The Freedom-based Account of Solidarity and Basic Income

Real-libertarianism, as it is expressed in Philippe Van Parijs' recent monograph Real Freedom for All is characteristically committed to both self-ownership and 'solidarity’ with the infirm or handicapped. In this article it is argued that the conception of (real) freedom that is used to endorse self-ownership is inconsistent with the conception of (social) freedom or opportunity that is used to justify transfer payments to those with no or low earning capacity. The problem turns around the question whether one's freedom consists in the access one has to a share of the social product or in the measure of economic self-sufficiency one enjoys. Accordingly the role of private property in external resources as a condition for freedom is unclear: is it the basis of people's capacity for self-determination or is it the basis of people's bargaining power? Van Parijs' commitment to self-ownership suggests the former, his commitment to solidarity suggests the latter. A similar ambivalence is pointed out in his argument for a universal basic income, for which Real Freedom for All is so well-known.     

Once More into the Breach of Self-Ownership: Reply to Narveson and Brenkert

In reply to Narveson, I distinguish his no-proviso argument from his liberty argument, and I show that both fail. I also argue that interference lacks the strategic status he assigns to it, because it cannot be appropriately distinguished, conceptually and morally, from prevention; that natural resources do enjoy the importance he denies they have; that laissez-faire economies lack the superiority he attributes to them; that ownership can indeed be a reflexive relation; that anti-paternalism does not entail libertarianism; and that he misrepresents the doctrines of a number of philosophers, including John Locke, Ronald Dworkin, and myself. In reply to Brenkert, I show that he seriously misconstrues my view of the nature of freedom, and of its relationship to self-ownership. I then refute his criticisms of my treatment of the contrasts between self-ownership, on the one hand, and autonomy and non-slavery, on the other. I also show that his attempt to exorcize the demon of self-ownership is multiply flawed.     

Contingency,arbitrariness, and the basis of moral equality

Hardly anyone denies that (nearly) all human beings have equal moral status and therefore should be considered and treated as equals. Yet, if humans possess the property that confers moral status upon them to an unequal degree, how come they should be considered and treated as equals? It has been argued that this is because the variations in the degree to which the status-conferring property is held above a relevant threshold are contingencies that do not generate differences in degrees of moral status. Call this the contingency argument for the basis of moral equality. In this paper, I reject the contingency argument. Instead, I develop an attitude-based account of the basis of moral equality: according to this account, the basis of moral equality lies in a fitting, basic, and independent moral attitude which is owed to human beings qua moral status-holders, and provides a coherent and plausible explanation for why the variations above the threshold for moral status do not matter.     

The Life and Works of a Bottom-Up Thinker

A brief account is given of the author's life as a physicist and then a priest. The twin foundations of the author's theological endeavors have been a respect for traditional Christian thinking, though not exempting it from revision where this is needed, and a style of argument termed bottom-up thinking, which seeks to proceed from experience to understanding. The diversity of the world faith traditions is perceived as a major source of perplexity. A revised and modest natural theology and the issue of divine action have been at the top of a science and theology agenda. A defense is sketched in realist terms of the metaphysical strategy of using an ontological interpretation of the unpredictabilities of chaos theory to support a notion of top-down causality through active information. The success of Christian theology as a resource of total explanation depends on a credible account of eschatological hope. Reference is made to practical experience of ethics in the public square.     

产权安排是社会道德的基础

作为社会经济生活中的一种根本制度安排和人们的一种基本权利,产权是社会道德的基础。一定的利益差别和产权界定,是道德产生的前提;社会产权制度的性质和变迁,规定着社会道德体系的特质和演变;社会产权安排的结构和状况,影响和制约着人们的道德行为选择和社会道德风尚。健全的产权安排有利于规范和约束人们的行为选择,安定人们的生活心态,创造积极的道德环境和条件,从而优化人们的道德行为选择,促进良好社会道德秩序的形成。     

Influence of perceived emotion and gender on social motor coordination

Theorists have long postulated that facial properties such as emotion and sex are potent social stimuli that influence how individuals act. Yet extant scientific findings were mainly derived from investigations on the prompt motor response upon the presentation of affective stimuli, which were mostly delivered by means of pictures, videos, or text. A theoretical question remains unaddressed concerning how the perception of emotion and sex would modulate the dynamics of a continuous coordinated behaviour. Conceived in the framework of dynamical approach to interpersonal motor coordination, the present study aimed to address this question by adopting the coupled-oscillators paradigm. Twenty-one participants performed in-phase and anti-phase coordination with two avatars (male and female) displaying three emotional expressions (neutral, happy, and angry) at different frequencies (100% and 150% of the participant's preferred frequency) by executing horizontal rhythmic left-right oscillatory movements. Time to initiate movement (TIM), mean relative phase error (MnRP), and standard deviation of relative phase (SDRP) were calculated as indices of reaction time, deviation from the intended pattern of coordination, and coordination stability, respectively. Results showed that in anti-phase condition at 150% frequency, MnRP was lower with the angry and the female avatar. In addition, coordination was found to be more stable with the male avatar than the female one when both displaying neutral emotion. But the happy female avatar was found to elicit more stable coordination than the neutral female avatar. These results implied that individuals are more relaxed to coordinate with the female than the male, and the sensorimotor system becomes more flexible to coordinate with an angry person. It is also suggested social roles influence how people coordinate, and individuals attend more to interact with a happy female. In sum, the present study evidenced that social perception is embodied in the interactive behaviour during social interaction.     

Appearance and reality

There is tension between the appealing idea that visual experience puts us in touch with objective reality and the doctrine of perceptual relativity, the claim that experience varies with such factors as distance, lighting, and angle of view. In this paper I present arguments for relativity, and then go on to propose that in view of relativity, we should believe that the properties presented to us in perception are relational and viewpoint‐dependent. I conclude by sketching a theory of how we nonetheless manage to achieve contact with objective properties. According to the theory, such contact is best explained in terms of perceptual representations acting in concert with cognitive and motoric representations, not in terms of perceptual representations alone.     

Mind-body dualism and the compatibility of medical methods

In this paper we analyse some misleading theses concerning the oldcontroversy over the relation between mind and body presented incontemporary medical literature. We undertake an epistemologicalclarification of the axiomatic structure of medical methods. Thisclarification, in turn, requires a precise philosophical explanation ofthe presupposed concepts. This analysis will establish two results: (1)that the mind-body dualism cannot be understood as a kind of biologicalvariation of the subject-object dichotomy in physics, and (2) that thethesis of the incompatibility between somatic and psychosomatic medicineheld by naturalists and others lacks solid epistemologicalfoundation.     

Coauthorship in physics

In a large and detailed survey on the ethics of scientific coauthorship, members of the American Physical Society (APS) were asked to judge the number of appropriate coauthors on his or her last published paper. Results show that the first or second coauthor are more appropriate than later coauthors about whom there is equal and considerable doubt. The probability of any third and subsequent coathors being judged as inappropriate is 23% for the APS guideline, 67% for the tighter guideline of the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, 59% if the guideline requires “direct contributions to scientific discovery or invention”. Only 3% of respondents report having personally rejected an undeserving scientist who expected to be an author on the last published paper. Respondents seem to be divided into two non-overlapping populations—those who report no inappropriate coauthorship and those who have a more graduated view.