Essential independence and likelihood-based ability estimation for polytomous items

A definition ofessential independence is proposed for sequences of polytomous items. For items satisfying the reasonable assumption that the expected amount of credit awarded increases with examinee ability, we develop a theory ofessential unidimensionality which closely parallels that of Stout. Essentially unidimensional item sequences can be shown to have a unique (up to change-of-scale) dominant underlying trait, which can be consistently estimated by a monotone transformation of the sum of the item scores. In more general polytomous-response latent trait models (with or without ordered responses), anM-estimator based upon maximum likelihood may be shown to be consistent for under essentially unidimensional violations of local independence and a variety of monotonicity/identifiability conditions. A rigorous proof of this fact is given, and the standard error of the estimator is explored. These results suggest that ability estimation methods that rely on the summation form of the log likelihood under local independence should generally be robust under essential independence, but standard errors may vary greatly from what is usually expected, depending on the degree of departure from local independence. An index of departure from local independence is also proposed.This work was supported in part by Office of Naval Research Grant N00014-87-K-0277 and National Science Foundation Grant NSF-DMS-88-02556. The author is grateful to William F. Stout for many helpful comments, and to an anonymous reviewer for raising the questions addressed in section 2. A preliminary version of section 6 appeared in the author's Ph.D. thesis.     

Humanizing education: Subjective and objective aspects

I propose that there are four standards to be met if a given educational enterprise is to be considered humane: (1) the practice to be mastered must be socially justified; (2) the disciplines pursued to master the practice must be appropriate to the practice; (3) the practice must be owned by the learner; and (4) this ownership must itself meet certain ethical requirements. The paper emphasizes the problem of ownership. It argues for a view of ownership that is communitarian. This view sees ownership as a function of identification or membership. People become committed to certain educational ends in virtue of the fact that they see themselves as members of a group and the ends as the ends of the group. It is central to this view that ownership of ends does not require full understanding or rational appraisal of such ends. I argue that a rational appraisal of ends is difficult when a novice seeks to appraise the ends of some practice both because the ends of the practice are internal to it in a way that makes grasping such ends difficult prior to mastery of the practice and because initiation into the practice will change the individual's standards of appraisal.     

What is educational theory and how to make it?

An analysis is provided detailing the conditions for the appropriate theoretical study of the object of educational science: pedagogy.     

HOW DID MORALITY EVOLVE?

Abstract. This paper presents and criticizes. Alexander's evolutionary theory of morality (1987). Earlier research, on which Alexander's theory is based, is also reviewed. The propensity to create moral systems evolved because it allowed ancestral humans to limit conflict within cooperating groups and thus form larger groups, which were advantageous because of intense between-group competition. Alexander sees moral codes as contractual, and the primary criticism of his theory is that moral codes are not completely contractual but also coercive. Ways of evaluating Alexander's theory as well as modified versions of it are discussed.     

Pierre de La Ramée et le déclin de la rhétorique

This article provides a basic general introduction to Ramus, and evaluates his role in the history of logic and rhetoric, especially with relation to the study of argumentation. The author agrees with Ong and other historians of logic that Ramus is not to be taken seriously as a logician, and that his undoubted importance in the history of ideas is to be found elsewhere.Ramus advocates a belief in nature, experience and reason, and rejects the reliance on the authority of ancient philosophers, above all Aristotle, though experience does not mean scientific experiment and, paradoxically, includes the example of great philosophers and writers. In the end Ramus is seen as responsible for substituting for ancient classical rhetoric an entirely ornamental rhetoric of figures which was to take over education (with the exception of the Jesuit schools) almost until our own day. This curtailing and diminishing of rhetoric is seen as a degeneration. Ancient five-part rhetoric had been concerned with convincing and persuading: Aristotle distinguished the analytic, scientific reasoning of logic, from dialectic which was based on opinion and probability and had close links with rhetoric; by the time of Cicero and Quintilian, who addressed themselves to jurists and politicians, logic has given way to dialectic. In the Middle Ages and the Renaissance the two become assimilated; the evolution of this is traced here through the thirteenth-century Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain to the fifteenth-century German humanist logician Rudolph Agricola, who influenced Ramus partly through the intermediary of Johann Sturm. Ramus took over their topical theories but restricted them to logic/dialectic, and left rhetoric with little more than tropes and figures. He believed that there was only one method for teaching all the arts, and one dialectic common to them all. The distinction between analytical and dialectical has disappeared, with far-reaching consequences for the study of argumentation. Over the centuries logic has lost its connection with controversy and persuasion. With the development of the post-Cartesian, post-Baconian emphasis on the clarity of scientific discourse, and the mid-nineteenth-century interest in mathematical and formal logic, the process was complete. Argumentation, or the new rhetoric, aims to fill the gap thus created.

     

Confidence depends on level of aggregation

The credible intervals that people set around their point estimates are typically too narrow (cf. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). That is, a set of many such intervals does not contain the actual values of the criterion variables as often as it should given the probability assigned to this event for each estimate. The typical interpretation of such data is that people are overconfident about the accuracy of their judgments. This paper presents data from two studies showing the typical levels of overconfidence for individual estimates of unknown quantities. However, data from the same subjects on a different measure of confidence for the same items, their own global assessment for the set of multiple estimates as a whole, showed significantly lower levels of confidence and overconfidence than their average individual assessment for items in the set. It is argued that the event and global assessments of judgment quality are fundamentally different and are affected by unique psychological processes. Finally, we discuss the implications of a difference between confidence in single and multiple estimates for confidence research and theory.     

Thoughts and feelings and things: A new psychiatric epistemology

Epistemology — the study of knowledge — is a philosophical discipline with close ties to psychiatry. When epistemologists address specific questions about how knowledge is actually realized by human beings, their philosophy must be informed by empirical studies of the sort psychiatrists now take up in a variety of forms. As this paper describes, psychiatrists can likewise improve their understanding of human psychology through a deeper appreciation of philosophical analysis in epistemology.The aim of this article is to introduce a unifying framework within which the experience from different approaches to psychiatry — (1) the conceptual schemas of cognitive psychiatry, (2) the mental structures of psychoanalytic psychiatry, (3) the categorical forms of existential psychiatry, and (4) the neural pathways of biological psychiatry — can all be applied productively to the central question of epistemology. By establishing a broad understanding of the problem of knowledge, this new view of epistemology is developed within the idiom of each psychiatric approach. In addressing themselves to a unitary problem, these diverse psychiatric approaches are themselves revealed, not as competing points of view, but as complementary views of a single subject. The result is a new epistemology that can not only bring the insights of psychiatry to philosophy, but can also contribute to the care of patients when psychiatrists bring this broader view to their clinical work.     

A study of the foundations of ethical decision making of clinical medical ethicists

A study of clinical medical ethicists was conducted to determine the various philosophical positions they hold with respect to ethical decision making in medicine and their various positions' relationship to the subjective-objective controversy in value theory. The study consisted of analyzing and interpreting data gathered from questionnaires from 52 clinical medical ethicists at 28 major health care centers in the United States. The study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists tend to be objectivists in value theory, i.e., believe that value judgments are knowledge claims capable of being true or false and therefore expressions of moral requirements and normative imperatives emanating from an external value structure or moral order in the world. In addition, the study revealed that most clinical medical ethicists are consistent in the philosophical foundations of their ethical decision making, i.e., in decision making regarding values they tend not to hold beliefs which are incompatible with other beliefs they hold about values.     

THE “WHERE IS IT?” REFLEX: AUTOSHAPING THE ORIENTING RESPONSE

The goal of this review is to compare two divergent lines of research on signal-centered behavior: the orienting reflex (OR) and autoshaping. A review of conditioning experiments in animals and humans suggests that the novelty hypothesis of the OR is no longer tenable. Only stimuli that represent biological “relevance” elicit ORs. A stimulus may be relevant a priori (i.e., unconditioned) or as a result of conditioning. Exposure to a conditioned stimulus (CS) that predicts a positive reinforcer causes the animal to orient to it throughout conditioning. Within the CS-US interval, the initial CS-directed orienting response is followed by US-directed tendencies. Experimental evidence is shown that the development and maintenance of the conditioned OR occur in a similar fashion both in response-independent (classical) and response-dependent (instrumental) paradigms. It is proposed that the conditioned OR and the signal-directed autoshaped response are identical. Signals predicting aversive events repel the subject from the source of the CS. It is suggested that the function of the CS is not only to signal the probability of US occurrence, but also to serve as a spatial cue to guide the animal in the environment.     

The second offspring of General Process Learning Theory: Overt behavior as the ambassador of the mind

Wasserman suggested in a recent book review that the study of intervening cognitive processes represents a current focus of interest in animal learning and that this has led to a revitalization of comparative psychology. An examination of the volume reviewed suggests that he may have overstated the case. Most of the authors to whom he refers expressed dissatisfaction with traditional stimulus-response associationism but few argued for the extreme (information processing) sort of cognitive approach described by Wasserman.