Katharina Ereky‐Stevens 《Infant and child development》2008,17(5):527-543

This study investigated associations between mother–infant interactions and children's subsequent understanding of mind and emotion. Mothers' tendency to comment on their infants' internal world and their general sensitivity to their infants' internal states were measured through coded play interactions at 10 months. The latter measurement included ratings on four aspects of maternal behaviour: mindful facilitation, joint attention commenting, pacing, and affect catching. In contrast to mothers' internal state language, these behaviours did not tap mothers' explicit linguistic representation of their infants' mental states. At 54 months, children's understanding of mind and emotion was measured through a range of false‐belief tasks and an emotion‐understanding task. Multivariate analysis revealed direct positive links between mothers' sensitivity to their infants' internal states and children's later understanding of mind. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Mohamad El Haj  Stéphane Raffard  Marie-Christine Gély-Nargeot 《Memory (Hove, England)》2016,24(4):526-534

Destination memory is the ability to remember the destination to which a piece of information has been addressed (e.g., “Did I tell you about the promotion?”). This ability is found to be impaired in normal ageing. Our work aimed to link this deterioration to the decline in theory of mind. Forty younger adults (M age = 23.13 years, SD = 4.00) and 36 older adults (M age = 69.53 years, SD = 8.93) performed a destination memory task. They also performed the False-belief test addressing cognitive theory of mind and the Reading the mind in the eyes test addressing affective theory of mind. Results showed significant deterioration in destination memory, cognitive theory of mind and affective theory of mind in the older adults. The older adults’ performance on destination memory was significantly correlated with and predicted by their performance on cognitive theory of mind. Difficulties in the ability to interpret and predict others’ mental states are related to destination memory decline in older adults.  相似文献   

    

Harald Atmanspacher  Wolfgang Fach 《The Journal of analytical psychology》2016,61(1):79-85

This commentary adds some ideas and refinements to the inspiring discussion in a recent paper by Connolly ( 2015 ) that makes use of a dual‐aspect framework developed by us earlier. One key point is that exceptional experiences (of which synchronicities are a special case) cannot in general be identified with experiences of non‐categorial or acategorial mental states. In fact, most exceptional experiences reported in the literature are experiences of categorial states. Conversely, there are non‐categorial and acategorial states whose experience is not exceptional. Moreover, the psychodynamics of a synchronistic experience contain a subtle mesh of interacting processes pertaining to categorial, non‐categorial and acategorial domains. We outline how this mesh may be addressed in particular cases of synchronicity described by Connolly.  相似文献   

    

Leïla Bensalah  Stéphanie Caillies  Marion Anduze 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2016,177(1):17-31

The authors investigated the development of the affective, cognitive, and behavioral components of empathy in preschoolers, specifically examining how cognitive empathy is linked to theory of mind and affective perspective taking. Participants were 158 children aged 4–6 years. They listened to narratives and then answered questions about the protagonists' emotions. The affective component was probed with the question, “How do you feel seeing the little girl/boy?”; the cognitive component with the question, “Why do you feel [emotion shared with the character]?”; and the behavioral one with the question, “What would you do if you were next to the little boy/girl [experiencing an emotional scenario]?” Results revealed a developmental sequence in the self-focused attribution of cognitive empathy, and a trend toward a developmental sequence for behavioral empathy, which underwent a slight linear increase between 4 and 6 years old. Affective empathy remained stable. More interestingly, they showed that cognitive empathy is linked to both theory of mind and affective perspective taking.  相似文献   

    

Amy A. Weimer  Philip G. Gasquoine 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2016,177(2):33-43

Belief reasoning and emotion understanding were measured among 102 Mexican American bilingual children ranging from 4 to 7 years old. All children were tested in English and Spanish after ensuring minimum comprehension in each language. Belief reasoning was assessed using 2 false and 1 true belief tasks. Emotion understanding was measured using subtests from the Test for Emotion Comprehension. The influence of family background variables of yearly income, parental education level, and number of siblings on combined Spanish and English vocabulary, belief reasoning, and emotion understanding was assessed by regression analyses. Age and emotion understanding predicted belief reasoning. Vocabulary and belief reasoning predicted emotion understanding. When the sample was divided into language-dominant and balanced bilingual groups on the basis of language proficiency difference scores, there were no significant differences on belief reasoning or emotion understanding. Language groups were demographically similar with regard to child age, parental educational level, and family income. Results suggest Mexican American language-dominant and balanced bilinguals develop belief reasoning and emotion understanding similarly.  相似文献   

    

Tom Foulsham  Maria Lock 《Cognitive Science》2015,39(7):1704-1726

Social attention is thought to require detecting the eyes of others and following their gaze. To be effective, observers must also be able to infer the person's thoughts and feelings about what he or she is looking at, but this has only rarely been investigated in laboratory studies. In this study, participants' eye movements were recorded while they chose which of four patterns they preferred. New observers were subsequently able to reliably guess the preference response by watching a replay of the fixations. Moreover, when asked to mislead the person guessing, participants changed their looking behavior and guessing success was reduced. In a second experiment, naïve participants could also guess the preference of the original observers but were unable to identify trials which were lies. These results confirm that people can spontaneously use the gaze of others to infer their judgments, but also that these inferences are open to deception.  相似文献   

    

《Consciousness and cognition》2015

Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine the kinds of mental states that plausibly could satisfy this version of DSP.  相似文献   

    

Carolien Rieffe  Mark Meerum Terwogt  Richard Cowan 《Infant and child development》2005,14(3):259-272

Theory of mind studies of emotion usually focus on children's ability to predict other people's feelings. This study examined children's spontaneous references to mental states in explaining others' emotions. Children (4‐, 6‐ and 10‐year‐olds, n = 122) were told stories and asked to explain both typical and atypical emotional reactions of characters. Because atypical emotional reactions are unexpected, we hypothesized that children would be more likely to refer to mental states, such as desires and beliefs, in explaining them than when explaining typical emotions. From the development of lay theories of emotion, derived the prediction that older children would refer more often to mental states than younger children. The developmental shift from a desire‐psychology to a belief‐psychology led to the expectation that references to desires would increase at an earlier age than references to beliefs. Our findings confirmed these expectations only partly, because the nature of the emotion (happiness, anger, sadness or fear) interacted with these factors. Whereas anger, happiness and sadness mainly evoked desire references, fear evoked more belief references, even in 4‐year‐olds. The fact that other factors besides age can also play an influential role in children's mental state reasoning is discussed. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Josef Perner  Daniela Kloo  Edith Gornik 《Infant and child development》2007,16(5):471-490

Two experiments with 3½‐ to 6½‐year‐old children showed that theory‐of‐mind development is associated with the growth of episodic memory. Episodic memory was assessed by manipulating informational conditions such that they permit or prevent the formation of episodic memories in terms of re‐experiencing the recalled event. Only experienced events, e.g. seeing how one puts a picture of a frog into a box, can be remembered by re‐experience. Events known through indirect information cannot be re‐experienced, e.g. putting pictures into the box when blindfolded and being later shown on video what was on these cards. Children were also tested on a battery of theory‐of‐mind tasks assessing their understanding of the origins of knowledge. There was a significant interaction in both experiments showing that recall of directly experienced items improved in relation to indirectly presented items the higher children's theory‐of‐mind scores. The discussion suggests that episodic memory development is specifically linked to the growing ability to introspect an ongoing experience and interpret it as representing an actual past event. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   

    

Uller C 《Animal cognition》2004,7(3):154-161

Do nonhuman primates attribute goals to others? Traditional studies with chimpanzees provide equivocal evidence for “mind reading” in nonhuman primates. Here we adopt looking time, a methodology commonly used with human infants to test infant chimpanzees. In this experiment, four infant chimpanzees saw computer-generated stimuli that mimicked a goal-directed behavior. The baby chimps performed as well as human infants, namely, they were sensitive to the trajectories of the objects, thus suggesting that chimpanzees may be endowed with a disposition to understand goal-directed behaviors. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.  相似文献