Wittgenstein's therapies: From rules to hinges

Recently Wittgenstein's claim to be primarily engaged in a kind of therapy for the problems that trouble people in the grip of a certain picture of how things must be has been strongly emphasized. The form the therapy takes is to display various kinds of grammatical errors in the pathological practice. In Wittgenstein's late work, On Certainty, the role of the concept of rule as the ground of a practice is extended to include a different kind of grounding in “hinges”. I argue that there is a therapeutic role for the work of bringing to light the “hinges” that hold fast when the door of philosophy turns. I contrast examples of Wittgensteinian therapy where the cure is achieved by a display of grammatical rules, to cases in which the cure depends on emphasizing the role of a hinge or hinges in pathological confusions of thought in psychology.