Therapists’ experiences with internal representations of clients

Fourteen therapists were interviewed via telephone regarding their experience of “carrying around” their clients with them between sessions (i.e. internal representations, or IRs, of clients), a phenomenon about which little empirically based knowledge exists. Data were analyzed using consensual qualitative research. Findings indicated that overall, therapists have IRs infrequently, most often have IRs of clients struggling with severe or challenging presenting problems, and do receive some training about IRs. When describing a specific IR experience, therapists typically noted a strong therapy relationship, and stated that the IRs typically had specific triggers. The IRs generally consisted of feelings about the client, and typically consisted of thoughts about the client or the felt presence of the client. The IRs generally yielded positive effects, typically both personally and professionally, and were typically discussed with supervisors/consultants. Implications for research, training, and practice are presented.     

Determinants of the magnitude of willingness to accept relative to willingness to pay

In this paper we test two hypotheses that stem from the work of Mellers, Chang, Birnbaum and Ordonez ( 1992 ). The first hypothesis is that in a binary gamble, the ratio of WTA to WTP is decreasing in the probability attached to a nonzero event. The second hypothesis is that this ratio is independent of the size of stakes. We find support for the first hypothesis, but mixed support for the second. The second hypothesis holds in the case of gains, but not in the case of losses. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

广告的加工时间和注意水平对消费者信息加工模式的影响

本研究通过直接测量、间接测量和加工分离程序这几种测量方法检验了消费者对广告品牌名称的外显记忆和内隐记忆,并考察了各种测量方法对注意水平和信息加工时间的敏感性。结果发现：(1)分散注意条件下,再认成绩降低,而名牌判断任务的成绩没有差异;控制性加工减少,而自动化加工在各种注意水平下变化不大;(2)广告刺激呈现时间的减少降低了控制性的加工;(3)PDP可以分离广告的控制性加工和自动化加工。     

Phantasies, Neurotic-Beliefs, and Beliefs-Proper

This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (themselves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly specified, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representational cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more complete and adequate theory of mind.