The Role of Science in Medicine

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - A suitable demarcation between pure science and applied research can be drawn in terms of their goals. This distinction of goals has methodological and cultural...     

现代知识分类思想下的学习迁移理论述评

本文概括并评论了在知识分类思想前提下三种主要的迁移理论,即认知结构迁移理论,产生式迁移理论和反省认知迁移理论。     

The theory of the organism-environment system: III. Role of efferent influences on receptors in the formation of knowledge

The present article is an attempt to give—in the frame of the theory of the organism-environment system (jarvilehto, 1998a)—a new interpretation to the role of efferent influences on receptor activity and to the functions of senses in the formation of knowledge. It is argued, on the basis of experimental evidence and theoretical considerations, that the senses are not transmitters of environmental information, but create a direct connection between the organism and the environment, which makes the development of a dynamic living system, the organism-environment system, possible. In this connection process, the efferent influences on receptor activity are of particular significance because, with their help, the receptors may be adjusted in relation to the parts of the environment that are most important in achieving behavioral results. Perception is the process of joining of new parts of the environment to the organism-environment system; thus, the formation of knowledge by perception is based on reorganization (widening and differentiation) of the organism-environment system, and not on transmission of information from the environment. With the help of the efferent influences of receptors, each organism creates its own peculiar world that is simultaneously subjective and objective. The present considerations have far-reaching influences as well on experimental work in neurophysiology and psychology of perception as on philosophical consideration of knowledge formation.     

Purchasing decisions,partial knowledge,and economic search experimental and simulation evidence

Several experimental studies have discovered high-performing heuristic strategies in the search for the most economic price of a good in situations where a searcher has both full prior knowledge and no prior knowledge of the underlying price distribution. This paper describes a new experiment set in a more realistic ‘partial-knowledge’ framework. Several new search heuristics are suggested which match well with observed behaviour, and which, over a large number of simulated trials, perform well in comparison with the optimal model and better than previously reported ‘no-knowledge’ rules.     

Mind knowledge in infancy: The emergence of intentional communication

When and how infants and young children start to understand that persons are entities different from ‘non-persons ’ is the central issue addressed in this paper. A critical examination is presented of empirical research inspired by the ‘theory of mind ’ approach and relative to the knowledge about the mind exhibited by pre-school children (2–5 years of age). In considering what kind of psychological knowledge pre-linguistic children may acquire, it is argued that the most significant developmental phenomenon is the grasp of the concept of intentional communication, as distinct from both agency and instrumentality. Intentional communication, so defined, implies the capacity to represent and influence the other person's attentional state about aspects of the world, and at the same time to represent the other person as capable of understanding one's communicative intentions.     

The development of young infants' intuitions about support

Previous research has shown that 3-month-old infants, like adults, expect a box to be stable when it is in full contact with a platform, and to fall when it loses all contact with the platform. Do young infants also have expectations about what should happen when the box is only in partial contact with the platform? The present research was designed to address this question. In Experiment 1, 6.5-month-old infants saw two test events: a full-contact and a partial-contact test event. In both events, the infants watched the extended finger of a gloved hand push a box along the top of a platform. In the full-contact event, the box was pushed until its leading edge reached the end of the platform. In the partial-contact event, the box was pushed until only 15% or 70% of its bottom surface remained on the platform. The infants looked reliably longer at the partial-than at the full-contact event when 15%, but not 70%, of the box rested on the platform. These results suggested that the infants were able to judge how much contact was needed between the box and the platform for the box to be stable. A control condition provided evidence for this interpretation. In Experiment 2, 5.5- to 6-month-old infants were found to look equally at the full- and the partial-contact events, even when only 15% of the box's bottom surface remained on the platform. This result suggested that prior to 6.5 months of age infants perceive any amount of contact between the box and the platform to be sufficient to ensure the box's stability. Interpretations of this developmental sequence are considered in the Conclusion.     

And so indeed are perfect cheat

Ethical discourse and fallacy theory come together in a natural way over concepts such as bias, prejudice, preconceived opinion, prototypical and stereotypical thinking, dogmatism and loyalty. By and large, these are concepts that have not been sufficiently worked up to bear the theoretical weight either of ethics or of logic. The present paper seeks to ameliorate this situation. It proposes that situations describable by any such concepts partition into (a) the rationally and morally regrettable and (b) the rationally and morally impeccable, and in any event, unavoidable. Finding (b) will come as a surprise to some theorists.[A]ll the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongIdeas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat; And therefore, however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. ...John Locke,Essay on Human Understanding, Book III.     

Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.     

Ernest Becker and the Psychology of Worldviews

Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski offer experimental confirmation for Ernest Becker's claim that the fear of death is a powerful unconscious motive producing polarized worldviews and scapegoating. Their suggestion that their findings also prove Sigmund Freud's theory of repression, with worldviews as its irrational products, is questionable, although Becker's own statements about worldviews as "illusions" seem to invite such interpretation. Their basic theory does not depend on this, however, and abandoning it would enable them to take better advantage of their finding that worldviews incorporating the values of rationality and tolerance tend to counteract polarization effects.     

The threshold model of scientific change and the continuity of scientific knowledge

The continuity thesis of the Pozna school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued — using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example — that the continuity thesis does not hold.A distinction between a historical and a systematic point of view is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes the systematic point of view. However, looking at matters from the systematic point of view need not yield the original theory, looked at from the historical point of view. Applied to the case of Van der Waals/Boyle-Mariotte laws, it turns out that the latter law is not a true idealizing special case of the former, contrary to the continuity thesis.