Improved Test–retest Reliability Criteria as Applied to Probability Assessments

Test–retest reliability is a common indicator of response consistency. It is argued that using regression coefficients for detecting systematic response error is less appropriate than testing for shifts in the mean (median) and variance. This procedure is exemplified using probability response data. For this data, shifts in centrality were found to be about 2.5 times more likely than shifts in variability. The shifts in centrality did not favor any particular direction; however, variability tended to decrease over time in early sessions.     

When is the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney procedure a test of location? Implications for effect-size measures

The Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney procedure is invariant under monotone transformations but its use as a test of location or shift is said not to be so. It tests location only under the shift model, the assumption of parallel cumulative distribution functions (cdfs). We show that infinitely many monotone transformations of the measured variable produce parallel cdfs, so long as the original cdfs intersect nowhere or everywhere. Thus there are infinitely many effect sizes measured as shifts of medians, invalidating the notion that there is one true shift parameter and thereby rendering any single estimate dubious. Measuring effect size using the probability of superiority alleviates this difficulty.     

Relationships between perfectionism,self-report impulsivity measures and delay discounting

Perfectionism and impulsivity are multidimensional constructs. While different perfectionism dimensions are exclusively measured through self-reports, different impulsivity dimensions can be measured through self-report or behaviour via preferences for different rewards. This study explored differential associations between perfectionism and impulsivity based on both dimension and measurement modality (self-report/behavioural). We then examined whether adaptive or maladaptive perfectionism would be differentially associated with impulsivity. Two-hundred and six students completed two perfectionism and three impulsivity measures (two self-report; one behavioural). Two self-report impulsivity measures were associated with specific perfectionism dimensions, whereas the behavioural measure was not associated with perfectionism. Maladaptive perfectionism was associated with decreasing impulsivity, whereas adaptive perfectionism was associated with increasing impulsivity. Perfectionism related to impulsivity differently depending on how each construct was measured.     

Examining children's ability to delay reward: Is the delay discounting task a suitable measure?

Discounting the value of delayed rewards has primarily been measured in children with the delay of gratification task and in adolescents and adults with the delay discounting task. In the present study, we assessed the suitability of the delay discounting task as a measure of temporal discounting in children. A sample of 7- to 9-year-olds (N = 98) completed a delay discounting task, a delay of gratification task, a sensation seeking measure, and IQ measures. In addition, teacher-based assessments of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder traits were measured. The results indicated that the majority of children produced meaningful data on the discounting task and discounted rewards hyperbolically. Children with an elevated risk of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder showed a trend towards discounting future rewards on the delay discounting task more steeply than did those at low risk. However, delay discounting was unrelated to either delay of gratification or sensation seeking. We interpret these results as providing some support for the use of delay discounting as a measure of intertemporal choice in children, although the results also suggest that delay discounting and delay of gratification tasks may tap different processes in this population.     

条件推理:“演绎”与“概率”两种实验研究范式之比较

本研究通过推理心理学研究中的“演绎”和“概率”两种实验范式设计对同一个班级的大学生参与者(实验一中N=57,实验二中N=43)进行先后两次有关条件推理的实验研究后,得出如下主要结果:(1)推理者在对不同的“纯形式条件命题本身的认可度”以及对由它们各自建构的同类型推理题的推理结果之间的作答反应模式之间的差异都很小且具有较高的一致性;(2)对由不同的“含具体内容的假言命题”本身的认可度之间以及由它们建构的同类型条件推理题的推理结果之间具有较大的差异性;(3)推理者对“演绎”和“概率”两种不同实验范式分别建构的内容近似的推进题进行推理时具有大致相同的作答反应趋势。由此可以推论推理者在“概率推理实验范式”中的作答或推理结果可以被视为只是对“演绎推理实验范式”的相应推理题给出“概率解”的心理加工过程。     

四卡问题解决中的内容与逻辑分析效应

选取条件概率(P(Q|P))由低到高的四个命题作为四卡问题中的检验规则,探讨了大学生被试对四张卡片的逻辑证明作用的推断能力及其对解决四卡问题的影响。结果发现:(1)不同条件概率的命题之间正确选择P-Q的人数百分比不存在显著差异,命题的条件概率因素对四卡问题的正确解决没有影响。(2)逻辑分析过程对四卡问题的正确解决产生了一定的抑制作用,这可能是因为被试不能从整体上思考四张卡片在命题检验中的逻辑作用的缘故。(3)一些被试即使在逻辑分析过程中表现出知道-Q卡片的证伪作用,仍然倾向于选择卡片Q而非-Q,这一现象再次证实了人类思维的非形式逻辑的一面。     

动机的概率意义——概率归并定理与Monty Hall问题的非贝叶斯解

本文探讨Monty Hall问题认知困惑的形成因素。通过对该问题数学结构的分析,导出一个与该问题的解密切相关的定理——概率归并定理;并依据该定理给出了Monty Hall问题的一种更直观的数学解。     

The Influence of Time Estimation and Time‐Saving Preferences on Learning to Make Temporally Dependent Decisions from Experience

In this paper, we merge research related to experiential learning, temporal perception, and the value of time and money by examining decisions where the timing of action (response) determines the outcome received. We predicted that time‐saving preferences and impatience would decrease maximization (i.e., taking action when it returned the largest reward), and that the constraints of temporal perception would compound their effects. Across three studies, participants undershot on average (i.e., responded earlier than the period of time during which a response would return the maximal reward) showed a preference for shorter‐delay options and often did not find the maximal reward. In addition, participants' reliance on temporal perception increased undershooting, increased preferences for shorter‐delay options, and reduced maximization. Nevertheless, participants who found the maximal reward continued to maximize at a high rate rather than opting for shorter delays and smaller rewards. Thus, while most participants appeared to have a preference for saving time, most behaved as reward maximizers rather than temporal discounters. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Generalized Quantum Episodic Memory Model

Recent evidence suggests that experienced events are often mapped to too many episodic states, including those that are logically or experimentally incompatible with one another. For example, episodic over‐distribution patterns show that the probability of accepting an item under different mutually exclusive conditions violates the disjunction rule. A related example, called subadditivity, occurs when the probability of accepting an item under mutually exclusive and exhaustive instruction conditions sums to a number >1. Both the over‐distribution effect and subadditivity have been widely observed in item and source‐memory paradigms. These phenomena are difficult to explain using standard memory frameworks, such as signal‐detection theory. A dual‐trace model called the over‐distribution (OD) model (Brainerd & Reyna, 2008) can explain the episodic over‐distribution effect, but not subadditivity. Our goal is to develop a model that can explain both effects. In this paper, we propose the Generalized Quantum Episodic Memory (GQEM) model, which extends the Quantum Episodic Memory (QEM) model developed by Brainerd, Wang, and Reyna (2013). We test GQEM by comparing it to the OD model using data from a novel item‐memory experiment and a previously published source‐memory experiment (Kellen, Singmann, & Klauer, 2014) examining the over‐distribution effect. Using the best‐fit parameters from the over‐distribution experiments, we conclude by showing that the GQEM model can also account for subadditivity. Overall these results add to a growing body of evidence suggesting that quantum probability theory is a valuable tool in modeling recognition memory.     

Do Politicians Take Risks Like the Rest of Us? An Experimental Test of Prospect Theory Under MPs

Political psychologists have been quick to use prospect theory in their work, realizing its potential for explaining decisions under risk. Applying prospect theory to political decision‐making is not without problems, though, and here we address two of these: (1) Does prospect theory actually apply to political decision‐makers, or are politicians unlike the rest of us? (2) Which dimension do politicians use as their reference point when there are multiple dimensions (e.g., votes and policy)? We address both problems in an experiment with a unique sample of Dutch members of parliament as participants. We use well‐known (incentivized) decision situations and newly developed hypothetical political decision‐making scenarios. Our results indicate that politicians’ deviate from expected utility theory in the direction predicted by prospect theory but that these deviations are somewhat smaller than those of other people. Votes appear to be a more important determinant of politicians’ reference point than is policy.