Judgments of Aggressive, Withdrawn and Prosocial Behavior: Perceived Control, Anger, Pity and Sympathy in Young Dutch Children

In two studies, we examined first- and second-grade children's judgments of aggressive, withdrawn, and prosocial behavior by means of fictional scenarios. In study I, we compared judgments of fictional aggressive children with those of fictional withdrawn children. Aggressive children were perceived as more responsible for their behavior and elicited more feelings of anger, while withdrawn children were more likely to be chosen as a friend and elicited more feelings of pity. In study II, we compared judgments of fictional aggressive, withdrawn, and prosocial children with each other. Again aggressive children elicited the strongest feelings of anger, while withdrawn children elicited the strongest feelings of pity. These withdrawn children were perceived as more similar to the prosocial children. In an attempt to test the ecological validity of our sympathy measure, we asked children to rate their peers on a three-point liking scale and checked the scores of those judged to be aggressive by their teachers. These aggressive children were found to receive the lowest liking scores. The results are discussed.     

A cognitive‐emotional account of the shape of the probability weighting function

Research has shown a tendency of decision makers to overweight small probabilities and to underweight moderate and large probabilities. In standard treatments this is graphically modeled by an inverse S‐shaped probability weighting function. We suggest that emotions play a significant role in the shaping of the probability weighting function. In particular, the weighting function is proposed to be some function of objective probability, expected elation, and expected disappointment. The overweighting of small probabilities results from the anticipated elation after having won, given that winning was very unlikely. The underweighting of large probabilities results from anticipated disappointment after having failed to win, given that winning was very likely. Hence, probability is assumed to influence utility. Three experiments investigate these hypotheses. Experiments 1 and 2 show that a convex function relates probability to surprise. Experiment 3 elicits choice data and further supports the proposed hypotheses. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes underlying the shape of the probability weighting function. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are there degrees of belief?

John Maynard Keynes claimed that not all probabilities were comparable. Frank Ramsey argued that they were, and that Keynes's views to the contrary rested on a confusion of degree of entailment and degree of belief. We will argue that Keynes and Ramsey largely talked past each other, and yet that there are issues of great significance underlying their dispute. In particular, the simple principle of maximizing expected utility may be seen in a new light as one step of a rich and complex process.     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

Choice with delayed and probabilistic reinforcers: effects of prereinforcer and postreinforcer stimuli.

In Experiment 1, pigeons' pecks on a green key led to a 5-s delay with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% (or, in other conditions, 50%) of the trials. Pecks on a red key led to an adjusting delay with red houselights, and then food was delivered on every trial. The adjusting delay was used to estimate indifference points: delays at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Varying the presence or absence of green houselights during the delays that preceded possible food deliveries had large effects on choice. In contrast, varying the presence of the green or red houselights in the intertrial intervals had no effects on choice. In Experiment 2, pecks on the green key led to delays of either 5 s or 30 s with green houselights, and then food was delivered on 20% of the trials. Varying the duration of the green houselights on nonreinforced trials had no effect on choice. The results suggest that the green houselights served as a conditioned reinforcer at some times but not at others, depending on whether or not there was a possibility that a primary reinforcer might be delivered. Given this interpretation of what constitutes a conditioned reinforcer, most of the results were consistent with the view that the strength of a conditioned reinforcer is inversely related to its duration.     

Second-order schedules of token reinforcement: effects of varying the schedule of food presentation

In the initial link of a complex schedule, one discriminative stimulus was presented and lever pressing produced tokens on fixed-ratio schedules. In the terminal link, signalled by a second discriminative stimulus, deposits of the tokens produced food. With two rats, the terminal link was presented after each sixth component schedule of token reinforcement was completed. With the other two rats, the terminal link was presented following the first component schedule completed after a fixed interval. During the terminal link, each token deposit initially produced food. The schedule of food presentation was subsequently increased such that an increasing number of token deposits in the terminal link was required for each food presentation. Rates of lever pressing in the initial link were inversely related to the schedule of food presentation in the terminal link. These results are similar to those of experiments that have varied schedules of food presentation in chained schedules. Rates and patterns of responding controlled throughout the initial link were more similar to those ordinarily controlled by second-order brief-stimulus schedules than to those controlled by comparable extended chained schedules.     

Rewording the Rules on Disjunctive Probability

Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or” (“just one of these statements is true,” “at least one of these statements is true”), logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false!     

Validation française de l’Inventaire d’Attitudes Environnementales

IntroductionClimate change has made it necessary to develop valid tools for studying pro-environmental behaviors.ObjectivesThe present study assessed the validity of the French translation of the brief version of Milfont and Duckitt's (2010) Environmental Attitudes Inventory. We chose this scale for its psychometric properties, its ability to predict behaviors, its theoretical foundations, and its use in many countries. In addition to the translation, we tested a shortened, 12-item version of the scale.MethodThree samples were used to study the structure of the IAE, its nomological network, its test–retest fidelity, and its predictive validity.ResultsIAE-24 has similar psychometric properties to the original version, for both one-factor and two-factor models (preservation and utilization dimensions). IAE-12 has satisfactory internal consistency if the one-factor model is used. The nomological network of IAE-24 is not totally identical to the original version. Differences can be ascribed to inconsistencies in the literature and the use of different scales. Both IAE-24 and IAE-12 have very satisfactory predictive validity and test–retest reliability.ConclusionThe French version of the IAE has satisfactory psychometric properties.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patterns of Preference for Numerical and Verbal Probabilities

We report results of an experiment designed to test a principle formulated by Budescu and Wallsten (1995), that, when communicating uncertainty information, mode choices are sensitive to sources and degrees of vagueness. In addition, we examined subjects’ efficacy in using such uncertainty information as a function of communication mode, source, and vagueness. In phase one of the experiment, subjects in a dyad used precise (numerical) or imprecise (verbal) expressions to communicate to a remote partner precise or vague uncertainty about the likelihoods of events. Spinner outcomes were used to generate precise uncertainty while answers to almanac questions were used to elicit vague uncertainty. In phase two, subjects saw the events paired with their partners’ estimates of similar events, and were asked to gamble on one event from each pair. Communication mode preferences were measured as the relative frequency that subjects chose the numerical mode to either express or receive uncertainty information regarding the events. Efficacy was measured as the relative frequency that subjects choose from the pair the event associated with the objectively more probable uncertainty expression. Underlying uncertainty interacted with direction of communication to affect preferences for modes of expression of the probabilities. Subjects preferred precise (numerical) information, especially for precise events (spinners). For vague events (questions), their preference for precise (numerical) information was stronger when receiving than when communicating information. Similar preferences were reflected in the efficiency of subsequent gamble decisions based on the probability estimates. Specifically, decisions were more efficacious (i.e. consistent with Expected Utility) when degrees of precision in events and estimates matched. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.