Acquisition and forgetting in monkeys' memory of informational object-reward associations

The first experiment showed the monkeys could recall whether an object had been rewarded with peanuts or with sultanas, two equally preferred foods. The second investigated the effect of rewarded trials with an object on monkeys' ability to recall a nonrewarded trial with the same object. The third demonstrated that monkeys could use the memory of reward to predict nonreward and the memory of nonreward to predict reward, in a Win-Shift Lose-Stay paradigm. The fourth found differences between Win-Shift Lose-Stay and Win-Stay Lose-Shift in the rate at which associations between objects and reward events were forgotten. These results are discussed in relation to D. L. Medin's (In A. M. Schrier, Ed., Behavioral primatology, Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977, Vol. I, pp. 33–69) distinction between informational and hedonic effects of reward in monkeys. It is argued that the association between an object and a reward event is represented in memory by many independent traces, different traces recording the object's association with different attributes of the reward event.     

Aversive CS control of instrumental avoidance as a function of selected parameters and method of Pavlovian conditioning

Effects of aversive CSs upon dogs' instrumental avoidance responding were assessed as a function of the Pavlovian conditioning parameters using off-baseline (Experiment 1) and on-baseline (Experiment 2) conditioning procedures. In each experiment, three UCS intensitites (2, 6, and 10 mA) were crossed factorially with two CS-UCS intervals (10 and 90 sec) yielding six groups. After 4 days of conditioning, the CS-produced effects on avoidance were determined primarily by an interaction between Pavlovian procedure (off- versus on-baseline) and UCS intensity. With off-baseline conditioning, CS-produced facilitation of avoidance was an increasing function of the UCS intensity. However, with on-baseline conditioning, only the CS paired with weak UCS facilitated avoidance, and the CS paired with the strong UCS suppressed responding. This reversing parametric function poses problems for two-process motivational theories of avoidance.     

Dissociative effects of different types and amounts of nonreinforced CS exposure on avoidance extinction and the CER

Two experiments examined the effectiveness of two amounts of flooding or response-prevention on hastening avoidance response extinction and on reducing CS-produced suppression of bar-pressing for food. In Experiment 1, 20 and 30 flooding trials were both shown to be effective in hastening the extinction of a well-learned shuttlebox avoidance response. In Experiment 2, rats trained under comparable conditions to those in Experiment 1 were tested following flooding for the CER in a different apparatus. The results indicated that 30, but not 20, flooding trials were sufficient to reduce the CER. In each experiment the results of additional control groups equated with the flooded groups for nonreinforced CS exposure also revealed a dissociation between the effectiveness of this CS time control procedure in hastening avoidance response extinction and in reducing the CER. Further comparisons showed that although 30 flooding trials did reduce the CER, the same total duration of nonreinforced CS Exposure in the form of avoidance extinction trials did not. Thus the context in which CS exposure occurs may affect the dynamics of extinction of the CER. The experiments are discussed in the broader context of dissociation of various indices of fear in humans.     

Retention of conditioned inhibition in a bar-press suppression paradigm

In three experiments, the retention of conditioned inhibition in rats was examined over long intervals. Retention deficits of conditioned inhibition were found at 21 days, although conditioned excitation was relatively stable over time. This loss of conditioned inhibition was demonstrated using both the summation and the retardation of learning techniques in a bar-press suppression paradigm. Furthermore, retention differences were found between within-groups and between-groups generalization tests of conditioned inhibition, using the summation procedure. These differences were interpreted within a retrieval-oriented model of memory.     

Reinforcement magnitude and the inhibiting effect of reinforcement

In a two-key concurrent variable-interval schedule (using pigeons), if the reinforcement frequency for one response is held constant while that for the other is increased, the rate of response on the constant key decreases. The immediate reinforcement for key pecking can usually be conceptualized as the change from a condition in which the key light is on and the food hopper light is off to one in which the key light is off and the hopper light is on. The prechange condition is associated with a delay to food of one-half the average interreinforcement interval in effect during this condition. The postchange condition is associated with a delay to food of about .5 seconds. The programming of additional reinforcement results in a decrease in the delay to food associated with the prechange stimulus condition, and thus a decrease in the value of the improvement that results from the change. This would appear to be analogous to a decrease in the amount of reinforcement, and thus sufficient explanation for the decrease in the rate of the response.     

On the base-free measure of change proposed by Tucker,Damarin and Messick

Tucker, Damarin and Messick proposed a base-free measure of change which involves the computation of residual scores that are uncorrelated with true scores on the pretest. The present note discusses this change measure and demonstrates that, because of an incorrect derivation by the authors, properties they attribute to (the coefficient for the regression of true scores from the second testing on true scores from the first testing) are, in fact, properties ofb, the ordinary regression coefficient. A correct derivation of the initial position—change correlation in terms of is obtained, and Tucker et al.'s discussion of the law of initial values is reconsidered.The preparation of this paper was supported by the Learning Research and Development Center supported in part as a research and development center by funds from the National Institute of Education.     

Cognitive flexibility-rigidity, repetition effects, and memory

This experiment examined the role of cognitive flexibility-rigidity in memory. On the basis of several personality tests, subjects were classified as flexible, intermediate, or rigid, using a postexperimental blocking procedure. All subjects were given a perceptual grouping task, which masks the meaningful structure of the material. Subjects have the option of discovering the more meaningful structure consisting of word pairs, or alternatively, processing less meaningful chunks of letters. Results were that flexible subjects recalled substantially more items than intermediate and rigid subjects, in that order. In addition, subjects given different (varied) groupings of the letter chunks recalled substantially more than subjects given repeated presentations of the same grouping structure. Transfer tests indicated that subjects acquired different coding strategies under varied and constant input. Repetitious input led subjects to adopt inefficient strategies in processing the material to be remembered, whereas varied input led subjects to adopt efficient encoding strategies.     

Through the looking glass: Sex differences in memory for self-facial poses

This study investigated recognition memory of photographs of the subject's own face. Male and female subjects were photographed as they projected sociable faces, trustworthy faces, and intelligent faces. After deciding which face of 10 best represented each characteristic, and judging which photograph best represented their “real self,” a recognition memory test of poses was given. Half of each sex were tested under intentional learning conditions and the remainder were tested under incidental learning conditions. Females demonstrated superior recognition memory of their own facial projections and, in particular, recalled photographs of their “real self” and “most sociable” self most easily. No differences were found between the two learning conditions. Subjects' recognition performance was not related to their confidence of judgments. The results were discussed in terms of sex differences and the role of self in memory.     

Skill-set,success outcome,and mania as determinants of the illusion of control

The illusion of control, the tendency for individuals to approach chance tasks with skill-appropriate strategies, was studied. Subjects premeasured on a mania scale were classified as either high (HM) or low (LM) in mania. In the first phase of the study, HM and LM subjects performed 30 trials on either a skill (verbal associates) or chance (coin-toss) task and were given either 20, 50, or 80% success feedback. After Task 1 was completed, subjects filled out an attribution questionnaire. In the final phase of the study, subjects anticipated 30 more trials either on a skill or chance task. Subjects' predicted successes were measured. It was hypothesized that predicted successes on anticipated skill and chance tasks would be affected more by outcomes on a previous skill task than by outcomes on a previous chance task. The results for the anticipated skill task directly supported the hypothesis. On the anticipated chance task, the hypothesis was confirmed for HM subjects only. The results are discussed in terms of how previous skill experiences may induce a set to control ungovernable situations for individuals with manic reactions.     

A general scheme for the analytic decomposition of objective test scores: Illustrative demonstrations using the Rod-and-Frame test and the Müller-Lyer illusion

Objective tests of personality typically include a number of items or trials; the total score on the test is the sum of the subject's “correct” responses across all such trials. Normally, the trials are varied systematically across various facets of the test design, so that the total score represents a composite measure of accuracy averaged across these test facets. However, since only one score is computed for each subject, some potentially important kinds of individual differences—namely all those associated with each particular variation in the test design—are treated solely as measurement unreliability. Such a psychometric stance may serve to obscure more differentiated types of individual differences, with the result that composite scores from trials based on one type of experimental design may not be highly related to such scores from trials using a somewhat different design. The present paper presents a general procedure for scoring objective tests more analytically. To illustrate this general rationale, and to demonstrate its potential utility, data have been reanalyzed from two previous studies, one using the Rod-and-Frame test, the other the Müller-Lyer illusion. In both cases, the traditional global accuracy score did not correlate significantly with other theoretically related variables, while a number of component scores were quite highly related.