Familial handedness and spatial ability: a study with Chinese students aged 14-24

This study tested Annett's right-shift theory on spatial ability with two samples from China. The Vandenberg Mental Rotation Test (MRT), Edinburgh Handedness Inventory, and Family Handedness Questionnaire were administered to 266 high school students and 297 undergraduates. We found very few r++ or r-- among Chinese students. Most Chinese are either moderately right-handed or ambidextrous. Consistent with Casey's finding, we found using different methods to classify handedness leads to different conclusions. However, we did not find the effect of familial handedness that Casey found. Visual strategy is related to success on the MRT but handedness is not.     

Beyond the Obvious: Chronic Vividness of Imagery and the Use of Information in Decision Making

The authors investigate two competing hypotheses about how chronic vividness of imagery interacts with the vividness and salience of information in decision making. Results from four studies, covering a variety of decision domains, indicate that chronic imagery vividness rarely amplifies the effects of vivid and salient information. Imagery vividness may, in fact, attenuate the effects of vivid and salient information. This is because, relative to nonvivid imagers, vivid imagers rely less on information that appears obvious and rely more on information that seems less obvious. This tendency is so robust that vividness of imagery may amplify the effects of vivid information only when this information is the only information available in the decision field. The findings seem to reflect vivid imagers' tendency to totally immerse themselves in a decision problem and scrutinize the available information creatively.     

元认知在画图表征策略和小学生数学问题解决能力中的中介作用

该研究采用自然实验和问卷调查法,对268名小学五年级学生进行画图表征策略训练,在此基础上根据策略学习情况筛选出掌握了该策略的218名学生,以这些学生为被试,探讨元认知在画图表征策略和小学生数学问题解决能力中的作用。结果表明:(1)策略学习后,小学生的画图表征策略水平和数学问题解决成绩均显著高于策略学习前。(2)画图表征策略通过元认知这一中介变量对小学生数学问题解决能力有显著的促进作用。     

Emotional intelligence: A promise unfulfilled?

Emotional intelligence (EI) is a relatively new construct in differential psychology. Proponents of EI have made strong claims for its importance in basic and applied psychology. This article considers whether the promise of EI has been fulfilled. We examine various fundamental challenges to establishing EI as a major individual differences factor, including cross‐cultural issues. We then examine strategies for assessing EI as a personal quality distinct from general intelligence and personality, and evaluate leading tests and scales for EI. Various sources of validity evidence demonstrate the value of research on EI, but we also identify various weaknesses of existing instruments. It appears that there is no strong, over‐arching general factor of EI that shapes human emotional functioning across a range of diverse contexts. Instead, we advocate a “multipolar” conception of EI that discriminates temperament, information‐processing, emotion‐regulation and acquired skills. Focusing research on more narrowly defined but conceptually coherent research domains may be a more productive strategy than seeking to define an all‐embracing general EI.     

Using individual differences to predict job performance: correcting for direct and indirect restriction of range

The present study investigates the relationship between individual differences, indicated by personality (FFM) and general mental ability (GMA), and job performance applying two different methods of correction for range restriction. The results, derived by analyzing meta-analytic correlations, show that the more accurate method of correcting for indirect range restriction increased the operational validity of individual differences in predicting job performance and that this increase primarily was due to general mental ability being a stronger predictor than any of the personality traits. The estimates for single traits can be applied in practice to maximize prediction of job performance. Further, differences in the relative importance of general mental ability in relation to overall personality assessment methods was substantive and the estimates provided enables practitioners to perform a correct utility analysis of their overall selection procedure.     

Faking on self-report emotional intelligence and personality tests: Effects of faking opportunity, cognitive ability, and job type

We assessed the combined effects of cognitive ability, opportunity to fake, and trait job-relevance on faking self-report emotional intelligence and personality tests by having 150 undergraduates complete such tests honestly and then so as to appear ideal for one of three jobs: nurse practitioner, marketing manager, and computer programmer. Faking, as expected, was greater (a) in higher-g participants, (b) in those scoring lower under honest conditions (with greater opportunity to fake), and (c) on job-relevant traits. Predicted interactions accounted for additional unique variance in faking. Combining all three factors yielded a “perfect storm” standardized difference of around 2, more than double the overall .83 estimate. Implications for the study of faking are discussed.     

Predictors of children's prosocial lie-telling: Motivation, socialization variables, and moral understanding

Children tell prosocial lies for self- and other-oriented reasons. However, it is unclear how motivational and socialization factors affect their lying. Furthermore, it is unclear whether children’s moral understanding and evaluations of prosocial lie scenarios (including perceptions of vignette characters’ feelings) predict their actual prosocial behaviors. These were explored in two studies. In Study 1, 72 children (36 second graders and 36 fourth graders) participated in a disappointing gift paradigm in either a high-cost condition (lost a good gift for a disappointing one) or a low-cost condition (received a disappointing gift). More children lied in the low-cost condition (94%) than in the high-cost condition (72%), with no age difference. In Study 2, 117 children (42 preschoolers, 41 early elementary school age, and 34 late elementary school age) participated in either a high- or low-cost disappointing gift paradigm and responded to prosocial vignette scenarios. Parents reported on their parenting practices and family emotional expressivity. Again, more children lied in the low-cost condition (68%) than in the high-cost condition (40%); however, there was an age effect among children in the high-cost condition. Preschoolers were less likely than older children to lie when there was a high personal cost. In addition, compared with truth-tellers, prosocial liars had parents who were more authoritative but expressed less positive emotion within the family. Finally, there was an interaction between children’s prosocial lie-telling behavior and their evaluations of the protagonist’s and recipient’s feelings. Findings contribute to understanding the trajectory of children’s prosocial lie-telling, their reasons for telling such lies, and their knowledge about interpersonal communication.     

What cognitive abilities are involved in trail-making performance?

The cognitive abilities involved in the Connections (Salthouse, et al., 2000) version of the trail making test were investigated by administering the test, along with a battery of cognitive tests and tests of complex span and updating conceptualizations of working memory, to a sample of over 3600 adults. The results indicate that this variant of the trail making test largely reflects individual differences in speed and fluid cognitive abilities, with the relative contributions of the two abilities varying according to particular measure of performance considered (e.g., difference, ratio, or residual). Relations of age on trail making performance were also examined. Although strong age differences were evident in the Connections and working memory measures, with both sets of variables there was nearly complete overlap of the age differences with individual differences in speed and fluid cognitive abilities.     

Assessing miserly information processing: An expansion of the Cognitive Reflection Test

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) is designed to measure the tendency to override a prepotent response alternative that is incorrect and to engage in further reflection that leads to the correct response. It is a prime measure of the miserly information processing posited by most dual process theories. The original three-item test may be becoming known to potential participants, however. We examined a four-item version that could serve as a substitute for the original. Our data show that it displays a .58 correlation with the original version and that it has very similar relationships with cognitive ability, various thinking dispositions, and with several other rational thinking tasks. Combining the two versions into a seven-item test resulted in a measure of miserly processing with substantial reliability (.72). The seven-item version was a strong independent predictor of performance on rational thinking tasks after the variance accounted for by cognitive ability and thinking dispositions had been partialled out.