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151.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
152.
探讨我国住院医师规范化培训的现况及对策 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
黄贞杰 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2007,28(10):64-65
临床住院医师规范化培训是培养高水平专业人才的重要手段,是提高我国医疗水平的重要环节和措施,是一项有关卫生事业发展的重要工作.目前,我国住院医师培训还存在不少问题.在各方面的不断努力和探索下,一定能够使住院医师规范化培新工作做得更好. 相似文献
153.
154.
Bernard E. Rollin 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):253-274
Although 20th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors
– John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given
the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear.
That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation
or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as
a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible
for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability
of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the
major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain
in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about
animal thought and feeling. 相似文献
155.
Peter Carruthers 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):275-297
This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense
of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning
psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating
that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us. 相似文献
156.
by Leonard Angel 《Zygon》2009,44(3):699-718
Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension. 相似文献
157.
by Teed Rockwell 《Zygon》2009,44(3):659-674
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna's argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to "The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything." Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world. 相似文献
158.
159.
Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions.
To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined.
Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states
operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge
for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine
that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument.
Fig. 1 Structure of argument
相似文献
Josef PernerEmail: |
160.
JAMES LINDEMANN NELSON 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(3-4):462-474
Abstract: The leading accounts of the ethics of proxy decision making implicitly draw on internalist conceptions of the philosophy of mind, or so this essay tries to demonstrate. Using the views of Ronald Dworkin as its jumping-off point, the essay argues that accepting the sort of externalism associated with writers such as Putnam and Burge would alter Dworkin's conclusions concerning how we should respond to the current or precedent decisions of people suffering from dementia. Building on the views of Agnieszka Jawarska, it argues that accepting "active" externalism à la Clark and Chambers would provide currently competent people with new resources for establishing the authority of their present values over inconsistent values they might come to entertain should they become demented. 相似文献