Public acceptance of connected vehicles: An extension of the technology acceptance model

To examine the public acceptance of connected vehicles (CVs), this study developed a novel connected vehicle acceptance model (CVAM) extending the technology acceptance model (TAM). The model was built based on a questionnaire survey of 2400 US adults. Perceived data privacy and security associated with the technology was found to shape the trust, attitude, and behavioral intention to use CVs, in addition to the predictors of original TAM: perceived usefulness and ease of use. Results revealed that trust mediates the effect of perceived data privacy and security on CV acceptance, though its directional relationship with perceived usefulness and perceived ease of use is unclear. Socio-demographic and other characteristics of respondents associated with CV acceptance and its predictors were explored. A number of theoretical and practical implications of the study findings are discussed.     

A Wild West of the Mind

§258 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is often seen as the core of his private language argument. While its role is certainly overinflated and it is a mistake to think that there is anything that could be called the private language argument, §258 is an important part of the private language sections of the Philosophical Investigations. As with so much of Wittgenstein's work, there are widely diverse interpretations of why exactly the private diarist's attempted ostensive definition fails. I argue for a version of the no-stage-setting interpretation of the failure of private ostension. On this interpretation, the reason why the diarist cannot establish a meaning for ‘S’ is that she lacks the conceptual-linguistic stage-setting needed to disambiguate the concentration of her attention (the private analogue of an ostensive definition). Thus, the problem with any subsequent use of ‘S’ is not that there is no criterion of correctness for remembering the meaning of ‘S’ correctly, or for re-identifying S correctly in the future. Rather, it is because of the initial failure to define ‘S’ that there is nothing that could count as a criterion of correctness for the future use of ‘S’; there is nothing to remember or re-identify. My argument for the no-stage-setting interpretation consists in showing how well it fits into the rest of the Philosophical Investigations and in defending it against objections from Robert J. Fogelin, Anthony Kenny, and most recently John V. Canfield. Kenny's and Canfield's objections are found to suffer from problems regarding memory scepticism.     

Some thoughts on the diffusion of psychoanalysis: the group dimension, ethics and the sense of identity

In this paper the author questions some of the ways in which psychoanalysis is passed on to the wider public, one of which is sometimes evocative of the sales promotion of a consumer product in contemporary society. This methodology does not give sufficiently deep prior thought to the eventual consequences of side effects. The detailed exposition of clinical cases, for example, raises sensitive ethical issues, even when anonymity is preserved. Although it is true that making information about Freud's theories more widely available may indeed encourage people to think about training as psychoanalysts, it is noticeable that this process is sometimes considered to be a form of training in itself. Some participants feel that acquiring a psychoanalytical vocabulary and reading clinical reports form a sufficient basis for practising thereafter as psychotherapists, both in institutional contexts and in private practice. The absence of group work on the part of the organizers might explain why closer study is not made of the methodologies of transmission and the different levels that it involves. This is sometimes due to the absence of a common object, formed within and by the group, and to the emergence of manic defences in the group.     

Beyond ‘nothing to hide’: When identity is key to privacy threat under surveillance

Privacy is psychologically important, vital for democracy, and in the era of ubiquitous and mobile surveillance technology, facing increasingly complex threats and challenges. Yet surveillance is often justified under a trope that one has ‘nothing to hide’. We conducted focus groups (N = 42) on topics of surveillance and privacy and using discursive analysis, identify the ideological assumptions and the positions that people adopt to make sense of their participation in a surveillance society. We find a premise that surveillance is increasingly inescapable, but this was only objected to when people reported feeling misrepresented, or where they had an inability to withhold aspects of their identities. The (in)visibility of the surveillance technology also complicated how surveillance is constructed. Those interested in engaging the public in debates about surveillance may be better served by highlighting the identity consequences of surveillance, rather than constructing surveillance as a generalised privacy threat.     

The Philosophy of Joel Feinberg*

This paper is offered as a tribute to Joel Feinberg. The first section of the paper applies Feinberg’s analysis of freedom of expression to a contemporary case of academic freedom. The second section engages Feinberg’s work on rights and punishment. The paper ends with numerous quotations from Feinberg’s vast array of writings, words that express his ideas on a number of important problems that occupied his mind throughout his fruitful and influential career.     

The Rise of Citizen Science in Health and Biomedical Research

Citizen science models of public participation in scientific research represent a growing area of opportunity for health and biomedical research, as well as new impetus for more collaborative forms of engagement in large-scale research. However, this also surfaces a variety of ethical issues that both fall outside of and build upon the standard human subjects concerns in bioethics. This article provides background on citizen science, examples of current projects in the field, and discussion of established and emerging ethical issues for citizen science in health and biomedical research.     

论医护人员对患者隐私权保护的注意义务

侵害患者隐私权的医疗纠纷频发,很大原因是医护人员未履行对患者隐私保密的高度注意义务。从具体案例出发,就医护人员对患者隐私权保护的注意义务进行阐释,探究该义务产生的根源,对违反该注意义务的责任进行评析。以期提高医护人员对患者隐私权保护注意义务的重视,减少相关医疗纠纷的发生。     

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency     

Who wants privacy protection,and what do they want?

As privacy controversies have become more salient since the early 1980s, one response by policy makers has been to try to encourage consumers to demand privacy protection, by expecting goods and services to be designed with privacy‐enhancing technologies (PETs) embedded in them. But what scope is there for this? Conventional approaches to understanding consumer demand for privacy protection have not been very helpful in providing robust accounts of when consumers will want which kinds of protection. This paper offers a neo‐Durkheimian institutionalist theoretical account of the roots of consumer preferences for privacy and services with PETs in particular, which yields testable hypotheses for future research. It grounds preferences in risk perceptions, shows how distinct styles of risk perceptions are the result of distinct types of situation in social organisation, and derives typical demand curves for each of these types, before exploring the extent of mobility of preferences predicted by the theory, which in turn provides the basis for understanding the scope for persuading consumers to demand privacy‐respecting services of different types. Rooted in the sociology of knowledge and in anthropological approaches, the argument represents a challenge to psychometric, naïve empiricist and postmodernist accounts, and it offers a distinct research agenda. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications Ltd.     

Piercing the Veil: Ethical Issues in Ethnographic Research

It is not unusual for researchers in ethnography (and sometimes Institutional Review Boards) to assume that research of “public” behavior is morally unproblematic. I examine an historical case of ethnographic research and the sustained moral outrage to the research expressed by the subjects of that research. I suggest that the moral outrage was legitimate and articulate some of the ethical issues underlying that outrage. I argue that morally problematic Ethnographic research of public behavior can derive from research practice that includes a tendency to collapse the distinction between harm and moral wrong, a failure to take account of recent work on ethical issues in privacy; failure to appreciate the deception involved in ethnographers’ failure to reveal their role as researchers to subjects and finally a failure to appropriately weigh the moral significance of issues of invasion of privacy and inflicted insight in both the research process and subsequent publication of research.