Indirect cueing elicits distinct types of autobiographical event representations

Studies that distinguish among believed memories, believed-not-remembered events (e.g., family stories), and nonbelieved memories (i.e., memories no longer believed to have occurred) typically rely on experimenter provided or overtly elicited events. These methods may mis-estimate the frequency and nature of such events in everyday memory. Three studies examined whether such events would be elicited via indirect cueing. Participants recalled and rated events on autobiographical belief, recollection, and other characteristics associated with remembering. All three event types resulted, but with a low rate of nonbelieved memories. Believed and nonbelieved memories received similar perceptual and re-experiencing ratings, and both exceeded believed-not-remembered events. Lifespan cueing found nonbelieved memories to be most frequent in middle childhood (ages 6–11). Cueing for “events” vs. “memories” revealed that “memory” cues lead to retrieval of a more homogeneous set of events and differences when predicting autobiographical belief and recollection. These studies support the distinction between autobiographical belief and recollection for autobiographical events.     

Abstractness and Messages Describing Consequences Promote Healthier Behavioral Intentions

Many health-risk behaviors present a self-control conflict in which the short-term outcomes of an action conflict with its long-term consequences. Across three studies, we find that an abstract construal level leads people to focus on long-term rather than short-term consequences when both are described in a message (vs. no message). Studies 1 and 2 explore this hypothesis through a risk behavior (snacking on sugary products), and Study 3 does the same through a health behavior (physical exercise). In Study 1, the Behavioral Identification Form scale is used to measure the construal level as a personal disposition; Studies 2 and 3 use a priming task designed by Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope to manipulate the construal level. All these studies show that, under an abstract mindset, people who have read a mixed-outcome message (vs. no message) tend to base their behavioral plans on long-term outcomes. Individually or in small groups (e.g. school class, therapy groups) health messages can be presented along with protocols to change construal level and thus, promote healthier intentions.     

Positional Sequences in Two-Choice Discrimination Problems with Non-Positional Cues

Individuals seem to differ in their ability to maintain consistent performance. This is obviously an important attribute of behavior that has been largely neglected by researchers. There is, however, some evidence to suggest that, in certain types of situations, the behaviors of the mental retardate are characterized by a relatively high degree of variability. Two studies are reported here that deal with some of the developmental implications of intraindividual variability. In one study, involving retardates, reliability and generality of response consistency were examined in reaction time, time estimation, and digit span tasks. It was shown that individual differences in consistency are reliable and that these generalize across tasks. A second experiment was concerned with the developmental aspects of variability. First-, third-, and fifth-grade pupils and college students were given many trials on a reaction-time task. A variety of measures, reflecting typical performance, limit of performance, and variability, were computed for each subject. The ability to react quickly shows a developmental trend not only with respect to overall performance, but also in the efficiency with whichthe individual maintains his optimal level of responding.     

Alief and Explanation

This article critiques the much‐discussed notion of alief recently introduced by Tamar Gendler. The narrow goal is to show that the notion is explanatorily unnecessary; the broader goal is to demonstrate the importance of making explicit one's explanatory framework when offering a philosophical account of the mind. After introducing the concept of alief and the examples Gendler characterizes in terms of it, the article examines the explanatory framework within which appeal to such a concept can seem necessary. This framework, it argues, is a generalization of the belief‐desire account of action. Although Gendler introduces the notion of alief in an attempt to move beyond the belief‐desire account, it argues that she nevertheless works within a generalized version of its explanatory structure. Once the framework is made explicit, we find no explanatory need that requires introducing the notion of alief into our account of the mind.     

中央执行子功能对预期式时距估计的作用——基于结构方程模型的结果

采用结构方程模型的方法探讨中央执行系统与时距加工过程的关系,考察三种中央执行子功能(转换,抑制,刷新)对预期式长、短时距估计(两种标准时距:2s,5s)的作用模式。结果发现刷新功能对长、短时距估计任务都产生影响;抑制功能只作用于长时距估计;转换功能不参与单独的预期式时距估计过程。结果表明,三种执行子功能对预期式短时距加工和长时距加工的作用不同,支持时距加工的差异机制假设。     

异同判断中“快同效应”的大脑机制：一项ERP研究

采用高密度的事件相关电位（ERPs）技术,记录分析了大学生被试在执行异同判断任务[包括不同颜色刺激对（DC）,不同形状刺激对（DS）和相同刺激对（Same）]时的脑内时程动态变化。行为结果表明,“同”反应的确显著快于“异”反应,表现出明显的快同效应。ERP结果显示：在280-320 ms内,DS和DC条件均比Same条件诱发一个更负的N2成分。偶极子溯源分析表明,DC和DS条件下,N2可能起源于大脑的前扣带皮层（ACC）,可能与“异”反应早期不一致信息（颜色或形状）的认知监控和调节有关;反之Same条件下,N2成分可能起源于楔前叶,主要反映了“同”反应早期知觉识别中整体特征比较加工的过程（同一性指示器）。另外,在450 ms左右, DC和DS比Same条件均诱发了一个更负的P3成分,可能反映了对刺激局部特征的比较和识别（慢速比较器）,并与选择性注意和资源分配等高级认知活动有关;并且,Same条件下P3成分的潜伏期更短,与行为结果一致。以上研究结果表明,异同判断中“同”反应和“异”反应可能有着不同的比较通道和大脑机制,支持双过程模型理论;同时表明,慢速比较器和同一性指示器可能是序列加工的。     

The cost of thinking about false beliefs: evidence from adults' performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task

Much of what we know about other people's beliefs comes non-inferentially from what people tell us. Developmental research suggests that 3-year-olds have difficulty processing such information: they suffer interference from their own knowledge of reality when told about someone's false belief (e.g., [Wellman, H. M., & Bartsch, K. (1988). Young children's reasoning about beliefs. Cognition, 30, 239-277.]). The current studies examined for the first time whether similar interference occurs in adult participants. In two experiments participants read sentences describing the real colour of an object and a man's false belief about the colour of the object, then judged the accuracy of a picture probe depicting either reality or the man's belief. Processing costs for picture probes depicting reality were consistently greater in this false belief condition than in a matched control condition in which the sentences described the real colour of one object and a man's unrelated belief about the colour of another object. A similar pattern was observed for picture probes depicting the man's belief in most cases. Processing costs were not sensitive to the time available for encoding the information presented in the sentences: costs were observed when participants read the sentences at their own pace (Experiment 1) or at a faster or a slower pace (Experiment 2). This suggests that adults' difficulty was not with encoding information about reality and a conflicting false belief, but with holding this information in mind and using it to inform a subsequent judgement.     

Chimpanzees know what others know, but not what they believe

There is currently much controversy about which, if any, mental states chimpanzees and other nonhuman primates understand. In the current two studies we tested both chimpanzees’ and human children’s understanding of both knowledge-ignorance and false belief - in the same experimental paradigm involving competition with a conspecific. We found that whereas 6-year-old children understood both of these mental states, chimpanzees understood knowledge-ignorance but not false belief. After ruling out various alternative explanations of these and related findings, we conclude that in at least some situations chimpanzees know what others know. Possible explanations for their failure in the highly similar false belief task are discussed.     

Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments

An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest that the present finding favors the view that moral appraisal plays a pervasive role in shaping diverse cognitive representations across multiple domains.