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161.
Alejandro Rosas Juan Pablo Bermúdez Antonio Gutiérrez 《Philosophical explorations》2018,21(3):350-363
In line with recent efforts to empirically study the folk concept of weakness of will, we examine two issues in this paper: (1) How is weakness of will attribution (WWA) influenced by an agent’s violations of best judgment and/or resolution, and by the moral valence of the agent’s action? (2) Do any of these influences depend on the cognitive dispositions of the judging individual? We implemented a factorial 2?×?2?×?2 between-subjects design with judgment violation, resolution violation, and action valence as independent variables, and measured participants’ cognitive dispositions using Frederick’s Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). We conclude that intuitive and reflective individuals have two different concepts of weakness of will. The study supports this claim by showing that: (1) the WWA of intuitive subjects is influenced by the action’s (and probably also the commitment’s) moral valence, while the WWA of reflective subjects is not; (2) judgment violation plays a small role in the WWA of intuitive subjects, while reflective subjects treat resolution violation as the only relevant trait. Data were collected among students at two different universities. All subjects (N?=?710) answered the CRT. A three-way ANOVA was first conducted on the whole sample and then on the intuitive and reflective groups separately. This study suggests that differences in cognitive dispositions can significantly impact the folk understanding of philosophical concepts and thus suggests that analysis of folk concepts should take cognitive dispositions into account. 相似文献
162.
In this paper we make the case for a psychoanalytically informed reconsideration of the phenomena of consciousness. Classically, following Freud, who viewed consciousness as merely a reflection or perception of unconscious mental activity, psychoanalysts have tended to regard a focus on conscious experience as potentially reductionistic and at risk of overlooking the mind's deeper structures. We describe the case of Mr K, a patient who experienced disturbances of consciousness that forced us to consider the possibility that the capacity to experience ourselves as conscious, intentional agents in a coherent world of objects is not merely a modality of perception but rather a maturational and developmental achievement that to some degree depends on adequate experiences of caregiving and is vital in ensuring the possibility of human communication. As such, it is a capacity that is vulnerable to experiences of neglect and maltreatment. We suggest that as well as compromising the capacity to think about one's own and other people's feelings, such experiences may have the further adverse consequence of leading the individual to experience and risk becoming conscious of certain dangerously maladaptive, destructive states of mind which in normal development remain inaccessible to conscious experience. Phenomenologically, such states of mind are experienced as fragmentation and disturbances of consciousness. We discuss the clinical implications of these reflections and the limitations they place on psychoanalytic work in the context of their impact on the work with Mr K. 相似文献
163.
Raul Hartke 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2016,97(3):893-913
The theory of the Oedipus complex as Freud formulated it rests on the following pillars: the child's characteristic sexual and aggressive impulses concerning the parents, phallic monism, and the castration complex. This paper reviews the context in which Freud discovered the Oedipus complex, as well as Freud's theory. It then examines the proposals of later authors whose general Oedipal theories differ from Freud's in an attempt to point out both their possible correlations and confrontations with Freud. It includes Klein's pre‐genital Oedipal theory, Lacan's structuralist reinterpretation, Bion's reconception of the complex under the knowledge vertex, Green's generalized triangulation theory, Meltzer's notions of the aesthetic object and sexual mental states, and Chasseguet‐Smirgel's archaic Oedipal matrix 相似文献
164.
Nathalie Pilard 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2018,63(1):65-84
Intuition is central in the work, practice, and philosophical legacy of C. G. Jung. In this paper, I will first discuss the importance of intuition for Jung in the paradigm usually designated the ‘paranormal’. Jung was attracted to intuition as an extra‐ordinary gift or function in the traditional sense, and this is considered here in relation to his 1896‐1899 Zofingia Lectures and 1902 On the Psychology and Pathology of So‐called Occult Phenomena: A Psychiatric Study. A significant development then occurred in 1913, when esotericist intuitions were turned toward psychological use with Jung's Red Book. There, his personal and private use of intuition – and we know how extraordinarily intuitive he was – led Jung to fully incorporate intuition at the core of his psychology. Not only in his practice, in the crucial intuitive form of empathy, but as we will see, also at the very heart of his theory. In 1921, Jung wrote Psychological Types, where intuition became one – the first – of the four fundamental functions and types of the psyche next to thinking, feeling, and sensation. In 1921, Jung proved to the world in rational argument that intuition was no longer a psychologist's hobby for table turning, but the most significant function of the psyche. 相似文献
165.
166.
The illumination of history 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Michael Feldman 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2007,88(3):609-625
Formulations regarding the patient's history have not only played an important part in understanding the patient, but interpretations explicitly linking the present with the past have been seen as central to the therapeutic process. In this paper the author considers the role of historical reconstruction in bringing about psychic change. He emphasizes the therapeutic value that lies in the exploration of the way the patient's history is embodied in his internal object relationships, becoming manifested in the transference-countertransference relationship. The author presents clinical material which he suggests allowed the analyst to follow the way the patient's internal object relations, coloured by her history, became expressed and played out in the sessions. He suggests that, when these processes can be followed and addressed in the present, this may lead to a diminution in the underlying anxieties. This can thus promote psychic change by freeing the patient's capacity to achieve a sense of connection with her history, and to tolerate the meaning of what emerges, which illuminates both the present and the past. 相似文献
167.
Jonathan Webber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):89-104
Gilbert Harman has argued that the common-sense characterological psychology employed in virtue ethics is rooted not in unbiased
observation of close acquaintances, but rather in the ‘fundamental attribution error’. If this is right, then philosophers
cannot rely on their intuitions for insight into characterological psychology, and it might even be that there is no such
thing as character. This supports the idea, urged by John Doris and Stephen Stich, that we should rely exclusively on experimental
psychology for our explanations of behaviour. The purported ‘fundamental attribution error’ cannot play the explanatory role
required of it, however, and anyway there is no experimental evidence that we make such an error. It is true that trait-attribution
often goes wrong, but this is best explained by a set of difficulties that beset the explanation of other people’s behaviour,
difficulties that become less acute the better we know the agent. This explanation allows that we can gain genuine insight
into character on the basis of our intuitions, though claims about the actual distribution of particular traits and the correlations
between them must be based on more objective data.
相似文献
Jonathan WebberEmail: |
168.
道德敏感性是对情境的道德含意的领悟和解释能力,是道德行为产生过程中逻辑上的初始心理成分。道德敏感性与个体对情境的自动化加工及其伴随着的直觉情绪有着密切的关系。情境的背景与特征,个体的角色卷入、道德图式以及人格特点等因素都可能影响个体的道德敏感性。道德敏感性研究已在儿童早期发展、职业伦理以及测验方法等领域取得一定成果,但其理论构建仍需进一步完善、深化,与教育干预密切相关的发展研究有待加强,研究方法也需拓展和改进 相似文献
169.
Lombrozo T 《Cognitive Science》2009,33(2):273-286
Traditional approaches to moral psychology assumed that moral judgments resulted from the application of explicit commitments, such as those embodied in consequentialist or deontological philosophies. In contrast, recent work suggests that moral judgments often result from unconscious or emotional processes, with explicit commitments generated post hoc. This paper explores the intermediate position that moral commitments mediate moral judgments, but not through their explicit and consistent application in the course of judgment. An experiment with 336 participants finds that individuals vary in the extent to which their moral commitments are consequentialist or deontological, and that this variation is systematically but imperfectly related to the moral judgments elicited by trolley car problems. Consequentialist participants find action in trolley car scenarios more permissible than do deontologists, and only consequentialists moderate their judgments when scenarios that typically elicit different intuitions are presented side by side. The findings emphasize the need for a theory of moral reasoning that can accommodate both the associations and dissociations between moral commitments and moral judgments. 相似文献
170.
Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):345-352
Contextual theories of truth are motivated primarily by the resolution they provide to paradoxical reasoning about truth.
The principal argument for contextual theories of truth relies on a key intuition about the truth value of the proposition
expressed by a particular utterance made during paradoxical reasoning, which Anil Gupta calls “the Chrysippus intuition.”
In this paper, I argue that the principal argument for contextual theories of truth is circular, and that the Chrysippus intuition
is false. I conclude that the philosophical motivation for contextual theories of truth fails.
相似文献
Jay NewhardEmail: |