Perceiving a story outside of conscious awareness: When we infer narrative attributes from subliminal sequential stimuli

Perceiving a story behind successive movements plays an important role in our lives. From a general perspective, such higher mental activity would seem to depend on conscious processes. Using a subliminal priming paradigm, we demonstrated that such story perception occurs without conscious awareness. In the experiments, participants were subliminally presented with sequential pictures that represented a story in which one geometrical figure was chased by the other figure, and in which one fictitious character defeated the other character in a tug-of-war. Although the participants could not report having seen the pictures, their automatic mental associations (i.e., associations that are activated unintentionally, difficult to control, and not necessarily endorsed at a conscious level) were shifted to line up with the story. The results suggest that story perception operates outside of conscious awareness. Implications for research on the unconscious were also briefly discussed.     

Using high-probability foods to increase the acceptance of low-probability foods

Studies have evaluated a range of interventions to treat food selectivity in children with autism and related developmental disabilities. The high-probability instructional sequence is one intervention with variable results in this area. We evaluated the effectiveness of a high-probability sequence using 3 presentations of a preferred food on increasing acceptance in a child with autism who refused a few specific foods. The high-probability sequence increased acceptance of 3 foods. We then systematically faded the intervention for 2 foods.     

Hierarchical models of simple mechanisms underlying confidence in decision making

Choice confidence is a central measure in psychological decision research, often being reported on a probabilistic scale. Simple mechanisms that describe the psychological processes underlying choice confidence, including those based on error and confirmation biases, have typically received support via fits to data averaged over subjects. While averaged data ease model development, they can also destroy important aspects of the confidence data distribution. In this paper, we develop a hierarchical model of raw confidence judgments using the beta distribution, and we implement two simple confidence mechanisms within it. We use Bayesian methods to fit the hierarchical model to data from a two-alternative confidence experiment, and we use a variety of Bayesian tools to diagnose shortcomings of the simple mechanisms that are overlooked when applied to averaged data. Bugs code for estimating the models is also supplied.     

Effects of time between trials on rats' and pigeons' choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers

Parallel experiments with rats and pigeons examined reasons for previous findings that in choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not. In both experiments, the animals chose between a standard alternative and an adjusting alternative. A choice of the standard alternative led to a short delay (1 s or 3 s), and then food might or might not be delivered. If food was not delivered, there was an "interlink interval," and then the animal was forced to continue to select the standard alternative until food was delivered. A choice of the adjusting alternative always led to food after a delay that was systematically increased and decreased over trials to estimate an indifference point--a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Under these conditions, the indifference points for both rats and pigeons increased as the interlink interval increased from 0 s to 20 s, indicating decreased preference for the probabilistic reinforcer with longer time between trials. The indifference points from both rats and pigeons were well described by the hyperbolic-decay model. In the last phase of each experiment, the animals were not forced to continue selecting the standard alternative if food was not delivered. Under these conditions, rats' choices were affected by the time between trials whereas pigeons' choices were not, replicating results of previous studies. The differences between the behavior of rats and pigeons appears to be the result of procedural details, not a fundamental difference in how these two species make choices with probabilistic delayed reinforcers.     

Modeling the effect of reward amount on probability discounting

The present study with college students examined the effect of amount on the discounting of probabilistic monetary rewards. A hyperboloid function accurately described the discounting of hypothetical rewards ranging in amount from $20 to $10,000,000. The degree of discounting increased continuously with amount of probabilistic reward. This effect of amount was not due to changes in the rate parameter of the discounting function, but rather was due to increases in the exponent. These results stand in contrast to those observed with the discounting of delayed monetary rewards, in which the degree of discounting decreases with reward amount due to amount-dependent decreases in the rate parameter. Taken together, this pattern of results suggests that delay and probability discounting reflect different underlying mechanisms. That is, the fact that the exponent in the delay discounting function is independent of amount is consistent with a psychophysical scaling interpretation, whereas the finding that the exponent of the probability-discounting function is amount-dependent is inconsistent with such an interpretation. Instead, the present results are consistent with the idea that the probability-discounting function is itself the product of a value function and a weighting function. This idea was first suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), although their prospect theory does not predict amount effects like those observed. The effect of amount on probability discounting was parsimoniously incorporated into our hyperboloid discounting function by assuming that the exponent was proportional to the amount raised to a power. The amount-dependent exponent of the probability-discounting function may be viewed as reflecting the effect of amount on the weighting of the probability with which the reward will be received.     

Situational information and the design of representative learning tasks: What impact does a scoreboard have on expert taekwondo fighters' behaviour and affective-cognitive responses?

Designing representative learning tasks is one means to enhance sports practice. Recent work has highlighted how the presence of situational information could help the design of these tasks by shaping intentions and enhancing the affective demands of practice, however this has yet to be empirically tested. This study tested this hypothesis by manipulating the presence of a scoreboard featuring time and score situational information as expert taekwondo athletes fought in practice. Nine taekwondo fighters fought with and without situational information in a counterbalanced order. Behaviour was assessed by tracking fighters' location coordinates to assess fighter-fighter dyad coordination and through notational analysis of attacking actions. Affect and cognition were assessed with mixed-methods that included perceptual scales measuring anxiety, arousal, mental effort, score perception, and post-fight video-facilitated confrontational interviews to explore how conditions differed. The results revealed that the presence of the situational information had significant effects on taekwondo players. When present, fighters reported greater cognitive anxiety (d = 0.39, p < 0.05), somatic anxiety (d = 1.11, p < 0.05) and emotion intensity (d = 0.33, p < 0.05). The enhanced affective demands were associated with behaviour changes that included fighters preferring to spend time at closer distances (d = 0.25, p < 0.05), and more predictable technique selection (d = 1.04, p < 0.05). Qualitative data supported these findings. Players also reported their intentions were coupled to the context of scoreboard. This study reveals that situational information changes the affective and behavioural demands of practice to be more like competition. Further, situational sampling affords performers the opportunity to practice attuning to the relevant affordances for a specific context.     

首词素位置概率信息未参与汉语阅读的词切分：基于副中央凹加工的证据

本研究采用边界范式,考察汉语阅读中读者是否在副中央凹处利用首词素的位置概率信息进行词切分和词识别。采用2（首词素位置概率：高、低）×２（预视类型：相同预视、假字预视）的被试内实验设计,以双字词为目标词,记录大学生阅读句子时的眼动轨迹。结果发现,在跳读率和第一遍阅读的眼动指标中,被试在高、低首词素位置概率条件中获得的预视效益量无显著差异。该结果表明,读者并未在副中央凹处加工首词素的位置概率信息。结合前期研究推断,首词素位置概率信息没有作用于汉语阅读的词切分和词识别。     

Sometimes it does hurt to ask: The constructive role of articulating impressions

Decisions can sometimes have a constructive role, so that the act of, for example, choosing one option over another creates a preference for that option (e.g., , ,  and ). In this work we explore the constructive role of just articulating an impression, for a presented visual stimulus, as opposed to making a choice (specifically, the judgments we employ are affective evaluations). Using quantum probability theory, we outline a cognitive model formalizing such a constructive process. We predict a simple interaction, in relation to how a second image is evaluated, following the presentation of a first image, depending on whether there is a rating for the first image or not. The interaction predicted by the quantum model was confirmed across three experiments and a variety of control manipulations. The advantages of using quantum probability theory to model the present results, compared with existing models of sequence order effects in judgment (e.g., Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992) or other theories of constructive processes when a choice is made (e.g.,  and ) are discussed.     

On the logical structure of de Finetti's notion of event

This paper sheds new light on the subtle relation between probability and logic by (i) providing a logical development of Bruno de Finetti's conception of events and (ii) suggesting that the subjective nature of de Finetti's interpretation of probability emerges in a clearer form against such a logical background. By making explicit the epistemic structure which underlies what we call Choice-based probability we show that whilst all rational degrees of belief must be probabilities, the converse doesn't hold: some probability values don't represent decision-relevant quantifications of uncertainty.