短时距估计中的标量特性

使用单任务研究程序,采用预期式研究范式和再现时距的研究方法,从心理物理学的视角,通过三个实验系统地考查了人类短时距估计的标量特性、变异源、时距估计中的转换点和韦伯函数的形态等问题。结果表明,刺激物的运动、变化、速度和物理时距是被试进行短时距估计的重要变异源;被试在实验中表现出高估较短时距和低估较长时距的倾向,时距估计的转换点为11.1s;计时过程中得到的韦伯函数是个分段连续函数, 韦伯函数的拐点有两个12s和21s,这两点与本研究得到的时距估计转换点具有部分一致性     

Challenging Design: How Best to Account for the World as It Really Is

Evolutionary psychology and intelligent‐design theory both need to be able to account for the empirical world, or the world as it is. This essay is an attempt to clarify the challenges these theories need to meet, if the relevant empirical findings are replicable. There is evidence of change in the biological world and of modularity of mind, and there is a growing body of work that finds evolutionary theory a convincing and fruitful account of the “design” of the mind. Three major empirical findings within evolutionary psychology are presented and discussed. The author claims that Cartesian dualism, as it is usually meant within psychology—a split between body and mind—is false, but that Descartes' original division between body and soul has not been challenged and is not challenged by the evidence that the mind is also a biological entity. The article concludes that the convergence of theology and science is to be found in the onus to discover the truth about the world as it really is, and this calls for an ability on both parts to account for the empirical world.     

Mapping the psyche-civilization relationship: how overcoming conceptual dualisms can help us better comprehend the trajectory of the human race

Global living standards have increased considerably as a result of the progress brought about by human civilization. However, ecological crises, global nuclear armament and an increasing sense of psychological discontent are among a list of things that bring into question the nature of modernity. Often these large-scale collective issues seem too overwhelming for the individual to ponder in any great depth and thus the question, ‘how are we, as individuals, supposed to address the problems facing broader humanity?’ remains. This paper suggests that it is the underlying conceptual dualisms that prevent an answer to this question, and by mapping the interaction between psyche and civilization, the actions necessary to correct the trajectory of Western civilization may become apparent.     

The Challenges of Qualitatively Coding Ancient Texts

We respond to several important and valid concerns about our study (“The Prevalence of Folk Dualism in Early China,”Cognitive Science 35: 997–1007) by Klein and Klein, defending our interpretation of our data. We also argue that, despite the undeniable challenges involved in qualitatively coding texts from ancient cultures, the standard tools used throughout the cognitive sciences—large quantities of data, coders as blind to the hypothesis as possible, intercoder reliability measures, and statistical analysis—allow the noise of randomly distributed interpretative differences to be distinguished from the signal of genuine historical patterns.     

Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas

Adults apply ownership not only to objects but also to ideas. But do people come to apply principles of ownership to ideas because of being taught about intellectual property and copyrights? Here, we investigate whether children apply rules from physical property ownership to ideas. Studies 1a and 1b show that children (6–8 years old) determine ownership of both objects and ideas based on who first establishes possession of the object or idea. Study 2 shows that children use another principle of object ownership, control of permission—an ability to restrict others’ access to the entity in question—to determine idea ownership. In Study 3 , we replicate these findings with different idea types. In Study 4 , we determine that children will not apply ownership to every entity, demonstrating that they do not apply ownership to a common word. Taken together, these results suggest that, like adults, children as young as 6 years old apply rules from ownership not only to objects but to ideas as well.     

Exploring the nature of cognitive flexibility

Cognitive flexibility is an important characteristic that helps humans pursue complex tasks, such as multitasking and finding novel, adaptable solutions to changing demands. Yet it is still a poorly understood construct. After briefly reviewing several investigations of this construct in cognitive science, I propose a unified account that considers cognitive flexibility a property of the cognitive system, rather than a cognitive skill. The emergence of cognitive flexibility is dependent on two kinds of interactions: the interaction of several cognitive mechanisms, and the interaction of sensorimotor mechanisms, cognition, and context in developmental time. The quest for a comprehensive and unified account of cognitive flexibility is highly justified given its potential usefulness in fostering efficient problem solving and creativity.     

Products of modal logics and tensor products of modal algebras

One of natural combinations of Kripke complete modal logics is the product, an operation that has been extensively investigated over the last 15 years. In this paper we consider its analogue for arbitrary modal logics: to this end, we use product-like constructions on general frames and modal algebras. This operation was first introduced by Y. Hasimoto in 2000; however, his paper remained unnoticed until recently. In the present paper we quote some important Hasimoto's results, and reconstruct the product operation in an algebraic setting: the Boolean part of the resulting modal algebra is exactly the tensor product of original algebras (regarded as Boolean rings). Also, we propose a filtration technique for Kripke models based on tensor products and obtain some decidability results.     

Excluding exclusion: the natural(istic) dualist approach

The exclusion problem for mental causation is one of the most discussed puzzles in the mind–body literature. There has been a general agreement among philosophers, especially because most of them are committed to some form of physicalism, that the dualist cannot escape the exclusion problem. I argue that a proper understanding of dualism – its form, commitments, and intuitions – makes the exclusion problem irrelevant from a dualist perspective. The paper proposes a dualist approach, based on a theory of event causation, according to which events are medium-grained, namely parsed into mental and physical property components. A theory of contrastive mental causation is built upon this theory of events, for which the problem of exclusion does not arise.     

Sport,Craft Or Technique? The Case of competitive aeromodelling

This essay takes competitive aeromodelling as a test case for certain contentious issues in philosophy of sport. More specifically, I look at the challenge it presents to prevailing ideas of what properly counts as ‘sport’, which in turn have their source in other, more basic or deep-rooted preconceptions. Among them are a range of ‘common-sense’ beliefs about the properly (naturally) human, the mind/body relationship, the role (if any) of scientific-technological innovation as a means of performance enhancement, and – most fundamentally – the distinction between nature and culture in so far as it bears on these questions. My approach is broadly deconstructionist in taking them as genuine questions and in pressing hard on those unresolved problems thrown up by any attempt to secure a definition of ‘sport’ that would pre-emptively exclude any kind of advanced technological adjunct (or Derridean ‘supplement’) that seemed to lead outside and beyond the realm of ‘natural’ human powers, capacities and skills. On the other hand I acknowledge – as against ‘strong’-conventionalist (e.g. Wittgensteinian) approaches – that the category ‘sport’ cannot be relativised or culturally contextualised to the point where it loses all determinate sense or normative significance. My main purpose here is to assess various claims and counter-claims by running them past a fairly detailed account of competitive aeromodelling – or one particular branch thereof – and the kinds of difficulty it creates not only for conservative, essentialist or naturalising definitions but also for that other reactive trend towards all-out cultural-relativist or social-constructivist doctrines. In addition, though far from incidentally, I want to make the case that this is indeed a sport on any reasonable, fair, or adequately informed reckoning and that its recognition as such might help to clarify certain obscure corners of current philosophical thinking about these issues.     

EMBODIED COGNITION IN CLASSICAL RABBINIC LITERATURE

Challenging earlier cognitivist approaches, recent theories of embodied cognition argue that the human mind and its functions are best understood as intimately bound up with the human body and its physiological dimensions. Some scholars have suggested that such theories, in departing from some core assumptions of the Western philosophical tradition, display significant similarities to certain non‐Western traditions of thought, such as Buddhism. This essay extends such parallels to the Jewish tradition and argues that, in particular, classical rabbinic thought presents a profoundly nondualistic account of the body–soul relation in its connection to cognition, action, and embodiment. Classical rabbinic texts therefore model the possibility of engaging with ‘Western’ conceptions such as God and the soul, while doing so in a manner that resonates strongly with many aspects of contemporary scientific theories. Thus, beyond their value as historical documents, insight into the texts and concepts of classical rabbinic Judaism can contribute to the further development of new theories of intellect and cognition.