A Nonmonotonic Modal Formalization of the Logic of Acceptance and Rejection

The problems we deal with concern reasoning about incomplete knowledge. Knowledge is understood as ability of an ideal rational agent to make decisions about pieces of information. The formalisms we are particularly interested in are Moore's autoepistemic logic (AEL) and its variant, the logic of acceptance and rejection (AEL2). It is well-known that AEL may be seen as the nonmonotonic KD45 modal logic. The aim is to give an appropriate modal formalization for AEL2.     

Upward versus Downward Anchoring in Frequency Judgments of Social Facts

Frequency estimation of social facts in two methods of judgment elicitation was investigated. In the “narrow-range” condition, subjects answered questions in the format: “Out of 100 incidents, how many belong to category X?” In the “wide-range” condition, the frequency for the same event was assessed with respect to “Out of 10,000”. Judged frequencies in the wide-range condition were divided by 100, and were compared with the corresponding judgments in the narrow-range condition. Such comparisons were made for low-frequency and high-frequency events. Previous research has shown that, for low-frequency events, judged frequencies are proportionally greater in the narrow-range than in the wide-range condition. These results reflect cognitive processes of implicit anchoring, whereby judged frequencies lie close to small numbers within the response ranges provided. I call this process “downward anchoring,” and predicted that this tendency would be replicated in the present study. Moreover, I predicted that assessments about high-frequency events would evoke similar cognitive processes operating in the opposite direction. By such “upward anchoring,” judged frequencies would lie close to relatively larger numbers within the given response ranges. Consequently, I predicted that judged frequencies for high-frequency events would be proportionally greater in the wide-range condition than in the narrow-range condition. These predictions were confirmed.     

Calibration of sensory and cognitive judgments: A single model for both

In a recent issue of this journal, Winman and Juslin (34 , 135–148, 1993) present a model of the calibration of subjective probability judgments for sensory discrimination tasks. They claim that the model predicts a pervasive underconfidence bias observed in such tasks, and present evidence from a training experiment that they interpret as supporting the notion that different models are needed to describe judgment of confidence in sensory and in cognitive tasks. The model is actually part of the more comprehensive decision variable partition model of subjective probability calibration that was originally proposed in Ferrell and McGoey (Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 26 , 32–53, 1980). The characteristics of the model are described and it is demonstrated that the model does not predict underconfidence, that it is fully compatible with the overconfidence frequently found in calibration studies with cognitive tasks, and that it well represents experimental results from such studies. It is concluded that only a single model is needed for both types of task.     

Defaults in update semantics

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.     

Undecidability and intuitionistic incompleteness

Let S be a deductive system such that S-derivability (s) is arithmetic and sound with respect to structures of class K. From simple conditions on K and s, it follows constructively that the K-completeness of s implies MP(S), a form of Markov's Principle. If s is undecidable then MP(S) is independent of first-order Heyting arithmetic. Also, if s is undecidable and the S proof relation is decidable, then MP(S) is independent of second-order Heyting arithmetic, HAS. Lastly, when s is many-one complete, MP(S) implies the usual Markov's Principle MP.An immediate corollary is that the Tarski, Beth and Kripke weak completeness theorems for the negative fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic are unobtainable in HAS. Second, each of these: weak completeness for classical predicate logic, weak completeness for the negative fragment of intuitionistic predicate logic and strong completeness for sentential logic implics MP. Beth and Kripke completeness for intuitionistic predicate or sentential logic also entail MP.These results give extensions of the theorem of Gödel and Kreisel (in [4]) that completeness for pure intuitionistic predicate logic requires MP. The assumptions of Gödel and Kreisel's original proof included the Axiom of Dependent Choice and Herbrand's Theorem, no use of which is explicit in the present article.     

Human Signal-detection Performance: Effects Of Signal Presentation Probabilities And Reinforcer Distributions

University students participated in one of four standard two-choice signal-detection experiments in which signal presentation probability was varied and the reinforcement distribution was held constant and equal. In Experiments 1, 3 and 4, subjects' performance showed a systematic response bias for reporting the stimulus presented least often. Experiments 1 and 4 showed that this effect was reliable with extended training and monetary, rather than point, reinforcement. In Experiment 2, all correct responses were signaled in some way, and this produced the opposite relationship between signal presentation probability and response bias. Experiments 1 and 3 found that explicitly deducting money (intended as punishment) for equal numbers of incorrect responses on each alternative, or varying the obtained overall rate of reinforcement, produced no clear change in response bias. The bias, shown by humans, for reporting the stimulus presented least often remains a challenge for theories of stimulus detection.     

Changeover behavior and preference in concurrent schedules

Pigeons were trained on a multiple schedule of reinforcement in which separate concurrent schedules occurred in each of two components. Key pecking was reinforced with milo. During one component, a variable-interval 40-s schedule was concurrent with a variable-interval 20-s schedule; during the other component, a variable-interval 40-s schedule was concurrent with a variable-interval 80-s schedule. During probe tests, the stimuli correlated with the two variable-interval 40-s schedules were presented simultaneously to assess preference, measured by the relative response rates to the two stimuli. In Experiment 1, the concurrently available variable-interval 20-s schedule operated normally; that is, reinforcer availability was not signaled. Following this baseline training, relative response rate during the probes favored the variable-interval 40-s alternative that had been paired with the lower valued schedule (i.e., with the variable-interval 80-s schedule). In Experiment 2, a signal for reinforcer availability was added to the high-value alternative (i.e., to the variable-interval 20-s schedule), thus reducing the rate of key pecking maintained by that schedule but leaving the reinforcement rate unchanged. Following that baseline training, relative response rates during probes favored the variable-interval 40-s alternative that had been paired with the higher valued schedule. The reversal in the pattern of preference implies that the pattern of changeover behavior established during training, and not reinforcement rate, determined the preference patterns obtained on the probe tests.     

Semilattice-based dualities

The paper discusses regularisation of dualities. A given duality between (concrete) categories, e.g. a variety of algebras and a category of representation spaces, is lifted to a duality between the respective categories of semilattice representations in the category of algebras and the category of spaces. In particular, this gives duality for the regularisation of an irregular variety that has a duality. If the type of the variety includes constants, then the regularisation depends critically on the location or absence of constants within the defining identities. The role of schizophrenic objects is discussed, and a number of applications are given. Among these applications are different forms of regularisation of Priestley, Stone and Pontryagin dualities.