《周易》与中国象科学

本文通过对《周易》和古希腊哲学的比较,说明中西方在传统认识上,由于时空选择不同,从而形成了两种科学。西方的传统认识,以空间为主,时间为辅.空间统摄时间。中国的认识传统,以时间为主,空间为辅,时间统摄空间.因此,前者认识世界着重在“体”,后者则着重在“象”,对“象”层面的认识为“象科学”,主要采用自然整体方法和意象方法.象的实质是“气”.“气”是时间属性占优势的物质存在,与空间属性占优势的实物和物理场不同,构成世界的另一半,中医学是象科学的代表.中医学的突破,定将带来象科学的复兴,对人类的未来和健康发展具有关键意义。     

Evidence for spontaneous level-2 perspective taking in adults

Social interactions are fostered by humans’ propensity to compute their partner’s perspective online. However, due to the mindreading system’s limited capacity perspective taking (PT) was argued to occur spontaneously only for level-1, but not level-2 perspectives. We propose that level-2 perspectives (containing aspectual information) can also be computed spontaneously if participants have reason to assume that the partner is indeed aware of the objects’ aspectual properties. Pairs of adult participants took part in the modified version of Surtees, Butterfill, and Apperly’s (2012) number verification paradigm. Participants had prior information on their partner’s task, which either called for processing aspectual properties or did not. The partner’s inconsistent perspective was found to interfere with RT-s providing evidence for spontaneous level-2 PT. However, such interference only occurred when the partner’s task involved processing the perspective dependent object feature, suggesting that PT was sensitive to the other’s awareness of the to be represented information.     

Changes in optimism and pessimism in response to life events: Evidence from three large panel studies

Although individuals vary in how optimistic they are about the future, one assumption that researchers make is that optimism is sensitive to changes in life events and circumstances. We examined how optimism and pessimism changed across the lifespan and in response to life events in three large panel studies (combined N = 74,886). In the American and Dutch samples, we found that optimism increased across younger adulthood, plateaued in midlife, and then decreased in older adulthood. In the German sample, there were inconsistent results with respect to age differences and mean level changes in optimism. Associations between life events and changes in optimism/pessimism were inconsistent across samples. We discuss our results in the context of life events and lifespan development.     

Examining arguments against quantitative research: “Case studies” illustrating the challenge of finding a sound philosophical basis for a human sciences approach to psychology

This article offers a close examination of critiques of quantitative research by Michell, 2011, Marecek, 2011, and Morawski (2011). One goal is to show that these three critics actually share with most mainstream quantitative researchers commitments to the Cartesian framework, even though this is not obvious because Cartesianism can appear in different guises. As a result of these commitments, the three theorists advance criticisms of mainstream quantitative research that fail to identify its key failings, put forward flawed views about how we should conduct research, and offer misguided criticisms of an approach I advocate called explicitly interpretive quantitative research. Another goal is to use the examination of the three critiques as a vehicle for clarifying the participatory perspective, a philosophical viewpoint that departs from the Cartesian framework. With regard to research methodology, the participatory perspective provides the basis for explicitly interpretive quantitative research, leads to ideas about changes we should make in how we conduct qualitative research, and treats quantitative and qualitative research as fundamentally similar because both should be pursued as interpretive modes of inquiry. I suggest that my analyses of the three critiques of quantitative research – or “case studies,” as I call these analyses – also may prove useful to researchers and theorists who want to develop a human sciences approach to other issues besides research methodology by helping them (1) recognize when lines of thinking that seem to depart from the mainstream actually represent variants of Cartesianism, and (2) consider what the participatory perspective might have to offer if they were to use it as the philosophical basis for their efforts.     

Cornell College: Program in Science and Religion

Cornell College in Mount Vernon, Iowa, has established a new interdisciplinary program in science and religion. One of the features of this program is an undergraduate major in science and religion that requires substantial course work in at least one of the natural sciences as well as course work in philosophy, religion, and history. As a result of a grant from the John Templeton Foundation, Cornell College will offer a special course, God and Physics: From Aquinas to Quantum Mechanics (April 1998), and will sponsor an international symposium on creation and contemporary cosmology (April 1999). Opportunities exist for interested scholars to come to Cornell as Templeton Visiting Fellows in order to participate in these activities.     

过去时间的心理结构

４０８名大学生被试用秒、分、小时、日、星期、年和月７个时间单位和模糊统计试验方法对４０个不定的过去时间修饰词作经验赋值,结果显示：（１）过去时间和未来时间在心理结构上是对称的,分为三个心理时间段,即以秒和分为计时单位的“较近的过去”和“较近的未来”,以小时、日和月为计时单位的“近的过去”和“近的未来”,和以年为计时单位的“远的过去”和“远的未来”。（２）随着时间修饰词的词义离现在由近至远,其词义地     

Finitism,Divisibilty, and the Beginning of the Universe: Replies to Loke and Dumsday

Some philosophers contend that the past must be finite in duration, because otherwise reaching the present would have involved the sequential occurrence of an actual infinity of events, which they regard as impossible. I recently developed a new objection to this finitist argument, to which Andrew Ter Ern Loke and Travis Dumsday have replied. Here I respond to the three main points raised in their replies.     

Finitism and Divisibility: A Reply to Puryear

Puryear (AJP, 2014) develops an objection against a prominent attempt to show that the universe must have a temporal beginning. Here I formulate a reply.