McDowell’s new conceptualism and the difference between chickens,colours and cardinals

McDowell recently renounced the assumption that the content of any knowledgeable, perceptual judgement must be included in the content of the knowledge grounding experience. We argue that McDowell’s introduction of a new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge is incompatible with the main line of argument in favour of conceptualism as presented in Mind and World [McDowell, John. 1996. Mind and World. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press]. We reconstruct the original line of argument and show that it rests on the assumption that a specific model of justification, the Comparison Model, must apply to all cases of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. We then show that the Comparison Model cannot be applied to McDowell’s new category of non-inferential, perceptual knowledge. As a consequence, McDowell is in need of an alternative model of justification and an alternative argument for conceptualism. We propose such an alternative model of justification based on McDowell’s reading of Sellars, but argue that the model only serves to make the need for an alternative motivation for conceptualism more urgent.     

Young Children's Reports of When Events Occurred: Do Event Type and Assessment Method Matter?

Studying young children's reporting about when various events occurred informs about the development of episodic memory and metacognition. In two experiments, 55 3‐ to 5‐year‐old children participated in two activity sessions, a week apart. During the activity sessions, they learned novel animal facts and body movements, and they coloured animal pictures and posed for body movement photos. Immediately after the second activity session, children were interviewed about when they experienced the various events. Overall, children were as accurate about learning events as physical events, but they were more accurate when asked temporal distance (e.g. ‘Which did you learn a longer time ago, “X” or “Y”?’) than temporal location questions (e.g. ‘Which did you learn before today, “X” or “Y”?’). The results suggest that young children's apparent difficulty recognizing new learning is not due to a rapid ‘remember‐to‐know shift’. Rather, the way we ask young children about when they experienced various events determines their accuracy. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Liangzhi and the Interpretative Obfuscation Regarding Knowledge

This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi良知 as innate,original,or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into "interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge." First,for Wang,what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge.Therefore,the focus ofzhizhi 知 and gewu格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either "the extension of knowledge" or "the investigation of things."Apart from that,drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions:liangzhi as perfect knowledge,the identity of knowledge and action,and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement.By clarifying the above misinterpretations,the meaning and implication of liangzhi will,in turn,also become clearer.     

Evocation of functional and volumetric gestural knowledge by objects and words

We distinguish between grasping gestures associated with using an object for its intended purpose (functional) and those used to pick up an object (volumetric) and we develop a novel experimental framework to show that both kinds of knowledge are automatically evoked by objects and by words denoting those objects. Cued gestures were carried out in the context of depicted objects or visual words. On incongruent trials, the cued gesture was not compatible with gestures typically associated with the contextual item. On congruent trials, the gesture was compatible with the item's functional or volumetric gesture. For both gesture types, response latency was longer for incongruent trials indicating that objects and words elicited both functional and volumetric manipulation knowledge. Additional evidence, however, clearly supports a distinction between these two kinds of gestural knowledge. Under certain task conditions, functional gestures can be evoked without the associated activation of volumetric gestures. We discuss the implication of these results for theories of action evoked by objects and words, and for interpretation of functional imaging results.     

Lexical learning in bilingual adults: the relative importance of short-term memory for serial order and phonological knowledge

Studies of monolingual speakers have shown a strong association between lexical learning and short-term memory (STM) capacity, especially STM for serial order information. At the same time, studies of bilingual speakers suggest that phonological knowledge is the main factor that drives lexical learning. This study tested these two hypotheses simultaneously in participants with variable levels of English-French bilingual proficiency. A word-nonword paired-associate learning task was administered, with nonwords obeying French phonotactic patterns. French phonological knowledge was estimated by a composite French proficiency score summarizing productive and receptive French vocabulary knowledge as well as quantitative and qualitative measures of French exposure. STM measures maximized retention of order information (serial order reconstruction) or retention of phonological item information (single nonword delayed repetition). The French proficiency score and the serial order STM measure independently predicted performance on the paired-associate learning task. These results highlight the conjoined role of phonological knowledge and serial order STM in lexical learning. Importantly, serial order STM remains a strong predictor of lexical learning, even for bilingual individuals who have broad phonological knowledge.     

When generating answers benefits arithmetic skill: the importance of prior knowledge

People remember information better if they generate the information while studying rather than read the information. However, prior research has not investigated whether this generation effect extends to related but unstudied items and has not been conducted in classroom settings. We compared third graders’ success on studied and unstudied multiplication problems after they spent a class period generating answers to problems or reading the answers from a calculator. The effect of condition interacted with prior knowledge. Students with low prior knowledge had higher accuracy in the generate condition, but as prior knowledge increased, the advantage of generating answers decreased. The benefits of generating answers may extend to unstudied items and to classroom settings, but only for learners with low prior knowledge.     

Children's knowledge of the earth: a new methodological and statistical approach

In the field of children’s knowledge of the earth, much debate has concerned the question of whether children’s naive knowledge—that is, their knowledge before they acquire the standard scientific theory—is coherent (i.e., theory-like) or fragmented. We conducted two studies with large samples (N = 328 and N = 381) using a new paper-and-pencil test, denoted the EARTH (EArth Representation Test for cHildren), to discriminate between these two alternatives. We performed latent class analyses on the responses to the EARTH to test mental models associated with these alternatives. The naive mental models, as formulated by Vosniadou and Brewer, were not supported by the results. The results indicated that children’s knowledge of the earth becomes more consistent as children grow older. These findings support the view that children’s naive knowledge is fragmented.     

Williamson on inexact knowledge

Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through. The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.

Designs of Learning and the Formation and Transformation of Knowledge in an Era of Globalization

In this article, the formation and transformation of knowledge and the role of designs for learning will be elaborated and discussed in relation to the introduction of national curricula and school textbooks during the beginning of the industrialized era vs. the introduction of individual curricula and new digital learning resources in the post-industrialized era of globalization and multiculturalism. Quite different teaching and learning strategies have been emphasized, which I will call here “designed information and teaching” vs. “designs for learning”. It seems obvious that our current society is in a stage of change that requires a new understanding of knowledge, learning and identity formation. The new position and role of the learner underlines the productive and constructive aspect of learning. Pupils not only read texts, they also produce texts, pictures, film and music and they compile and edit virtual texts. Multimodal texts, as well as the information flow of the Internet, are the consequences of, and at the same time a vehicle for, new social patterns. “Learning Design Sequences” (LDS) is introduced as a theoretical map for the purpose of analyzing critical incidents in (a creative) learning process, using different genres, modes and media in a process of meaning-making.

Propositional knowledge and know-how

This paper is roughly in two parts. The first deals with whether know-how is constituted by propositional knowledge, as discussed primarily by Gilbert Ryle (1949) The concept of mind. London: Hutchinson, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing how. Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 411–444 as well as Stephen Hetherington (2006). How to know that knowledge-that is knowledge-how. In S. Hetherington (Ed.) Epistemology futures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The conclusion of this first part is that know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist in propositional knowledge. The second part defends an analysis of know-how inspired by Katherine Hawley’ (2003). Success and knowledge-how. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, pp. 19–31, insightful proposal that know-how requires counterfactual success. I conclude by showing how this analysis helps to explain why know-how sometimes does and sometimes does not consist of propositional knowledge.