The conceptual distinction between projective identification (Klein) and container-contained (Bion)

This paper describes the use of play in the psychotherapy of a latency child from a severely traumatised background. It considers the meaning of play in relation to the role of the psychotherapist and to psychotherapeutic technique and explores its functions in terms of the child's development. The paper documents the psychotherapist's learning experience about the difficulty of trying to make the ‘right’ interpretations and her consequent realisation of the intrinsic value of play in psychotherapy. In considering these themes, the author explores how, by placing interpretation secondary to play, the therapy enabled the development of the child's creativity and self-agency, facilitating a movement from primarily paranoid–schizoid defences towards the beginnings of a depressive position.     

Out of the body: embodiment and its vicissitudes

Body‐mind dualism and the consequent neglect of the body of the analyst can have important negative effects on the analytical process leading all too often to misinterpretations of the analysand's verbal and non‐verbal communications and to disturbances of analytical temporality. This is intensified when we are dealing with individuals where disembodiment and states of psychic deadness are central features. The paper explores the philosophical roots of the idea of a disembodied mind and the way in which this impacts our relationship with the world. While André Green's concept of the dead mother and disturbances in the sense of self‐agency have been held to play an important role in states of psychic deadness, I suggest that it is rather disturbances in the sense of body ownership and of the body image which are more central. The paper then discusses the particular kinds of countertransference that can be evoked in the analyst when we find ourselves dealing with this type of patient and suggests how we can use our embodied countertransference to become aware of and elaborate our own feelings of deadness in order to overcome the loss of temporality that is characteristic of such states. This is illustrated with reference to my work with a young man with a masochistic perversion and a severe disturbance of the body image with an accompanying profound sense of psychic deadness.     

The 'secret cocoon': fantasies about the private self in the absence of consensual reality

Clinical material is presented from an analysand whose defense of withdrawal to 'a private internal space' was mobilized when she became confused, within her relationships and within the transference, about whose understanding of a shared event was 'real.' Analysis of the defense as resistance revealed a disrupted sense of connection to others and to the analyst in the face of the difficulty in determining a consensual reality. This was accompanied by emotional withdrawal, with a complex fantasy of retreat to a protective inner hiding place, or cocoon. The phenomenology and functions of such withdrawals, the fantasies accompanying them, and the ways in which they changed during the analysis are discussed in this paper. For the patient described, the analysis of her shifting 'cocoon' states and of the fantasies connected with them eventually enabled her to access her creative 'private self' more freely and with less conflict.     

Reading Susan Isaacs: toward a radically revised theory of thinking

The author views Isaacs's (1952) paper, The nature and function of phantasy, as making an important contribution to the development of a radically revised psychoanalytic theory of thinking. Perhaps Isaacs's most important contribution is the notion that phantasy is the process that creates meaning, and that phantasy is the form in which all meanings - including feelings, defense 'mechanisms,' impulses, bodily experiences, and so on - exist in unconscious mental life. The author discusses both explicit formulations offered by Isaacs as well as his own extensions of her ideas. The latter include (1) the idea that phantasying generates not only unconscious psychic content, but also constitutes the entirety of unconscious thinking; (2) the notion that transference is a form of phantasying that serves as a way of thinking for the first time (in relation to the analyst) emotional events that occurred in the past, but were too disturbing to be experienced at the time they occurred and (3) a principal aim and function of phantasy is that of fulfilling the human need to get to know and understand the truth of one's experience. The author concludes by discussing the relationship between Isaacs's concept of phantasy and Bion's concepts of alpha function and the human need for the truth, as well as the differences between Fairbairn's and Isaacs's conceptions of the nature of unconscious internal object relationships.     

Further developments of the concept of fantasy

After the Isaacs' seminal work on the nature and function of unconscious phantasy (1948), several authors (mostly in the British Society) have reflected on the topic and tried to extend the concept of fantasy. In this paper I shall examine the contributions of Winnicott, Gaddini, Joseph and Anne Marie Sandler that aim at broadening this psychoanalytic concept. The authors that I have considered share a focus mostly on the early stages of child development. Both Winnicott and Gaddini belong to a line of thinking that explores the vicissitudes of the primary emotional development of the infantile self (in the mother‐infant relationship) involving the earliest processes of holding and bodily and kinaesthetic fantasy that form the bodily integrity of the person. The Sandlers focused mostly on the concept of the past unconscious understood as a place of primitive vicissitudes with a deficit in figuration where the process of repression is missing. The present unconscious phantasy (that is located in the here and now) has the function of rendering the past unconscious phantasy partly accessible; otherwise it would remain unknowable.     

Submission, inhibition and sexuality: Masochistic character and psychic change in Austen's Mansfi eld Park

Mansfield Park is Austen's most controversial novel. 'Squarely taking on such issues as class, gender, sexuality, religion, education, theatricality, and colonialism, Mansfield Park now appears to occupy a more critical place in Austen's canon and in literary and cultural history generally than that perennial favorite, Pride and prejudice' (Johnson, 1998, p. xiii). Austen's heroine, Fanny Price has generated heated controversy because of the provocative contradictions in her character, which this paper argues tally with the psychoanalytic understanding of moral masochism within the masochistic character. As a child neglected at home and then sent to a frightening new environment, in which she was lowest and last, Fanny Price needed the love and protection even of those who mistreated her. She needed to control and influence them with submission and the inhibition of her aggressive impulses and through a vigilant scrupulousness. Austen created a plot in which she also dramatized the seeds of change that lie within the submissive character, within the repressed and inhibited psychosexual desire linked to the father which can drive the reemergence of wishes for love and satisfaction in situations of relative safety.     

False Memories,Negative Affects,and Psychic Reality: The Role of Extra‐Clinical Data in Psychoanalysis1

Psychoanalysis as a treatment originated in the idea that neurosis is related to the ways in which individual psychic reality departs from actuality. Psychic reality includes memories, beliefs and their associated affects and fantasies connected with an individual's experience of the inner and outer world. The psychoanalytic determination of what meaningful memories or beliefs are inaccurate, distorted or false ordinarily relies upon principles of intra‐clinical validation. By itself, however, intra‐clinical validation is subject to limitations and pitfalls that conviction alone about what is actual cannot circumvent. Despite this fact, there are remarkably few analytic case reports demonstrating false or signifi cantly distorted memories through the use of data obtained from outside the consulting room. This paucity of reports may be related, at least in part, to the belief that the use of extra‐clinical data is essentially unanalytic or supports resistance. Based on the views that (a) psychic reality cannot be regarded as exclusively subjective or objective but is inherently both; and that (b) a goal of analysis is to achieve a different, acceptable and more accurate view of reality, the authors report a clinical case involving a confi rmably false pivotal memory and its associated negative affects. They discuss theoretical and technical considerations in utilizing extra‐clinical data during the treatment process.     

EXAMINING THE STRUCTURE AND ROLE OF EMOTION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF NEUROBIOLOGY TO THE STUDY OF EMBODIED RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

Abstract. Certain properties of the body and emotions facilitate the transmission of religious knowledge and the development of religious states through particular qualities of perception and memory. The body, which is the ground of religious experience, can be understood as transformative: the characteristic that recalled emotion is “refelt” in the present enables emotion to be cultivated or developed. Emotions and the stimuli that evoke them are necessarily culturally specific, but the automatic nature of this process is universal. Religious traditions have made use of these processes to educate the feeling toward certain qualities and to develop religious experience, through the use of sacred images, ritual posture and gesture, and repetition of ritual acts. Neuroscience contributes to our understanding of the emotional processes that take place when emotions are evoked, refelt, and developed; the neurobiological processing of emotion parallels experience. Keeping experience central makes it possible to bring religion and neuroscience together in a nonreductive examination of spiritual experience.     

Co‐development of child‐mother gestures over the second and the third years

This study looks at whether there is a relationship between mother and infant gesture production. Specifically, it addresses the extent of articulation in the maternal gesture repertoire and how closely it supports the infant production of gestures. Eight Spanish mothers and their 1‐ and 2‐year‐old babies were studied during 1 year of observations. Maternal and child verbal production, gestures and actions were recorded at their homes on five occasions while performing daily routines. Results indicated that mother and child deictic gestures (pointing and instrumental) and representational gestures (symbolic and social) were very similar at each age group and did not decline across groups. Overall, deictic gestures were more frequent than representational gestures. Maternal adaptation to developmental changes is specific for gesturing but not for acting. Maternal and child speech were related positively to mother and child pointing and representational gestures, and negatively to mother and child instrumental gestures. Mother and child instrumental gestures were positively related to action production, after maternal and child speech was partialled out. Thus, language plays an important role for dyadic communicative activities (gesture–gesture relations) but not for dyadic motor activities (gesture–action relations). Finally, a comparison of the growth curves across sessions showed a closer correspondence for mother–child deictic gestures than for representational gestures. Overall, the results point to the existence of an articulated maternal gesture input that closely supports the child gesture production. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Natural reference: A phylo‐ and ontogenetic perspective on the comprehension of iconic gestures and vocalizations

The recognition of iconic correspondence between signal and referent has been argued to bootstrap the acquisition and emergence of language. Here, we study the ontogeny, and to some extent the phylogeny, of the ability to spontaneously relate iconic signals, gestures, and/or vocalizations, to previous experience. Children at 18, 24, and 36 months of age (N = 216) and great apes (N = 13) interacted with two apparatuses, each comprising a distinct action and sound. Subsequently, an experimenter mimicked either the action, the sound, or both in combination to refer to one of the apparatuses. Experiments 1 and 2 found no spontaneous comprehension in great apes and in 18‐month‐old children. At 24 months of age, children were successful with a composite vocalization‐gesture signal but not with either vocalization or gesture alone. At 36 months, children succeeded both with a composite vocalization‐gesture signal and with gesture alone, but not with vocalization alone. In general, gestures were understood better compared to vocalizations. Experiment 4 showed that gestures were understood irrespective of how children learned about the corresponding action (through observation or self‐experience). This pattern of results demonstrates that iconic signals can be a powerful way to establish reference in the absence of language, but they are not trivial for children to comprehend and not all iconic signals are created equal.