Freedom,foreknowledge, and betting

Certain kinds of prediction, foreknowledge, and future-oriented action appear to require settled future truths. But open futurists think that the future is metaphysically unsettled: if it is open whether p is true, then it cannot currently be settled that p is true. So, open futurists—and libertarians who adopt the position—face the objection that their view makes rational action and deliberation impossible. I defuse the epistemic concern: open futurism does not entail obviously counterintuitive epistemic consequences or prevent rational action.     

Run length, visit duration, and reinforcers per visit in concurrent performance

The contingencies in each alternative of concurrent procedures consist of reinforcement for staying and reinforcement for switching. For the stay contingency, behavior directed at one alternative earns and obtains reinforcers. For the switch contingency, behavior directed at one alternative earns reinforcers but behavior directed at the other alternative obtains them. In Experiment 1, responses on the main lever, in S1, incremented stay and switch schedules and obtained a stay reinforcer when it became available. Responses on the switch lever changed S1 to S2 and obtained switch reinforcers when available. In S2, neither responses on the main lever nor on the switch lever were reinforced, but a switch response changed S2 to S1. Run lengths and visit durations were a function of the ratio of the scheduled probabilities of reinforcement (staying/switching). From run lengths and visit durations, traditional concurrent performance was synthesized, and that synthesized performance was consistent with the generalized matching law. Experiment 2 replicated and extended this analysis to concurrent variable-interval schedules. The synthesized results challenge any theory of matching that requires a comparison among the alternatives.     

Human symbolic matching-to-sample performance: Effects of reinforcer and sample-stimulus probabilities

Four experiments, each with 6 human subjects, varied the distribution of reinforcers for correct responses and the probability of sample-stimulus presentation in symbolic matching-to-sample procedures. Experiment 1 held the sample-stimulus probability constant and varied the ratio of reinforcers obtained for correct responses on the two alternatives across conditions. There was a positive relation between measures of response bias and the ratio of reinforcers. Experiment 2 held the ratio of reinforcers constant and varied the sample-stimulus probability across conditions. Unlike previous studies that used pigeons as subjects, there was a negative relation between bias and the ratio of sample-stimulus presentations. In Experiment 3, the sample-stimulus probability and the reinforcer ratio covaried across conditions. Response bias did not vary systematically across conditions. In Experiments 1 to 3, correct responses were reinforced intermittently. Experiment 4 used the same procedure as Experiment 3, but all correct responses now produced some scheduled consequence. There was a positive relation between response bias and the ratio of reinforcers. The results suggest that human performance in these tasks was controlled by both the relative frequency of reinforced responses and the relative frequency of nonreinforced responses.     

QUANTUM PHYSICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE IMAGE OF GOD: INSIGHTS FROM WOLFGANG PAULI

Abstract. Nobel Laureate in physics Wolfgang Pauli studied philosophy and the history of ideas intensively, especially in his later years, to form an accurate ontology vis-à-vis quantum theory. Pauli's close contacts with the Swiss psychiatrist C.G. Jung gave him special qualifications for also understanding the basic problems of empirical knowledge. After Pauli's sudden death in 1958, this work was maintained mainly in his posthumously published correspondence, which so far extends only to 1939. Because Pauli's view differs essentially from the direction physics research took after the deaths of the founding fathers of quantum theory, this article attempts to describe the main features in Pauli's revolutionary thought, which is based on nature's "epistemological lesson" as revealed by Pauli's atomic research. Pauli's conclusions have important implications for various issues in Western culture, not least with the limits of science and the relation of science to religion.     

Molar versus local reinforcement probability as determinants of stimulus value.

During one component of a multiple schedule, pigeons were trained on a discrete-trial concurrent variable-interval variable-interval schedule in which one alternative had a high scheduled rate of reinforcement and the other a low scheduled rate of reinforcement. When the choice proportion between the alternatives matched their respective relative reinforcement frequencies, the obtained probabilities of reinforcement (reinforcer per peck) were approximately equal. In alternate components of the multiple schedule, a single response alternative was presented with an intermediate scheduled rate of reinforcement. During probe trials, each alternative of the concurrent schedule was paired with the constant alternative. The stimulus correlated with the high reinforcement rate was preferred over that with the intermediate rate, whereas the stimulus correlated with the intermediate rate of reinforcement was preferred over that correlated with the low rate of reinforcement. Preference on probe tests was thus determined by the scheduled rate of reinforcement. Other subjects were presented all three alternatives individually, but with a distribution of trial frequency and reinforcement probability similar to that produced by the choice patterns of the original subjects. Here, preferences on probe tests were determined by the obtained probabilities of reinforcement. Comparison of the two sets of results indicates that the availability of a choice alternative, even when not responded to, affects the preference for that alternative. The results imply that models of choice that invoke only obtained probability of reinforcement as the controlling variable (e.g., melioration) are inadequate.     

Individual differences in impulsive choice and timing in rats

Individual differences in impulsive choice behavior have been linked to a variety of behavioral problems including substance abuse, smoking, gambling, and poor financial decision-making. Given the potential importance of individual differences in impulsive choice as a predictor of behavioral problems, the present study sought to measure the extent of individual differences in a normal sample of hooded Lister rats. Three experiments utilized variations of a delay discounting task to measure the degree of variation in impulsive choice behavior across individual rats. The individual differences accounted for 22-55% of the variance in choice behavior across the three experiments. In Experiments 2 and 3, the individual differences were still apparent when behavior was measured across multiple choice points. Large individual differences in the rate of responding, and modest individual differences in timing of responding were also observed during occasional peak trials. The individual differences in timing and rate, however, did not correlate consistently with individual differences in choice behavior. This suggests that a variety of factors may affect choice behavior, response rate, and response timing.     

Protecting Against Low‐Probability Disasters: The Role of Worry

We carry out a large monetary stakes insurance experiment with very small probabilities of losses and ambiguous as well as exact probabilities. Many individuals do not want to pay anything for insurance whether the probabilities are given exactly or are ambiguous. Many others, however, are willing to pay surprisingly large amounts. With ambiguity, the percentage of those paying nothing is smaller and the willingness to pay (WTP) of the other individuals larger than with exact probabilities. Comparing elasticities with ambiguity, we find that worry is much more important than subjective probability in determining WTP for insurance. Furthermore, when the ambiguous loss probability is increased by a factor of 1000, it has almost no effect on WTP. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Disjunction Between Probability and Verdict in Juror Decision Making

Although the law assumes a close relation between the probability that a defendant committed the act in question and the ensuing verdict of the jurors, prior research has shown this assumption to be often violated. We present five experiments designed to show that factors that influence probability also influence verdict, but other factors are capable of directly producing changes in verdict without affecting probability. In Experiment 1, we replicated the Wells Effect; scenarios generating the same probability that the Blue Bus Company was to blame for the same accident, nevertheless, generated significantly different likelihoods of finding the defendant liable. In Experiment 2, we showed that equally diagnostic affirmative and negative evidence had differential effects on mock jurors' probability estimates and verdicts. In Experiment 3, we showed that a completely nondiagnostic witness, who either implicates the same bus company or a different bus company as did a diagnostic witness, significantly influenced mock jurors' verdicts. However, the nondiagnostic witness did not change the probability that the Blue Bus Company was responsible for the accident. In Experiment 4, we demonstrated that base rate and witness reliability information resulted in very similar probability estimates but radically different verdicts. In Experiment 5, we showed that a change in the diagnosticity of the evidence influenced both probability and verdict with the former mediating differences in the later. Because probability is only one of the several determinants of the verdict, the two dependent variables are not as closely related as the law presumes. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.