Event structure as a basis of semantic processing of familiar metaphors

In this paper I propose a model of metaphor interpretation that would account for the possibility that semantic processing of familiar metaphors no longer go through the sequential steps of alignment and projection, but may rather be established upon schematic semantic units allowing faster processing. The proposition is grounded on the notion that metaphors are formed based on peoples’ perception of what is typically associated with entities. It is suggested that in its most abstract form, these associations are essentially events, analyzed in terms of event structure.     

Inferring task performance and confidence from displays of eye movements

Eye movements reveal what is at the center of people's attention, which is assumed to coincide with what they are thinking about. Eye-movement displays (visualizations of a person's fixations superimposed onto the stimulus, for example, as dots or circles) might provide useful information for diagnosing that person's performance. However, making inferences about a person's task performance based on eye-movement displays requires substantial interpretation. Using graph-comprehension tasks, we investigated to what extent observers (N = 46) could make accurate inferences about a performer's multiple-choice task performance (i.e., chosen answer), confidence, and competence from displays of that person's eye movements. Observers' accuracy when judging which answer the performer chose was above chance level and was higher for displays reflecting confident performance. Observers were also able to infer performers' confidence from the eye-movement displays; moreover, their own task performance and perceived similarity with the performer affected their judgments of the other's competence.     

Retracing Augustine's Ethics

Augustine's exposition of the image of God in Book 15 of On The Trinity (De Trinitate) sheds light on multiple issues that arise in scholarly interpretations of Augustine's account of lying. This essay argues against interpretations that posit a uniform account of lying in Augustine—with the same constitutive features, and insisting both that it is never necessary to tell a lie and that lying is absolutely prohibited. Such interpretations regularly employ intertextual reading strategies that elide distinctions and developments in Augustine's ethics of lying. Instead, I show how looking at texts written prior and subsequent to the texts usually consulted suggests a trajectory in Augustine's thought, beginning with an understanding of lies as morally culpable but potentially necessary, and culminating in a vision of lying as the fundamental evil and the origin of every sin.     

Where Philosophy and Literature merge in the Platonic dialogues

It is no surprise if a good quality communication unit succeeds in seizing the attention of the intended audience (or readership) and is able to let people see precisely what the author wanted them to see, while avoiding that the average addressee become aware of what the author wants to convey in an almost subliminal way. In this respect Plato is no exception. Nevertheless the study of these resources, far from having been somewhat systematic, still is largely neglected, and only a minority of commentators find it important to pay head to the communicational strategies which are at work in Plato's dialogues. It will be argued that the shades of meaning and the contextualization of thought (a) systematically grant to Plato ample room for affecting the way a reader comes to perceive his points of doctrine and (b) often let him convey a biased perception of his arguments.The paper includes an outline of the already longstanding debate on these matters, a case study (Memo 80–82), and a sketchy typology of how the literary working-out is able to affect the reader's perception of the line of thought, esp. within the aporetic dialogues.     

Using dream interpretation to resolve group developmental impasses

This paper focuses on the use of dream interpretation in psychoanalytic group psychotherapy. One of the goals of the paper is to demonstrate that the kinds of dreams, manifestly about the group, offered at various points in the life history of the group, are influenced by, and, in turn, influence developmental phases in group. Dream interpretation also helps the therapist to identify emerging developmental themes in the group-as-a-whole as well as illuminate developmental impasses and resistances of the group. The second goal of this paper is to demonstrate how interpretations of these dreams can help lessen resistance and help the group to resolve the impasse. The paper first reviews some basic principles and approaches to dream interpretation in a group setting and then elucidates typical phases in group development. Two extended case examples are presented to illustrate how dream interpretation may be utilized to help the group move beyond the impasse.     

A developmental perspective on psychotherapy process, psychotherapists' expertise, and “Meaning-Making Conflict” within therapeutic relationships: A two-part series

Part I (in this issue)—A Dialectical-Constructivist View of Human Development, Psychotherapy, and the Dynamics of Meaning-Making Conflict Within Therapeutic Relationships— reviews a dialectical-constructivist model of human development and articulates, in the language of that model, how psychotherapy, in general, works. It describes and illustrates three generic processes, which contribute to the frequent successes of an extremely diverse range of psychotherapy theories and practices. This view of psychotherapy focuses on both the client's meaning-making processes and the therapist's meaning-making processes and how they contribute together to effective psychotherapy. Part I also offers a way of understanding what is going on when therapeutic progress is blocked by conflict between the client's and the therapist's meaning-making processes. Part II—Dialectical Thinking and Psychotherapeutic Expertise: Implications for Training Psychotherapists and Protecting Clients from Theoretical Abuse—explores those experiences in which the therapist's own exercise of his or her meaning-making structures, and maintenance of the integrity of his or her theories, has a limiting or destructive impact on the value of therapy to the client. It considers the concept of “theoretical abuse” by psychotherapists as a way of characterizing the most destructive of these experiences. This serves as a rhetorical device for introducing comparisons between these phenomena and the phenomena of sexual abuse by psychotherapists, in terms of dynamics, prevalence, and appropriate strategies for prevention. Part II uses work on the development of dialectical thinking in adulthood to conceptualize how different understandings of the nature of psychotherapists' expertise increase or decrease the likelihood and severity of “theoretical abuse”. Finally, it derives implications for training psychologists and other psychotherapy professionals.     

Reasoning about update logic

Logical frameworks for analysing the dynamics of information processing abound [4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20, 22]. Some of these frameworks focus on the dynamics of the interpretation process, some on the dynamics of the process of drawing inferences, and some do both of these. Formalisms galore, so it is felt that some conceptual streamlining would pay off.This paper is part of a larger scale enterprise to pursue the obvious parallel between information processing and imperative programming. We demonstrate that logical tools from theoretical computer science are relevant for the logic of information flow. More specifically, we show that the perspective of Hoare logic [13, 18] can fruitfully be applied to the conceptual simplification of information flow logics.     

Reasoning to what is true in fiction

The paper discusses the principle by which we reason to what is true in fiction. The focus is David Lewis's article Truth in Fiction (1978) which proposes an analysis in terms of counterfactuals and possible worlds. It is argued thatLewis's account is inadequate in detail and also in principle in that it conflicts radically with basic and familiar tenets of literary criticism. Literary critical reasoning about fiction concerns not the discovery of facts in possible worlds but the recovery of meanings in interpretative frameworks. The model theoretic approach fails to account for common literary or rhetorical devices like unreliable narration, connotation and point of view. And in explaining indeterminacy of content in terms of truth-value gaps it gives too simplistic an account of critical reasoning about character motivation and thematic development. A more adequate account of content-indeterminacy can be provided through a comparison of the interpretation of fiction with the interpretation of human action. A broader motif in the paper is the underlying tension between what is required for the logic of fiction and what is required for the aesthetics of fiction.     

On the uses of language in working and idealized logic

The interpretation of discourse covers a continuum with two extremes: on the one hand, a text considered as an ideal, distant object, and on the other hand, a conversation regarded as a real, present event. On the basis of a distinction between relatively context-invariant propositions and relatively context-dependent statements, it is argued that statements in conversational discourse are easier to interpret than statements in texts, whereas only propositions in symbolic logic can be interpreted with exactitude. In the same way, the interpretation of dialogical arguments proceeds more easily than the interpretation of arguments in texts. While dialogical argumentation requires a dialectical approach, textual argumentation necessitates an imaginative reconstruction of the argument. From this it can be concluded that for different sorts of argumentative discourse diverse sorts of interpretative activities have to be used.     

Interpretation as a misunderstanding

In the following article ‘who’ as the agent in the clinical session becomes questioned. By speaking we are introduced in the world of misunderstanding, where we are not merely speaking but being spoken to. Listening to what is being said and in this way misunderstanding what the patient is trying to say helps us in order to locate where the subject of the unconscious places himself in relation to the desire of the Other. In the article, it is conveyed how interpretation is not something that clarifies or explains to the patient his difficulties, but instead locates them by letting them take part in the session. In Lacanian psychoanalysis, locating the subject of the unconscious is crucial as this gives the patient a clue about where they place themselves in relation to the Other. This is why cutting the session is an essential element of its technique, as it stops in this way something that can disturb or hide where the subject of the unconscious has appeared. This allows patients to experience where they are gratifying themselves in their own difficulty. Interpretation is not speaking about the truth but instead, making the truth present in the session.