‘A Compound Wholly Mortal’: Locke and Newton on the Metaphysics of (Personal) Immortality

In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, with distinct characteristics and functions, but are, nevertheless, ontologically interdependent. Consciousness – the locus of personhood, and thus, a necessary condition for personal immortality – is an embodied phenomenon; its preservation requires the life and proper functioning of the body. Dying with the dissolution of his body, then, man is a compound wholly mortal. Nevertheless, both Locke and Newton accepted the possibility of personal immortality; with Hobbes, both looked to the Biblical promise of bodily resurrection. For with the re-vitalization of the body – and a subsequent restoration of consciousness and memory – personal identity is preserved, even beyond the grave.     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Skew lattices and binary operations on functions

A recent study of the override and update operations defined on sets of partial functions placed both operations within the algebraic context of a certain variety of algebras. We show the latter to be term equivalent to the variety of right-handed skew Boolean algebras. Both operations are then studied within the broader context of skew lattices with an eye towards achieving greater insight into their joint algebraic behavior. A decision procedure is given to determine whether an equation in both operations holds for all sets of partial functions.     

On the Ranges of Algebraic Functions on Lattices

We study ranges of algebraic functions in lattices and in algebras, such as Łukasiewicz-Moisil algebras which are obtained by extending standard lattice signatures with unary operations.We characterize algebraic functions in such lattices having intervals as their ranges and we show that in Artinian or Noetherian lattices the requirement that every algebraic function has an interval as its range implies the distributivity of the lattice. Presented by Daniele Mundici     

On Varieties of Biresiduation Algebras

A biresiduation algebra is a 〈/,\,1〉-subreduct of an integral residuated lattice. These algebras arise as algebraic models of the implicational fragment of the Full Lambek Calculus with weakening. We axiomatize the quasi-variety B of biresiduation algebras using a construction for integral residuated lattices. We define a filter of a biresiduation algebra and show that the lattice of filters is isomorphic to the lattice of B-congruences and that these lattices are distributive. We give a finite basis of terms for generating filters and use this to characterize the subvarieties of B with EDPC and also the discriminator varieties. A variety generated by a finite biresiduation algebra is shown to be a subvariety of B. The lattice of subvarieties of B is investigated; we show that there are precisely three finitely generated covers of the atom. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 03G25, 06F35, 06B10, 06B20 Dedicated to the memory of Willem Johannes Blok     

Makers' Rights

This paper examines the thesis that human labor creates property rights in or from previously unowned objects by virtue of labor's power to make new things. This thesis is considered for two possible roles: first, as a thesis to which John Locke might have been committed in his writings on property; and second, as a thesis of independent plausibility that could serve as part of a defensible contemporary theory of property rights. Understanding Locke as committed to the thesis of makers' rights has seemed to many of the best known recent Locke scholars to explain and unify Locke's various claims about property in a way that more traditional labor-mixing interpretations cannot. This paper argues that there is in fact no convincing evidence in Locke's texts to suggest any commitment to the thesis of makers' rights for humans. Further, not only does a version of the traditional labor-mixing argument yield a much superior interpretation of Locke's writings, it is an argument that is far more convincing than makers' rights arguments, quite independent of its usefulness in the interpretation of Locke's theory.     

Pragmatism, Relativism, and the Critique of Philosophy

The relativist strain in Rorty's work should be distinguished from the Davidsonian strain. The latter may be exploited in support of Rorty's critique of philosophy but it is at odds with his use of "solidarity" and "ethnocentrism"as explanatory concepts. Once this is recognized, there remains in Rorty's work a consistent challenge to the search for general philosophical theories of truth, objectivity, and rationality (of which relativism itself is an example). On this reading, however, Rorty's pragmatism is not a theory that offers answers to questions about the authority of beliefs and practices but rather a critical tool used to open detailed, concrete, and critical investigation into particular questions about the establishment and viability of the beliefs and practices we have.     

What's Wrong With Methodism?

I distinguish between two theses, DPJ and DGP. DPJ asserts that one's justification for accepting particular epistemic propositions positively depends on one's being justified in believing general epistemic principles. DGP claims that one's justification in believing general epistemic propositions positively depends on one's being justified in believing particular epistemic propositions. I claim that methodism accepts DPJ and rejects DGP and particularism accepts DGP and rejects DPJ. I argue that we should reject DGP and methodism roughly because these views imply that many of us do not know epistemic propositions that we do know. This point is made by Roderick Chisholm in The Problem of the Criterion and challenged by Robert Amico. I consider Chisholm's arguments and Amico's objections. Finally, I argue that even if we reject DPJ and methodism, we need not embrace particularism, since we could reject both DPJ and DGP.     

Fostering Creativity in Philosophy

The American Philosophical Association suggests that studying philosophy can have an important impact on one's creative thinking ability. This paper abstracts from the empirical research on creativity a reasonable model of creative thinking, and discusses what the account implies about fostering creative thinking in philosophy courses. Given the empirical research on creativity and the nature of philosophy, studying philosophy can have an important impact on one's creative thinking ability, but faculty need to focus on it in their courses.