How do Children Evaluate the Gossiper of Negative Gossip?

In this study, we investigated how children evaluate gossipers. There are two conflicting ways in which children evaluate the gossiper of negative gossip about another person. One is that they perceive the gossiper of negative gossip as bad because saying something negative about another person can be seen as indirect aggression. The other is that they perceive the gossiper of negative gossip as good because such gossip is beneficial to regulate their relationship with the gossip's target. To address the issue, we asked 7- and 8-year-olds to choose the gossiper of negative gossip or the gossiper of neutral gossip as a cooperative partner and to distribute resources between the gossipers. We found that the children often did not choose the gossiper of negative gossip as a partner and did not distribute many resources to her, indicating a perception of the negative gossiper as bad. This suggests that children's evaluation of a gossiper is influenced by the valence of gossip rather than the value of gossip.     

Revisiting Religious Ethics as Field and Discipline

Returning to John P. Reeder's 1978 essay on “Religious Ethics as a Field and Discipline,” this essay explores debates surrounding the original intentions for the Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE) and for the field of religious ethics, as these have played out over the decades among an influential group of scholars involved with the JRE since its inception: Arthur Dyck, Ronald Green, Stanley Hauerwas, and Jeffrey Stout. While the JRE and its founding mission are in need of ongoing critique and transformation, we might well still affirm the journal's ongoing importance as a site for the negotiation of a commons, the identification of possibilities for shared life, imagined beyond exclusion and domination.     

The Ethics and Politics of Religious Ethics, 1973–2023

This essay addresses the questions, “what good is religious ethics for?” and “what justification exists for the field?” in three steps. First, it canvases how religious ethicists have offered reasons for carrying out work in the field to identify an Anti-Reductive Paradigm that is guided by an Egalitarian Imperative. That imperative functions as a thin, minimal morality of inclusivity and equal respect that guides work in the field. Second, the essay considers the field's ends. Here the focus shifts from values that shape the field's methods to values that can describe the field's purposes. That shift requires us to think in terms of a thick rather than a thin morality, one with substantive rather than procedural virtues in mind. The essay offers a constructive, substantive proposal under the rubric of Critical Humanism. Critical Humanism justifies the study of religious ethics as an enterprise that can expand the moral imagination through its encounter with difference. It is shaped by four values: post-critical reasoning, social criticism, cross-cultural fluency, and environmental responsibility. Third, the essay brings the two parts of the argument together by explaining how to connect such purposes to the thin morality of inclusivity and equal respect. One upshot of the essay is to have us think not only about values, but also about power as it pertains to scholarship in the guild; hence the attention to the ethics and politics of religious ethics.     

Solidarity across group lines: Secondary transfer effect of intergroup contact,perceived moral distance,and collective action

We tested, in three studies, whether the generalization of contact effects from primary to secondary outgroups—the secondary transfer effect (STE)—occurs for collective action. The results supported a serial mediation model: contact with immigrants by advantaged group members (Italians: Study 1, N = 146, 121 females, M_age = 28.31 years; Study 3, N = 406, 239 females, M_age = 36.35; British people, Study 2, N = 160, 113 females, M_age = 32.31) was associated with lower perceived moral distance toward primary outgroups, which in turn was associated with more positive attitudes and greater collective action intentions toward primary outgroups, and lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups. Lower perceived moral distance toward secondary outgroups and stronger collective action intentions toward the primary outgroup were associated with higher collective action intentions toward secondary outgroups (results were inconsistent for attitudes). We discuss the findings with a focus on how a consideration of perceived moral distance extends current theorizing, and the relevance of generalized prejudice for the STE.     

Mental rotation and temporal contingencies.

A task that requires subjects to determine whether two forms of the same shape, but in different orientations, are mirror images or identical except for orientation is called a handedness recognition task. Subjects' reaction times (RT) on this task are consistently related to the angular disparity (termed alpha) between the two presented forms. This pattern of data has been interpreted to indicate that subjects solve the task by imagining that one of the forms rotates into the orientation of the other (termed mental rotation). The speed with which one imagines one of the forms rotating has been widely considered a fixed capability of the individual, and thus immune to the effect of contingencies. We present an experiment that assesses the effects of temporal contingencies in a handedness recognition task on the slope of the function RT = f(alpha). The data indicate that the slope of this function can come under the control of temporal contingencies.     

Liberating Moral Traditions: Saga Morality and Aristotle's Megalopsychia

It is a matter for both surprise and disappointment that so little has been written from a philosophical perspective about the moral tradition enshrined in Europe's oldest living literature, the Icelandic sagas. The main purpose of the present essay is to start to ameliorate this shortcoming by analysing and assessing the moral code bequeathed to us by the saga literature. To do so, I draw attention to the striking similarities between saga morality and what tends to be called an 'ancient moral outlook' (with special reference to Aristotle's much-maligned virtue of megalopsychia) and then try to defend the credentials of both outlooks in so far as they clash, or seem to clash, with certain aspects of a 'modern moral outlook.'     

The Evolutionary Roots of Morality in Theological Perspective

Theological ethics can interpret the relation between evolution and morality in at least three ways. The reductionist approach holds that morality emerges because it is adaptive. The independent approach maintains that morality develops without registering the influence of evolution. Finally, the interdependence position holds that morality reflects the influence of evolution to the extent that the latter shapes human emotional capacities and predispositions, for example, those regarding reciprocity and kin preference. The third approach is more suitable for theological ethics, which attends to ways in which natural desires can be ordered to serve morality, for example, to be habituated to virtue, and to ways in which we must strive to curb or minimize their disruptive effects on human communities.     

Schools,identity and the conception of the good. The denominational tradition as an example

The Dutch education system relies upon a large number of publicly-subsidized, denominational schools. The authors defend the importance of schools that educate children within a specific — including denominational — conception of the good by arguing for the importance of such a conception for the development of the child's identity. An essential component of this developmental process is critical reflection, conceived as crucial to the formation of moral autonomy.     

Finding one's way home: Notes on the texture of moral experience

In this article, I seek to illuminate the texture of moral experience. I pursue that aim through a close reading of David Lean's film, Brief Encounter, produced in 1946. The chief protagonist in the film undergoes a moral odyssey that reveals and tests all that she has understood about how to conduct a life. Her experience sheds light on the constituents of an individual moral sensibility as well as how its enactment appears in practice when one confronts a heartfelt difficulty. I argue that moral experience is best understood through the idiom of narrative and character, rather than through ethical language that places formal or universal principle at the center of the moral life. In the workshop of the moral self, as Lean's protagonist reveals, the task is not to fashion or take on universal principles but rather to cultivate virtuous relations with other people in the here-and-now.     

What is anger provoking?—Provokers and provoked in anger situations: Developmental trends and sex differences

Some structural properties of situations, described as anger-provoking by teenagers, were investigated. The study was directed toward exploring developmental trends and sex differences with respect to who was the provoker and who was provoked in the described situations. A simple classification, identical for both situational properties (provoker and provoked) was formed. The results showed that at age 18 years there was no sex difference in any of the aspects investigated. At age 12 years boys seemed to be more general than girls in their views on provokers. With increasing age the provoked in the described situations was more often someone else than the describing subject. This is interpreted as corroborating the often proposed relatedness between anger and morality.