Limits on efficient human mindreading: Convergence across Chinese adults and Semai children

We tested Apperly and Butterfill's (2009, Psychological Review, 116, 753) theory that humans have two mindreading systems whereby the efficient‐system guiding anticipatory glances displays signature limits that do not apply to the flexible system guiding verbal predictions. Experiments 1 and 2 tested urban Mainland‐Chinese adults (n = 64) and Experiment 3 tested Semai children living in the rainforests of Peninsular Malaysia (3‐ to 4‐year‐olds, n = 60). Participants – across different ages, groups and methods – anticipated others’ false‐beliefs about object‐location but not object‐identity. Convergence in signature limits signalled that the early‐developing efficient system involved minimal theory‐of‐mind. Chinese adults and older Semai children showed flexibility in their direct predictions. The flexible mindreading system in ascribing others’ beliefs as such was task‐sensitive and implicated maturational and cultural contributions.     

害羞者对模糊情境信息的解释偏向

以模糊情境句子和形容词为刺激材料,分别采用文本材料范式和改编的词汇情境联接范式,对害羞者的延时解释和即时解释偏向特点进行探讨。结果发现：害羞者对模糊情境信息不仅缺乏积极的即时解释偏向特点,而且也缺乏积极的延时解释偏向特点;害羞者未表现出消极的即时和延时解释偏向特点。研究表明害羞者可能是社交焦虑的前期阶段,对害羞者的干预可以通过引导其积极的解释偏向的方式来实现。     

At‐one‐ment,intuition and ‘suchness’1

Many senses exist for perceiving sensory experience; there are in turn others which make it possible to perceive emotional experience: intuition is one of these. The author, using W. R. Bion's work, studies intuition psychoanalytically, considering it to be a powerful ‘sense’ in clinical work. He describes the metapsychology of intuition, and proposes models that make it possible to think—from different perspectives— about how to make use of it in an analysis. To this end, he examines a series of useful processes and concepts: growth, tolerance, ‘suchness’, suffering and courage. The author defi nes the intuitive mechanism as a derivation of the renunciation of memory, desire and understanding; such a renunciation, learning from the experience of suffering the pain of facing the Truth in at‐one‐ment, makes it possible to tolerate the frustrations associated with observing the analysand ‘such‐as‐he‐is’. Finally, once immersed in the intelligence of intuition, the author considers ways in which intuition might be linked with concepts, with a view to interpreting the facts that must be transformed in the analysis.     

Religious Naturalism Today

Three questions are addressed. First, concerning the definition of naturalism, I accept the characterization by Rem Edwards (1972) but insist on a materialist or physicalist interpretation of these features. Second, the distinctive characteristic of my religious naturalism is an argument that although a theological position based on a physicalist ontology is constrained by physicalism, the ontology itself does not dictate theological content. Theological content can break free of ontology if this content is valuational rather than ontological. Such a valuational theism becomes possible when Rudolf Bultmann's and Fritz Buri's method of existentialist interpretation is wedded to Henry Nelson Wieman's naturalist conception of God. The knowledge of God in events of grace, therefore, is rooted in moments of creative transformation that are themselves always transformative. This approach makes possible a better approach to the problem of objectivity than Bultmann could achieve. Third, concerning the chief issues facing religious naturalism today, I argue that religious naturalists should more forthrightly confront the issue of ontological materialism and that the most pressing issue concerns thinking out more fully the religious or theological content to be ascribed to such a position after the nature of naturalism is resolved.     

Reflections on Klein's radical notion of phantasy and its implications for analytic practice

Analysts may incorporate many of Melanie Klein's important contributions (e.g., on preoedipal dynamics, envy, and projective identification) without transforming their basic analytic approach. In this paper I argue that adopting the Kleinian notion of unconscious phantasy is transformative. While it is grounded in Freud's thinking and draws out something essential to his work, this notion of phantasy introduces a radical change that defines Kleinian thinking and practice and significantly impacts the analyst's basic clinical approach. This impact and its technical implications in the analytic situation are illustrated and discussed.     

A MODEL FOR INTEGRATING ACTUAL NEUROTIC OR UNREPRESENTED STATES AND SYMBOLIZED ASPECTS OF INTRAPSYCHIC CONFLICT

In psychoanalytic theory, the importance of actual neuroses—considered to be devoid of psychic content—diminished as Freud and subsequent analysts focused on unconscious intrapsychic conflict. This paper explores the relationship between actual neurotic and unrepresented states, which are believed to be best addressed through attention to countertransference, intersubjectivity, and enactments rather than interpretation of intrapsychic conflict. Models suggesting how actual neurotic states and symbolized intrapsychic conflict may interact with each other and environmental stressors are described. Symbolizing actual neurotic states and establishing meaningful linkages between somatic/affective experiences and intrapsychic conflict are viewed as necessary for effective treatment of many disorders.     

CLINICAL WINNICOTT: TRAVELING A REVOLUTIONARY ROAD

The author contends that, contrary to the usual perception that Winnicott followed a linear progression “through pediatrics to psychoanalysis,” Winnicott's vision was always a psychoanalytic one, even during his early pediatric work. His place in the development of psychoanalytic theory is highlighted, and the author discusses such key Winnicottian concepts as transitional space, the false self, and the use of the object. Winnicott's unique approach to the form and value of analytic interpretation is particularly emphasized, and his thoughts on the treatment of depression are also addressed, as well as his distinction between regression and withdrawal. Included is a summary of convergences and divergences between Winnicott's thinking and that of Bion.     

Turning quickly on myself: Automatic interpretation biases in dysphoria are self-referent

Cognitive theories emphasise automatic interpretation biases (AIB) in the development and maintenance of depression. The current study examined AIB using the word sentence association paradigm for depression (WSAP-D) via endorsement rates and reaction time indices. We directly tested the importance of self-relevance for AIB by modifying the WASP-D task to include self-referent ambiguous stimuli and contrasting them with other-referent ambiguous stimuli. We hypothesised that the dysphoric group, but not the non-dysphoric group, would demonstrate AIB only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Consistent with our main hypotheses, dysphoric individuals endorsed negative interpretations more often and faster than non-dysphoric individuals, only for self-referent ambiguous stimuli. Self-relevance may be a critical aspect of AIB in dysphoric populations.     

样例在理解时间相关事件中的作用

该文的两个实验探讨了人们理解自己和熟悉的人物日常惯例事件的方式。实验1在中文条件下验证了Coleombe等（2002）的研究,即人们不利用已经形成的原型去理解和袁征自己或熟悉人物的日常惯例事件;实验2证明了出现这一结果是因为人们在理解这些事件时利用了过去生活中与当前描述相同的具体样例。实验2还发现,即使不存在上述样例,被试仍然没有启用相关的原型。     

Between the quills: Schopenhauer and Freud on sadism and masochism

It is a matter of common knowledge that Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) shared a common worldview. Everyone familiar with the works of these two thinkers should recognize their general philosophical affinities. Both men were pessimistic about the power of human reason and attributed human behavior to powerful unconscious forces and, as a result, both were deeply skeptical about the future of human society. Drawing from previous literature, this essay compares the philosophical theory of Schopenhauer with the psychoanalytic theory of Freud. We find that, while Schopenhauer and Freud share a common philosophical orientation and diagnosed the same fundamental problems with life in civilization, they proposed some ostensibly similar, yet ultimately very different solutions. Focusing on each thinker's respective notion of sadism and masochism, this paper tries to understand and come to terms with the dimensions of this radical pessimism.