Sexual Morality: Is Consent Enough?

The liberal view that valid consent is sufficient for a sex act to be morally legitimate is challenged by three major philosophies of sex: the Catholic view of sex as ordained for procreation and properly confined to marriage, the romantic view of sex as bound up with love, and the radical feminist analysis of sex in our society as part and parcel of the domination of women by men. I take a critical look at all three, focusing on Mary Geach's recent statement of the procreation view, Roger Scruton's theory of sexual desire as naturally evolving into intimacy and love, and several radical feminist discussions of sex in sexist society which argue that the notion of consent is unhelpful and, indeed, irrelevant. I argue that none of these lines of argument is convincing, and that consent remains the touchstone of morally permissible sex – although, dmittedly, it may not be very helpful in discussing ideals of human sexuality.     

Two Puzzles for Deontologists: Life-Prolonging Killings and the Moral Symmetry Between Killing and Causing a Person to be Unconscious

Some form of agent-relative constraint against the killing of innocent personsis a central principle in deontological moraltheories. In this article I make two claimsabout this constraint. First, I argue that somekillings of innocents performed incircumstances usually not taken to exculpatethe killer are not even pro tanto wrong.Second, I contend that either there is noagent-relative constraint against the killingof innocents or this constraint has a verydifferent shape from that which deontologistsnormally take it to have. My defence of theseclaims rests on two propositions. First, inkilling someone one may actually prolong thatperson's life. Roughly, life-prolongingkillings are possible, because to kill someoneis to perform an act that causes someone'sdeath and it might well be true that, had onenot performed this act, one's ``victim' wouldhave died earlier. Second, all other thingsbeing equal, killing and causing a person to beunconscious are morally equivalent. Both ofthese propositions are defended in thearticle.     

Citizens' Sense of Justice and the Legal System

When an actor commits a wrong action, citizens have perceptions of the kind of responsibility the actor incurs, the degree to which the act was mitigated or justified, and the appropriate punishment for the actor. The legislatively mandated law of criminal courts, statutes, and criminal codes deals with the same issues. Experimental evidence shows that there are important discrepancies between the principles that people and legal codes use to assign responsibility. That is, the moral retributive-justice principles that people use are sometimes in conflict with the directions in which modern code drafters are taking criminal law. These discrepancies may cause citizens to feel alienated from authority, and to reduce their voluntary compliance with legal codes.     

论民族道德与政治道德

民族道德与社会政治道德具有不可分割的关系。一般说来,民族道德易受制于政治道德,而民族道德又会反作用于政治道德,同时,民族道德与政治道德作为一种有联系的精神实体,又会在相互影响、相互作用的过程中协调发展。     

试论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学的理论主旨

罗尔斯顿从整个西方伦理思想发展的角度出发,认为道德是人的存在方式,环境伦理的产生不是要推翻或取代人际伦理,而是要为自然共同体中的人类确立生存方式。人类道德之所以要观照自然生态系统,是因为自然生态系统具有自身的内在价值和存在目的,以文化方式生存于其中的人类须对此给予道德的尊重。环境伦理与人际伦理共同构成了完整的人之伦理,它们都是人的生存之道。     

大众与个人审美品位的认知与神经机制

大众与个人的审美品位分别代表了审美活动在个体间的一致性和差异性。将大众品位和个人品位相结合的新趋势正在挑战传统的"普遍性"审美法则,并日益凸显审美反应的个体差异。存在诸多因素可以调节大众和个人审美品位的相对比例,包括刺激类型、专业性、文化背景、先前经验和年龄等。大众与个人审美品位的神经机制中,奖赏系统和默认模式网络扮演重要角色。目前,审美品位与审美加工模型的理论关系有待进一步厘清和验证。未来相关研究可以在拓展审美对象领域、完善大众与个人审美品位与不同审美加工阶段的对应关系等方向上继续开展。     

GOD IS GREAT, GOD IS GOOD: JAMES ASHBROOK'S CONTRIBUTION TO NEUROETHICAL THEOLOGY

Abstract. James Ashbrook's work has not only clarified issues in brain and belief, it has offered intriguing suggestions for ethics. The relevance of neurotheology to ethics is evident if we assume that ethics entails, in part, concerns about character, responsibility, and the art of living.     

TOWARD A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE VERBAL SELF-REGULATION

We developed a methodology, derived from the theoretical literatures on rule-governed behavior and private events, to experimentally investigate the relationship between covert verbal self-regulation and nonverbal behavior. The methodology was designed to assess whether (a) nonverbal behavior was under the control of covert rules and (b) verbal reports of these rules were functionally equivalent to the covert rules that control nonverbal behavior. The research was conducted in the context of teaching shopping skills to persons with mild intellectual disabilities using a self-instruction training format. In Phase 1, 4 participants were successfully taught to perform shopping skills using overt and covert self-instructions. The self-instructions were then blocked under overt and covert self-instruction conditions, which resulted in a reversal of shopping skills to baseline levels. This indicated that the overt and covert self-instructions might be controlling responding. In Phase 2, we demonstrated that the self-instructions, when used as external directives, produced successful shopping with 3 other participants. By demonstrating that self-rules can produce correct responding when used as external directives, we were more confident that it was the self-instructions and not other verbal or nonverbal behavior that controlled responding under overt, covert, and blocking conditions in Phase 1.     

BEFRIENDING AN AMORAL NATURE

Abstract. Contrary to George C. Williams, moral judgments of nature are not appropriate, whereas affirmation of the intrinsic value of creation is. The concern for offspring and kin identified by Williams as the principle force of evolution is not inherently evil in its operation in human society. Instead of juxtaposing it as enemy to justice and altruism, we should try to extend the scope of felt kinship to the whole human race.     

Self-reported reasons for moral decisions

Many investigations of moral decision-making employ hypothetical scenarios in which each participant has to choose between two options. One option is usually deemed “utilitarian” and the other either “non-utilitarian” or “deontological”. Very little has been done to establish the validity of such measures. It is unclear what they measure, let alone how well they do so. In this exploratory study, participants were asked about the reasons for their decisions in six hypothetical scenarios. Various concerns contributed to each decision. Action decisions occurred when utilitarian concerns dominated. Bystanding decisions resulted from different concerns or combinations of concerns dominating in different situations, with utilitarianism usually among participants’ concerns. None of the labels usually used for either decision therefore seems entirely appropriate. Five concerns were identified as necessary and sufficient to predict over 85% of participants’ decisions. This suggests great promise for future research, particularly in investigation of real-world moral decisions.