Giving,Fast and Slow: Reflection Increases Costly (but Not Uncostly) Charitable Giving

Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation (Are people intuitively generous or stingy? Does reflection make people more willing to give generous amounts to charity? Findings across the literature are mixed, with many studies finding no clear relationship between reflection and charitable giving (e.g., Hauge, Brekke, Johansson, Johansson‐Stenman, & Svedsäter, 2016 ; Tinghög et al., 2016 ), while others find that reflection negatively affects giving (e.g., Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007 ), and still others find that reflection is positively associated with giving (e.g., Lohse, Goeschl, & Diederich, 2014 ). I demonstrate that reflection consistently increases costly giving to charity. In Study 1, people were initially reluctant to give costly amounts of money to charity, but those who reflected about the decision were more willing to give. In Studies 2–3, I isolated the role of costly stakes by randomly assigning people to either an uncostly donation ($0.40) or costly donation condition (e.g., $100), and randomly assigning them to decide under time pressure or after reflecting. Reflection increased their willingness to give costly amounts, but did not influence their willingness to give uncostly amounts. Similarly, the relationship between decision time and giving was positive when the stakes were costly but was relatively flat when the stakes were uncostly (Study 4). Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

风险决策过程验证：补偿/非补偿模型之争的新认识与新证据

风险决策是人类赖以生存和发展的重大决策。如何进行风险决策是人类不断认识和改造世界过程中遇到的未解之谜。主流风险理论认为, 风险决策是一个补偿性的、期望值最大化的过程; 而非主流的风险理论则认为, 风险决策是非补偿性的, 并不遵循期望法则所假设的加权求和等过程。这一谜团为何一直没有得以破解, 或许是因为我们未找到揭示其心理过程的令人信服的证据。近10年来, 我们针对风险决策过程, 借助行为实验、眼动记录法、事件相关电位、功能磁共振成像等技术, 系统探索风险决策的心理和神经机制, 为回答“风险决策是否遵循补偿性规则”这一问题提供了汇聚性证据。本文依据期望法则所假设的概率函数推导、加权过程、加权求和过程、总分最大化等步骤, 对这些研究进行梳理与回顾, 以期加深人们对风险决策机制的理解, 并为建立、健全与风险决策相关的政策、法律法规提供理论依据。     

大学生面孔信任评价的自动化加工

本研究以40名大学生为研究对象,通过内隐加工和内隐记忆的方法探讨面孔信任评价是否为自动加工。结果表明,在外显记忆任务下,大学生在三种可信度面孔的再认成绩两两之间差异显著,其中不可信任面孔再认正确率最高,反应最快;在内隐记忆任务下,不可信任面孔的再认成绩最好,且反应最快。这些结果说明,个体可以依据陌生面孔的可信度对面孔进行自动加工,且对不可信任面孔最为敏感。     

多媒体学习中线索效应的元分析

作为多媒体学习中一种重要的指导性教学设计形式, 线索能否引导学习者的注意并促进学习效果, 目前结论尚不一致。研究运用元分析技术, 分别以保持测验、迁移测验的成绩作为学习效果的结果变量, 以线索区的注视时间、注视次数作为注意引导的结果变量, 探讨多媒体环境中的线索对学习效果和注意引导的影响, 并通过调节效应检验考察线索效应的边界条件。采用严格标准进行文献检索和筛选后, 共获取43篇符合元分析的文献。在保持测验成绩和迁移测验成绩上, 分别生成了44个(3910人)和41个(3906人)独立效应量; 在对线索区的注视时间和注视次数上, 分别生成了14个(938人)和11个(816人)独立效应量。结果发现, 线索的加入显著提高了保持测验成绩(g = 0.53)和迁移测验成绩(g = 0.36), 同时也增加了学习者对线索区的注视时间(g = 0.50)和注视次数(g = 0.70)。调节效应分析发现：在保持测验成绩上, 静态学习材料、陈述性知识、理工科条件下的线索效应分别高于动态学习材料、程序性知识和文科; 在迁移测验成绩上, 时空线索、静态学习材料、陈述性知识条件下的线索效应分别高于物理线索、动态学习材料和程序性知识; 而在眼动指标上, 线索对注意的引导主要受线索类型的调节, 物理线索条件下学习者对线索区的注视时间和注视次数均高于时空线索。结论认为, 线索的加入确实促进了学习者对学习材料的识记和理解效果, 同时也引导了学习者的注意分配; 但线索效应一定程度上受线索类型、学习材料动态性、知识类型、学科属性等因素的调节。未来研究需进一步考察线索效应的其他边界条件。     

Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind

Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first two studies employed the Ultimatum game and the Trust game. The third study used a variant of the Monty Hall problem. All games were conducted by individual participants playing interactively against a computer. The outcomes were designed to capture a common characteristic of real‐life decisions: they varied from rather negative to fairly positive, and for every outcome, it was possible to imagine both more and less profitable outcomes. In all experiments, those who changed their minds reported much stronger post‐outcome regret than those who did not change, even if the final outcomes were equally good (Experiments 2 and 3) or better (Experiment 1).This finding was not because of individual differences with respect to gender, tendency to regret, or tendency to maximize. Previous studies have found that those who change from a correct to wrong option regret more than those who select a wrong option directly. This study indicates that this finding is a special case of a more general phenomenon: changing one's mind seems to come with a cost, even when one ends up with favorable outcomes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Group process in Jungian analytic training and institute life

Group process experience for analytic candidates is a neglected dimension of training, and receives little attention in the analytic literature. Jung observed group dynamics, but he never studied them closely, attending instead to the psychology of the individual. Unconscious currents in small groups have been studied by others, most notably by Wilfred Bion, and there are similarities between his theories of the group unconscious and Jung's theories of complexes. Experiential and didactic seminars in group process were added to the analytic curriculum at the C.G. Jung Institute of San Francisco in the early 1990s, leading to changes in the group dynamic of trainees and analysts alike. A discussion of the theories of Bion and Jung are followed by a report on our experiences of facilitating group process for analytic candidates. We give quotes from candidates and analyst members to illustrate the group process and its effects. The need for further study to develop a uniquely Jungian perspective on the unconscious structure and dynamics of the group is suggested.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

Opening up Openness to Experience: A Four‐Factor Model and Relations to Creative Achievement in the Arts and Sciences

Openness to experience is the broadest personality domain of the Big Five, including a mix of traits relating to intellectual curiosity, intellectual interests, perceived intelligence, imagination, creativity, artistic and aesthetic interests, emotional and fantasy richness, and unconventionality. Likewise, creative achievement is a broad construct, comprising creativity across the arts and sciences. The aim of this study was to clarify the relationship between openness to experience and creative achievement. Toward this aim, I factor analyzed a battery of tests of cognitive ability, working memory, Intellect, Openness, affect, and intuition among a sample of English Sixth Form students (N = 146). Four factors were revealed: explicit cognitive ability, intellectual engagement, affective engagement, and aesthetic engagement. In line with dual‐process theory, each of these four factors showed differential relations with personality, impulsivity, and creative achievement. Affective engagement and aesthetic engagement were associated with creative achievement in the arts, whereas explicit cognitive ability and intellectual engagement were associated with creative achievement in the sciences. The results suggest that the Intellectual and Openness aspects of the broader openness to experience personality domain are related to different modes of information processing and predict different forms of creative achievement.     

Memory for Frequency of Bizarre and Common Stimuli: Limitations of the Automaticity Hypothesis

In 2 experiments, the influence of intention to process frequency on accuracy of memory for frequency of bizarre and common sentences was investigated. The results from multiple regression analyses indicated that intentional processing increased the accuracy of frequency judgments when memory for frequency was tested after a 2-min (Experiment 1) and after a 48-hr (Experiment 2) retention interval. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that unintentional processors tended to overestimate frequencies of bizarre relative to common items after a delay. The implications of the results are discussed with regard to L. Hasher and R. T. Zacks's (1984) automaticity hypothesis, human performance, and the accuracy of judgments of frequency of occurrence of unusual events.