Nietzsche,Sport, and Contemporary Culture

The word ‘sport’ next to Nietzsche’s name may raise eyebrows among many Nietzsche readers. ‘What an odd pairing?’ one may ask. We prefer Nietzsche and arts or something from the domain of the Geist. Sport is embedded in mass culture and Nietzsche detests anything that has to do with masses; fandom, an important part of sport culture, is nothing Nietzsche would look at favourably but call it a manifestation of the herd instinct. Besides, clubs and sports organizations control this sporting culture through political and economic apparatuses. On the other hand, modern sports, far from producing higher types and the overhuman, appeal to the lowest common denominator, the person on the street and all athletes are equal. All of these objections notwithstanding, one may still speak of a sporting spirit that embodies play, ecstasy in the sense of Dionysian, inventiveness, agonism, grand spectacle, festivity, a specific type of aesthetics and a form of askesis of the body, and a specific outlet for enactment of active justice and a Gestalt of power relations. Playfulness and game-making are crucial in sports, and play is key to Nietzsche’s thought. Sport is a form of letting go, losing oneself in the game, and can be construed as a field for Dionysian forces. Agonism, a significant aspect of Nietzsche’s thought, applies to all competitive sports. Furthermore, sport constitutes one of the major types of spectacles in our age. Finally, sport belongs to the regime of the body, a form of askesis, which Nietzsche would have supported as opposed to the ascetic idealism. In what ways do Nietzsche’s ideas on interpretation shed light on sport and its various aspects as listed above? What hermeneutic tools do we have to interpret sport as a field of culture? These were the guiding questions for this essay.     

The illusion of conscious will

Wegner (Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. MIT Press) argues that conscious will is an illusion, citing a wide range of empirical evidence. I shall begin by surveying some of his arguments. Many are unsuccessful. But one—an argument from the ubiquity of self-interpretation—is more promising. Yet is suffers from an obvious lacuna, offered by so-called ‘dual process’ theories of reasoning and decision making (Evans, J., &; Over, D. (1996). Rationality and reasoning. Psychology Press; Stanovich, K. (1999). Who is rational? Studies of individual differences in reasoning. Lawrence Erlbaum; Frankish, K. (2004). Mind and supermind. Cambridge University Press). I shall argue that this lacuna can be filled by a plausible a priori claim about the causal role of anything deserving to be called ‘a will.’ The result is that there is no such thing as conscious willing: conscious will is, indeed, an illusion.     

Existential-Hayatological Theism

One of the oldest conceptions of theology is discourse of the poets about the gods and its philosophical interpretation. Judaism and Christianity borrowed this Greek understanding of theology and revised it only slightly to reflect its own monotheistic vision of God and God’s relations to and with the world of nature and human existence. The question as to which philosophy best explicates and justifies the oral and written mythopoetic discourse of the imaginative bards of Israel and the early Christian community became a fundamental issue and has remained so through the centuries. The aim of this essay is to explore this question once again in the context of post-liberal theology in general, the works of Abraham Heschel, Claude Tresmontant, and the Japanese theologian Tetsaturo Ariga on an implicit biblical philosophy and the explicit metaphysical theism of Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. The outcome of this exploration will be a rational reconstruction or ideal type of neo-classical theism or what I have chosen to call existential-hayatological theism.     

Supportive interventions and nonsymbolic mental functioning

The author aims to show how supportive interventions are the analyst's most relevant therapeutic means to helping patients with a feeble symbolic system transform nonsymbolic episodes and reestablish symbolic mental functioning. Symbolic and nonsymbolic modes of mental functioning are first outlined. Supportive interventions are redefined as an analyst's effort at improving a patient's nonsymbolic mental functioning, by using principally pragmatic or interactive aspects of communication to deal with her or his patient's nonsymbolic in-session experiences. These interventions are psychoanalytic when transference focused, in so far as they foster the symbolization and transformation of more primitive (nonsymbolic) layers of the transference. Some probable mechanisms underlying the effect of supportive interventions on nonsymbolic functioning include the modification of mental procedures. Supportive interventions also help restore symbolic mental elaboration through the gratification of a basic ego or self-need, bringing about a temporary relief from psychic pain, with increased affect tolerance and a renewed capacity to use symbols. This soothing effect accounts for a missing link in Bion's model of the elaborative effect of the analyst's reverie.     

Dialogue,Pluralism, and Change: The Intertextual Constitution of Bakhtin,Kristeva, and Derrida

In this article I show how the concept of intertextuality as developed by Mikhail Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva and Jacques Derrida can be applied to the political theory of constitutionalism. Such an approach carries with it the valuable democratic idea that all texts in society, including the political constitution, are in a dynamic relationship and reflect social pluralism. By analyzing and comparing intertextual theories, I develop the idea of the constitution as an open and emancipatory interpretative and textual category. I show how intertextual theorizing contributes significantly to the democratization of a modern liberal constitutional order, offering distinct strategies for progressive political and social transformation.     

Society Against Societies: The Possibility of Transcultural Criticism

This paper argues against particularism about social criticism of the form presented by Walzer. I contend that while limitation of the scope of criticism depends on the existence of our shared meanings, which are not shared by them, shared meaning itself depends on society. So, an account of society showing that societies are not discrete and mutually inaccessible refutes particularism. I argue for such an account. I deal with the objection that the focus of particularism is culture, not society, and conclude that the conditions of possibility of shared meaning have anti-particularist consequences. This paper draws on Samuel Clark, Living Without Domination: The Possibility of an Anarchist Utopia (Aldershot: Ashgate, forthcoming 2007), chapter 2. I would like to thank Gideon Calder, and two anonymous referees for Res Publica, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.     

Interpreting functional analysis outcomes using automated nonparametric statistical analysis

Current methods employed to interpret functional analysis data include visual analysis and post-hoc visual inspection (PHVI). However, these methods may be biased by dataset complexity, hand calculations, and rater experience. We examined whether an automated approach using nonparametric rank-based statistics could increase the accuracy and efficiency of functional analysis data interpretation. We applied Automated Nonparametric Statistical Analysis (ANSA) to a sample of 65 published functional analyses for which additional experimental evidence was available to verify behavior function. Results showed that exact behavior function agreement between ANSA and the publications authors was 83.1%, exact agreement between ANSA and PHVI was 75.4%, and exact agreement across all 3 methods was 64.6%. These preliminary findings suggest that ANSA has the potential to support the data interpretation process. A web application that incorporates the calculations and rules utilized by ANSA is accessible at https://ansa.shinyapps.io/ansa/     

Reflexive Communication and the Whole Self

After summarizing Kathleen Wallace’s cumulative network model of the self, this paper explores Wallace’s account of the whole self’s capacity for self-reflection in some detail. Supposing that constituents of the self are capable of interpreting and communicating with one another, how is it possible for the whole self to interpret and communicate with itself and to act on the basis of its self-understandings? The paper suggests that Wallace needs an account of the self’s ability to synthesize the information that interpretative communication furnishes and manage it to reach all-things-considered judgments and decide what to do. The paper sketches such an account and concludes by considering some implications for selfhood of different types of traumatic experience.     

THE HISTORICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN THE GOLDEN RULE AND THE SECOND GREATEST LOVE COMMAND

The golden rule, perhaps the most recognizable moral maxim in Western culture, is an inadequate basis for morality. In light of its flaws as a precept and its apparent lack of moral content, it is initially perplexing that the historic Judeo‐Christian tradition has often linked the golden rule with the second greatest command to love one's neighbor as oneself. However, after examining the presuppositions behind this link and investigating the biblical context of these sayings, it is clear that the Judeo‐Christian tradition is justified in making this connection. Although the golden rule and the love command should not be conflated and their distinctions should not be abandoned, the biblical intention of the golden rule can only be understood and properly practiced in connection with the love command.     

Art,Ethics, and Critical Pluralism

Those who have views about the relation between aesthetic and ethical value often also have views about the nature of art criticism. Yet no one has paid much attention to the compatibility of views in one debate with views in the other. This is worrying in light of a tension between two popular kinds of view: namely, between critical pluralism and any view in the art and ethics debate that presupposes an invariant relation between aesthetic value and ethical value. Specifically, the tension with invariance arises insofar as critical pluralism accommodates the aesthetic value of interpretive richness, including the aesthetic value of ethically conflicted interpretive richness. Given this tension, a shift of focus is needed in the art and ethics debate; from specifying the criteria for the aesthetic relevance of a work's ethical qualities to defending the fundamental nature of the aesthetic‐ethical value relation.