从具身视角看道德判断

道德判断是个体对于某类行为的善恶好坏和是非对错所进行的评价及判断。随着具身认知理论的兴起, 道德判断的具身研究随之展开。道德判断具身性的研究主要围绕身体清洁、厌恶, 身体温度及身体动作这3个维度展开。从皮亚杰及维果茨基的心理发展观, 概念隐喻理论和进化心理学3个角度对道德判断具身效应进行了理论解释和探讨。考虑到身体变量会通过情绪、认知因素进而影响道德判断, 今后具身认知视角下的道德判断应与道德判断中已有的理论进行整合, 同时对其与道德直觉的关系需要深入探讨, 并需进一步考察具身效应发生的时效性和动态性问题, 探讨道德判断具身效应的调节变量及个体差异, 同时要对道德判断具身效应进行跨文化比较。     

Submission, inhibition and sexuality: Masochistic character and psychic change in Austen's Mansfi eld Park

Mansfield Park is Austen's most controversial novel. 'Squarely taking on such issues as class, gender, sexuality, religion, education, theatricality, and colonialism, Mansfield Park now appears to occupy a more critical place in Austen's canon and in literary and cultural history generally than that perennial favorite, Pride and prejudice' (Johnson, 1998, p. xiii). Austen's heroine, Fanny Price has generated heated controversy because of the provocative contradictions in her character, which this paper argues tally with the psychoanalytic understanding of moral masochism within the masochistic character. As a child neglected at home and then sent to a frightening new environment, in which she was lowest and last, Fanny Price needed the love and protection even of those who mistreated her. She needed to control and influence them with submission and the inhibition of her aggressive impulses and through a vigilant scrupulousness. Austen created a plot in which she also dramatized the seeds of change that lie within the submissive character, within the repressed and inhibited psychosexual desire linked to the father which can drive the reemergence of wishes for love and satisfaction in situations of relative safety.     

False Memories,Negative Affects,and Psychic Reality: The Role of Extra‐Clinical Data in Psychoanalysis1

Psychoanalysis as a treatment originated in the idea that neurosis is related to the ways in which individual psychic reality departs from actuality. Psychic reality includes memories, beliefs and their associated affects and fantasies connected with an individual's experience of the inner and outer world. The psychoanalytic determination of what meaningful memories or beliefs are inaccurate, distorted or false ordinarily relies upon principles of intra‐clinical validation. By itself, however, intra‐clinical validation is subject to limitations and pitfalls that conviction alone about what is actual cannot circumvent. Despite this fact, there are remarkably few analytic case reports demonstrating false or signifi cantly distorted memories through the use of data obtained from outside the consulting room. This paucity of reports may be related, at least in part, to the belief that the use of extra‐clinical data is essentially unanalytic or supports resistance. Based on the views that (a) psychic reality cannot be regarded as exclusively subjective or objective but is inherently both; and that (b) a goal of analysis is to achieve a different, acceptable and more accurate view of reality, the authors report a clinical case involving a confi rmably false pivotal memory and its associated negative affects. They discuss theoretical and technical considerations in utilizing extra‐clinical data during the treatment process.     

Multiple Realizability Intuitions and the Functionalist Conception of the Mind

A popular argument supporting functionalism has been what is commonly called the “multiple realizability” argument. One version of this argument uses thought experiments designed to show that minds could be composed of different types of material. This article offers a metaphilosophical analysis of this argument and shows that it fails to provide a strong case for functionalism. The multiple realizability argument is best understood as an inference‐to‐the‐best‐explanation argument, whereby a functionalist account of our mental concepts serves to explain our multiple realizability intuitions. I show that the argument is inadequate because alternative accounts of our mental concepts exist that provide equally plausible explanations for these intuitions. Moreover, in the case of our qualia concepts, a nonfunctionalist account explains several other intuitions that functionalism cannot explain. Thus, despite its popularity, the intuition‐based version of the multiple realizability argument is a poor reason for accepting functionalism.     

Intelligence analysts’ strategies for solving analytic tasks

Analytic performance may be assessed by the nature of the process applied to intelligence tasks and analysts are expected to use a “critical” or deliberative mindset. However, there is little research on how analysts do their work. We report the findings of a quantitative survey of 113 intelligence analysts who were asked to report how often they would apply strategies involving more or less critical thinking when performing representative tasks along the analytic workflow. Analysts reported using “deliberative” strategies significantly more often than “intuitive” ones when capturing customer requirements, processing data, and communicating conclusions. Years of experience working in the intelligence community, skill level, analytic thinking training, and time spent working collaboratively (opposed to individually) were largely unrelated to reported strategy use. We discuss the implications of these findings for both improving intelligence analysis and developing an evidence-based approach to policy and practice in this domain.     

直觉还是推理,道德判断如何形成?

道德判断形成的机制一直存在争议,许多研究者通过实证研究来探索诸因素对道德判断的影响,这有助于理清不同因素的作用,但却难以构建道德判断形成的理论框架。文章系统性地回顾和总结了道德判断形成的五个经典理论模型及其相关理论,并结合实证研究的成果梳理了道德判断形成中理性、情绪、认知、直觉和推理之间的关系。基于此,构建了以直觉和推理为基本路径,基于规则的认知和情绪为调节因素的道德判断形成的理论框架。现有的理论模型和实证研究在该框架下均可以的得到较好的解释。同时,根据该框架,建议未来的实证研究中应当注重对影响因素的分类以及对实验情景的控制。     

Room for a view: on the metaphysical subject of personal identity

Sydney Shoemaker leads today’s “neo-Lockean” liberation of persons from the conservative animalist charge of “neo-Aristotelians” such as Eric Olson, according to whom persons are biological entities and who challenge all neo-Lockean views on grounds that abstracting from strictly physical, or bodily, criteria plays fast and loose with our identities. There is a fundamental mistake on both sides: a false dichotomy between bodily continuity versus psychological continuity theories of personal identity. Neo-Lockeans, like everyone else today who relies on Locke’s analysis of personal identity, including Derek Parfit, have either completely distorted or not understood Locke’s actual view. Shoemaker’s defense, which uses a “package deal” definition that relies on internal relations of synchronic and diachronic unity and employs the Ramsey–Lewis account to define personal identity, leaves far less room for psychological continuity views than for my own view, which, independently of its radical implications, is that (a) consciousness makes personal identity, and (b) in consciousness alone personal identity consists—which happens to be also Locke’s actual view. Moreover, the ubiquitous Fregean conception of borders and the so-called “ambiguity of is” collapse in the light of what Hintikka has called the “Frege trichotomy.” The Ramsey–Lewis account, due to the problematic way Shoemaker tries to bind the variables, makes it impossible for the neo-Lockean ala Shoemaker to fulfill the uniqueness clause required by all such Lewis style definitions; such attempts avoid circularity only at the expense of mistaking isomorphism with identity. Contrary to what virtually all philosophers writing on the topic assume, fission does not destroy personal identity. A proper analysis of public versus perspectival identification, derived using actual case studies from neuropsychiatry, provides the scientific, mathematical and logical frameworks for a new theory of self-reference, wherein “consciousness,” “self-consciousness,” and the “I,” can be precisely defined in terms of the subject and the subject-in-itself.     

An application of bi‐logical theory to the study of psychic change and mourning4

The authors propose that the process of psychic change involves the ‘working through’ of mourning for the loss of ‘theories of life’ that are based on narcissistic omnipotent beliefs. These theories need to be changed by other more realistic ones regarding how to resolve the inherent and natural problems of existence. Questioning the ‘truth’ of these theories of life, as well as the acquisition of the perception of the existence of time, makes up part of the process referred to, and this applies to the analyst in a certain way as much as to the patient. Such problems are lived, re‐edited and revised in the transference/countertransference relationship. The authors present a clinical illustration. They explore the concepts of symmetry, asymmetry, homogenization and differentiation in MatteBlanco's bi‐logical theory and propose that these are important to the comprehension of the dynamic of the psychic changes which occur in a non‐static analytic process.     

The song of the siren: Some thoughts on idealization and creativity in Martinů's Julietta

The authors draw on ideas posited by Segal in her seminal paper 'A psychoanalytic approach to aesthetics' to explore idealization and the creative endeavour as it is imaginatively portrayed in the Poutney/Lazaridis production of Martin3's Julietta, performed by Opera North (2003). The opera is set in a dreamlike world in which confusion proliferates, and Julietta is portrayed as a modern-day siren, luring Mischa, the main character, on to the rocks of psychic withdrawal. It depicts an inner drama where music, narrative and spectacle work together to evoke the main character's struggle which touches on universal themes–the ongoing nature of infantile longings, the pain of loneliness and separation and the fear of madness. Through careful reading of the opera and consideration of Martin3's life, the authors refl ect on the factors that may have shaped Martin3's relationship to this work, including his feelings towards his homeland, his mid-life crisis and the social and political turmoil of Europe at the time. The authors conclude by refl ecting on the aesthetic experience of the opera and the way in which the music transforms the drama and seeks to extend our understanding of psychic truth.     

Psychoanalytic process and thought: Convergence of Bion and Matte‐Blanco1

Using the convergence between Bion and Matte‐Blanco, in this article the author attempts to stress the view of the psychoanalytical method as promoter of expansion of the ability of the patient to think his emotional experiences. After a brief résumé of the ideas of both Bion and Matte‐Blanco, certain points of congruence between the two are emphasised: the way of perceiving the range of phenomena observed by psychoanalysis, intuition as a method for observing this field, the feelings as the raw material for thinking, and the importance of the concept of infinity in psychoanalysis. The way in which the ideas of Matte‐Blanco assist in the understanding of Bion's propositions is highlighted. Following these correlations, the author discusses certain questions pertinent to the psychoanalytical method and proposes a model in which the analyst acts as a mediator/catalyst in the process of revision of the ways in which the patient has organised his emotional experiences and the theories constructed to support these hypotheses. Samples of clinical material are presented.