Knowledge as aptness

I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.

Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performances

Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of epistemic normativity as does belief itself, yet to suspend is of course precisely not to perform, certainly not with the aim of truth. The paper takes up this problem, and proposes a solution that distinguishes levels of performance norrmativity, including a first order where execution competence is in play, and a second order where the performer must assess the risks attendant on issuing a first-order performance. This imports a level of reflective knowledge that ascends above the animal level.

Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information flow

What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers.     

Children’s understanding of addition and subtraction concepts

After the onset of formal schooling, little is known about the development of children’s understanding of the arithmetic concepts of inversion and associativity. On problems of the form a + b − b (e.g., 3 + 26 − 26), if children understand the inversion concept (i.e., that addition and subtraction are inverse operations), then no calculations are needed to solve the problem. On problems of the form a + b − c (e.g., 3 + 27 − 23), if children understand the associativity concept (i.e., that the addition and subtraction can be solved in any order), then the second part of the problem can be solved first. Children in Grades 2, 3, and 4 solved both types of problems and then were given a demonstration of how to apply both concepts. Approval of each concept and preference of a conceptual approach versus an algorithmic approach were measured. Few grade differences were found on either task. Conceptual understanding was greater for inversion than for associativity on both tasks. Clusters of participants in all grades showed that some had strong understanding of both concepts, some had strong understanding of the inversion concept only, and others had weak understanding of both concepts. The findings highlight the lack of developmental increases and the large individual differences in conceptual understanding on two arithmetic concepts during the early school years.     

Knowledge and Attitudes Towards Genetic Testing: A Two Year Follow-Up Study in Patients with Asthma,Diabetes Mellitus and Cardiovascular Disease

Adequate knowledge and personal attitudes towards DNA-testing are major determinants of optimal utilization of genetic testing. This study aims to (1) assess the genetic knowledge and attitude towards genetic testing of patients with asthma, diabetes mellitus type II and cardiovascular diseases, (2) determine whether their knowledge or attitude changed since 2002, and (3) investigate the predictive role of knowledge on attitude. Data were collected within the Panel of Patients with Chronic Diseases in 2002 and 2004, resulting in 398 data-pairs. Results show that factual knowledge mainly relates to associations between genes and diseases, less is known on associations between genes, chromosomes, cells and body. The perceived knowledge on DNA-testing has not increased since 2002. The attitude towards genetic testing also appeared to be rather consistent. Less perceived medical genetic knowledge and more perceived social genetic knowledge were found predictive for a more reserved attitude towards genetic testing. In conclusion, advanced developments in the field of genetics are not accompanied by increased knowledge of patients with common multi-factorial diseases. The finding that more perceived social genetic knowledge results in more reluctance can be considered an indicator for the necessity of social debates on genetic testing.     

否定句理解中知觉仿真的动态过程

采用移动窗口阅读技术探讨否定句理解中被否定的情境和真实情境在头脑中的具体表征。实验材料包括否定句和图片,根据句子隐含形状与再认图片的匹配关系分为匹配和不匹配两个版本。实验1中句子呈现时间为700ms,结果发现匹配版本中图片再认时间明显短于不匹配版本,证实了否定句理解中被否定情境的知觉仿真。实验2中句子呈现时间延长到1000ms,结果两个版本图片再认时间没有差异,说明读者已经转为对否定句所表达的真实情境进行仿真。实验支持了知觉符号观并进一痔说明否常甸珈解中知带仿直和知慌符号瀚活是一个动杰的“两步击”的加工讨程。     

Cut-free common knowledge

Starting off from the infinitary system for common knowledge over multi-modal epistemic logic presented in [L. Alberucci, G. Jäger, About cut elimination for logics of common knowledge, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 133 (2005) 73–99], we apply the finite model property to “finitize” this deductive system. The result is a cut-free, sound and complete sequent calculus for common knowledge.     

儿童运动认知的朴素理论

主要介绍了关于运动的朴素理论中儿童具有的两类知识系统,一是儿童在日常运动中能够描述出来的朴素信念即外显的概念知识,另一是儿童和运动的物体发生相互作用时所具有的知识即内隐的知识,并进一步阐述了内隐知觉知识和外显概念知识之间具有不可渗透性,内隐运动知识和外显概念知识存在着分离,内隐运动知识可以通过运动表象的方式转化为外显概念知识。提出了有待进一步探讨的问题：错误信念是否具有任务特殊性,内隐知觉知识和内隐运动知识之间关系等     

实践社区成员的自我效能感对知识传播过程和效果的影响

通过自编实践社区成员自我效能感问卷以及知识传播过程和效果问卷对宁夏、重庆两地200名企业实践社区成员进行测量,以研究自我效能感对知识传播过程及效果的影响。结果表明,问卷具有良好的信度和效度;自我效能感不同的实践社区成员在知识传播过程和效果方面存在显著的差异,可以利用自我效能感来预测实践社区知识传播的过程和效果。     

Option fixation: A cognitive contributor to overconfidence

The ASC model of choice and confidence in general knowledge proposes that respondents first Assess the familiarity of presented options, and then use the high-familiarity option as a retrieval cue to Search memory for the purposes of Constructing an explanation about why that high-familiarity option is true. The ASC process implies that overconfidence results in part from a tendency to fixate on the high-familiarity option, to the neglect of the other option. If this implication is true, then judgment tasks requiring respondents to evaluate each option independently should result in reduced overconfidence as compared with standard judgment tasks. Two experiments tested this implication, and found that confidence and overconfidence were reduced when respondents evaluated options independently. The findings support the proposal that option fixation contributes to overconfidence, and also clarify the limitations of random error explanations of overconfidence.