits in women

Empathic and moral processing correlates of psychopathic personality have seldom been studied in women. In this study, we experimentally tested associations between psychopathic personality traits and empathic and moral processing in a female sample, and further directly compared them to results from a male sample. We found that high levels of affective-interpersonal traits were associated with diminished affective response to sad and fearful emotions in others; lower propensity to feel moral emotions; higher endorsement of utilitarian solutions to moral dilemmas involving direct harm; and less self-reported difficulty when performing moral decision making. Overall, our findings strengthen the view that the two dimensions of psychopathy make distinct contributions to emotional and moral processing; and demonstrate that, in women, psychopathic personality traits are associated with a similar pattern of empathic and moral processing biases as the one that has been previously reported in men.     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.