ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.     

Rhetoric and “doing philosophy”

By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of variability, time between trials, and conditioned reinforcers.

In a discrete-trials procedure with pigeons, a response on a green key led to a 4-s delay (during which green houselights were lit) and then a reinforcer might or might not be delivered. A response on a red key led to a delay of adjustable duration (during which red houselights were lit) and then a certain reinforcer. The delay was adjusted so as to estimate an indifference point--a duration for which the two alternatives were equally preferred. Once the green key was chosen, a subject had to continue to respond on the green key until a reinforcer was delivered. Each response on the green key, plus the 4-s delay that followed every response, was called one "link" of the green-key schedule. Subjects showed much greater preference for the green key when the number of links before reinforcement was variable (averaging four) than when it was fixed (always exactly four). These findings are consistent with the view that probabilistic reinforcers are analogous to reinforcers delivered after variable delays. When successive links were separated by 4-s or 8-s "interlink intervals" with white houselights, preference for the probabilistic alternative decreased somewhat for 2 subjects but was unaffected for the other 2 subjects. When the interlink intervals had the same green houselights that were present during the 4-s delays, preference for the green key decreased substantially for all subjects. These results provided mixed support for the view that preference for a probabilistic reinforcer is inversely related to the duration of conditioned reinforcers that precede the delivery of food.     

Fixed-ratio pausing: Joint effects of past reinforcer magnitude and stimuli correlated with upcoming magnitude

Pigeons responded on fixed-ratio schedules ending in small or large reinforcers (grain presentations of different duration) interspersed within each session. In mixed-schedule conditions, the response key was lit with a single color throughout the session, and pausing was directly related to the past reinforcer (longer pauses after large reinforcers than after small ones). In multiple-schedule conditions, different colors accompanied the ratios ending in small and large reinforcers, and pausing was affected by the upcoming reinforcer as well as the past one. Pauses were shorter before large reinforcers than before small ones, but they continued to be longer after large reinforcers than after small ones. The influence of the past reinforcer was modulated by the magnitude of the upcoming reinforcer; in the presence of the stimulus before the small reinforcer, the effect of the past reinforcer was enhanced relative to its effect in the stimulus before the large reinforcer. These results show that pausing between ratios is jointly determined by two competing factors: past conditions of reinforcement and stimuli correlated with upcoming conditions.     

影响频度记忆的几个因素

本研究通过两个实验探讨了刺激呈现频度、刺激的形式及其性质、加工深度、操作难度、意向性诸因素对频度记忆的影响,结果表明频度编码并不是一个独立、自动的加工系统,对其它识记过程有影响的因素同时也能改变被试的频度估计水平;意向的作用主要体现在当识记任务有一定难度且又缺乏有效的回忆线索时,能够在有限的范围内提高频度估计的水平;记忆痕迹的深度和广度对于频度信息的提取来说是两个彼此关联的线索。此外,本文还就频度记忆领域几个主要理论观点作了简要评述。     

记忆训练对改善少年、青年和老年人认知功能的作用

本工作采用“位置法”(method of loci)对24例少年、24例青年和22例老年被试进行了记忆训练研究。以毕生发展的观点比较认知训练对改善不同年龄人记忆的作用,进而探讨发展的认知功能储备能量的年龄差异和训练的迁移效应。结果表明认知干预措施可在一定程度上改善老年人的记忆,同时也显示了在发展的储能和对图形的迁移效应方面,老年人明显不如青、少年,而青年与少年则彼此相近。     

谈谈个人对智力落后儿童早期干预的看法

本文作者根据从事智力落后儿童的早期干预教学研究的实践经验对当今在我国开展早期干预的必要性以及早期干预的目的、设置的理由、内容、方式、对象、教师的条件、效果的评价以及开展的步骤等9个问题,提出了自己的看法。     

量词肯定句和否定句的理解

本研究试图探索人们对舍有“所有”、“每一个”、“有一些”等量词的肯定句、否定句和双重否定句的理解。要求成人被试尽快判断呈现在计算机屏幕上的句子和哪一幅图画的内容相符。结果表明,影响反应时的因素为(1)句子的表层结构和它的底层意义的一致程度;(2)句子的意义和从图画中得出的命题的一致程度;(3)句子中使用的量词。结果还表明,否定句的判断时间不一定全都比肯定句的长。     

PARADIGMS OF BELIEF, THEORY AND METATHEORY

Abstract. My account of the recent turnabout in the treatment of mental states in science and its basis in a modified concept of causal determinism and my claim that this opens the way for beliefs and values consistent with science are here reaffirmed in response to perceived weaknesses and "inherent incompleteness." Contested issues are reviewed to better clarify the main thesis. An inherent weakness in respect to deep spiritual needs is recognized and tentative remedial measures explored.