Why Brains Are Not Computers,Why Behaviorism Is Not Satanism,and Why Dolphins Are Not Aquatic Apes

Modern psychology has, to all intents and purposes, become synonymous with cognitive psychology, with an emphasis on the idea that the brain is a form of computer, whose job is to take in sensory input, process information, and produce motor output. This places the brain at a remove from both the body and environment and denies the intimate connection that exists between them. As a result, a great injustice is done to both human and nonhuman animals: On the one hand, we fail to recognize the distinctive nature of nonhuman cognition, and on the other hand, we continue to promote a somewhat misleading view of human psychological capacities. Here, I suggest a more mutualistic, embodied, enactive view might allow us to ask more interesting questions about how animals of all kinds come to know their worlds, in ways that avoid the (inevitable) anthropocentric baggage of the cognitivist viewpoint.     

The relationship between positive psychological characteristics and longer telomeres

Objective: Longer telomeres are associated with better health and longevity. This research investigated the relationship between positive psychological dispositional traits and telomere length. Positive traits examined were typical high positive affect, typical low negative affect, life satisfaction, trait mindfulness, trait emotional intelligence, general self-efficacy and optimism.

Design and Measures: One hundred and twenty women and men, with a mean age of 40.92, completed measures of positive characteristics and provided samples for telomere length analysis.

Results: Together the positive dispositional characteristics explained significant variance in telomere length, R = .40. Among the individual characteristics, greater optimism and higher emotional intelligence were associated with longer telomeres after adjustment for age and gender and the association between optimism and telomere length remained significant after adjusting for age and gender as well as the other positive characteristics, with a partial correlation r of .30.

Conclusion: These results in conjunction with previous research findings provide a platform for further exploration of biological pathways connecting positive characteristics such as optimism to telomere length and investigation of the impact of increasing a characteristic such as optimism on telomere functioning.     

Counselling psychology in the United States

Counseling psychology (CP) emerged in the US as the result of the convergence of a number of trends in early applied psychology, a number of social factors, as well as changes in the organizational structure of the American Psychological Association. We offer an overview of the history of counseling psychology in the US, focusing on key events that have helped establish and shape the profession. Struggles over the definition of CP as a specialty and its relations with clinical psychology and professional counseling are discussed, as are matters related to the licensing of CP practitioners, and the profession’s relationships with counseling-related professional organizations. The educational and professional preparation of CPs, the profession’s core values that affect both training in and the practice of counseling psychology, and the settings in which CPs work are briefly described. We close with a discussion of several of the challenges facing CP as it is organized and institutionalized in the US.     

Conversation,responsibility, and autism spectrum disorder

In this paper, I present a challenge for Michael McKenna’s conversational theory of moral responsibility. On his view, to be a responsible agent is to be able to engage in a type of moral conversation. I argue that individuals with autism spectrum disorder present a considerable problem for the conversational theory because empirical evidence on the disorder seems to suggest that there are individuals in the world who meet all of the conditions for responsible agency that the theory lays out but who are nevertheless not responsible agents. Attending to the moral psychology of such individuals will, I think, help shed light on an important gap in the conversational theory.     

Laying down a path in talking

This paper aims to provide a starting point for a non-representational approach to language. It will do so by undoing some of the reifying tendencies that are at the heart of the ontology of scientific psychology. Although non-representational theories are beginning to emerge, they remain committed to giving explanations in terms of ontological structures that are independent of human activity. If they maintain this commitment it is unlikely that they will displace representationalism in domains such as language. By following some of Wittgenstein’s remarks on language, I explain the phenomenon of reification by carefully considering the formative, situational flow of language—thus without invoking representations. In this way, the paper sketches a direction of approach for a non-representational theory of language, undercutting the most important assumptions that justify an explanatory ontology devoid of human activity.     

Counselling psychology’s genotypic and phenotypic features across national boundaries

This article integrates the survey results presented in the introductory article of this journal issue as well as the articles describing counselling psychology in each of the countries covered in the issue to examine the international character of counselling psychology. Specifically, it addresses the similarities and differences in the histories, education and training, demographics, and practice characteristics of the specialty within and across these national boundaries. The article concludes with an analysis of the value dimensions describing the international character of counselling psychology and addresses where the different countries place themselves along the two dimensions that were identified: Dimension 1 capturing basic research as different from most of the other values, and Dimension 2 being defined by an applied client focus versus a more indirect clinical perspective (i.e. social justice and research adding to the knowledge base).     

Materialism in the mainstream of early German philosophy

ABSTRACT

Discussions of the reception of materialist thought in Germany in the first half of the eighteenth century tend to focus, naturally enough, upon the homegrown freethinkers who advanced the cause of Lucretius, Hobbes, and Spinoza in clandestine publications and frequently courted the ire of the state for doing so. If the philosophers belonging to the mainstream of German intellectual life in that period are accorded a place in the story, it is only insofar as they actively set themselves against the materialist threat and, in the course of working to undermine it, actually only succeeded in inadvertently drawing more popular attention to it. By contrast, in this paper I will show that it was not just insofar as the thinkers of the early eighteenth century played the role of the diligent critic and unwittingly propagated the views of their opponents that materialism can be said to have penetrated into the very mainstream of the German Enlightenment. Rather, as I will argue, there was a striking degree of uptake of distinctively materialist claims even among its most vociferous mainstream critics, and that this is the case for thinkers in both the Wolffian and the Thomasian traditions.     

Springs,Nitre, and Conatus. The Role of the Heart in Hobbes's Physiology and Animal Locomotion

This paper focuses on an understudied aspect of Hobbes's natural philosophy: his approach to the domain of life. I concentrate on the role assigned by Hobbes to the heart, which occupies a central role in both his account of human physiology (which he names ‘vital motion’) and of the origin of animal locomotion (‘animal or voluntary motion’). With this, I have three goals in mind. First, I aim to offer a cross-section of Hobbes's effort to provide a mechanistic picture of human life. Second, I aim to contextualize Hobbes's views in the seventeenth-century debates on human physiology and animal locomotion. In particular, I will compare Hobbes's views with the theories put forth by Harvey, Descartes, the Galenic, and Peripatetic traditions. Also, I will show that Hobbes was receptive to advances within contemporary English physiology and chemistry. Third, by means of a comparison with Descartes, I advance some hypothesis to explain why Hobbes indentified the heart, and not the brain (as was increasingly common in his day), as the organ originating animal locomotion. In this regard, I trace out some possible implications of Hobbes's views on human physiology and locomotion for his psychology and political philosophy.     

Canaries in the Ethical Coal Mine? Case Vignettes and Empirical Findings for How Psychology Leaders Have Adopted Twitter

Twitter, an online application, allows users to post microblog statements in real time. Have psychologists in leadership positions adopted Twitter? What ethical standards are navigated in doing so? Little research has examined the adoption rate of Twitter within a sample of psychologists. This article outlines a series of case vignettes depicting ethical dilemmas encountered by psychologists who adopt Twitter. Data reviewing Twitter adoption by professional psychologists who served as president within psychology advocacy organizations reveal higher adoption rates from student group leaders than professional organization advocacy presidents. Implications for ethical standards and professional development are discussed.     

Concept Creep: Psychology's Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology

Many of psychology's concepts have undergone semantic shifts in recent years. These conceptual changes follow a consistent trend. Concepts that refer to the negative aspects of human experience and behavior have expanded their meanings so that they now encompass a much broader range of phenomena than before. This expansion takes “horizontal” and “vertical” forms: concepts extend outward to capture qualitatively new phenomena and downward to capture quantitatively less extreme phenomena. The concepts of abuse, bullying, trauma, mental disorder, addiction, and prejudice are examined to illustrate these historical changes. In each case, the concept's boundary has stretched and its meaning has dilated. A variety of explanations for this pattern of “concept creep” are considered and its implications are explored. I contend that the expansion primarily reflects an ever-increasing sensitivity to harm, reflecting a liberal moral agenda. Its implications are ambivalent, however. Although conceptual change is inevitable and often well motivated, concept creep runs the risk of pathologizing everyday experience and encouraging a sense of virtuous but impotent victimhood.