The Return of Ethnocentrism

The concept of ethnocentrism was introduced by Gumplowicz in the 1870s, popularized by Sumner in the 1900s, and first investigated psychometrically by Adorno and colleagues in the 1940s. It has become a fundamental concept in the social sciences, but over the last several decades, its popularity and usage in political and social psychology have decreased. Recent events, such as the growing popularity of ethno-nationalist and populist leaders and policies, show that ethnocentrism as a phenomenon has been resurging around the world. In addition, given its important explanatory power, an increasing number of political psychologists have started again to use the concept. This article presents an analysis of ethnocentrism reconceptualized as a hierarchical construct emanating from a strong sense of ethnic group self-centeredness and self-importance. It discusses the prevalence of ethnocentrism around the world, its conceptualization and measurement, and its theoretical underpinnings, supporting them with novel empirical research conducted with two abbreviated measures of ethnocentrism. The article argues that ethnocentrism ultimately stems from the need to strengthen one's own ethnic group at the expense of anyone who and anything that can weaken it.     

Slower access to visual awareness but otherwise intact implicit perception of emotional faces in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders

Schizophrenia-spectrum disorders are characterized by deficits in social domains. Extant research has reported an impaired ability to perceive emotional faces in schizophrenia. Yet, it is unclear if these deficits occur already in the access to visual awareness. To investigate this question, 23 people with schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder and 22 healthy controls performed a breaking continuous flash suppression task with fearful, happy, and neutral faces. Response times were analysed with generalized linear mixed models. People with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders were slower than controls in detecting faces, but did not show emotion-specific impairments. Moreover, happy faces were detected faster than neutral and fearful faces, across all participants. Although caution is needed when interpreting the main effect of group, our findings may suggest an elevated threshold for visual awareness in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, but an intact implicit emotion perception. Our study provides a new insight into the mechanisms underlying emotion perception in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders.     

Motion-induced blindness does not affect the formation of negative afterimages

Aftereffects induced by invisible stimuli constitute a powerful tool to investigate what type of neural information processing can occur in the absence of visual awareness. This approach has been successfully used to demonstrate that awareness of oriented gratings or translating stimuli is not necessary to obtain a robust orientation-specific or motion-specific aftereffect. We exploit motion-induced blindness (MIB, Bonneh, Cooperman, & Sagi, 2001) to investigate the related question of the influence of visual awareness on the formation of negative afterimages. Our results show that MIB does not affect the persistence and intensity of afterimages. Thus, there is no significant contribution to the formation of afterimages beyond the sites mediating MIB.     

Category and stereotype activation revisited

In Study 1 (N= 230), we found that the participants' explicit prejudice was not related to their knowledge of cultural stereotypes of immigrants in Sweden, and that they associated the social category immigrants with the same national/ethnic categories. In Study 2 (N= 88), employing the category and stereotype words obtained in Study 1 as primes, we examined whether participants with varying degrees of explicit prejudice differed in their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice when primed with category or stereotypical words. In accord with our hypothesis, and contrary to previous findings, the results showed that people's explicit prejudice did not affect their automatic stereotyping and implicit prejudice, neither in the category nor stereotype priming condition. Study 3 (N= 62), employing category priming using facial photographs of Swedes and immigrants as primes, showed that participants' implicit prejudice was not moderated by their explicit prejudice. The outcome is discussed in relation to the distinction between category and stereotype priming and in terms of the associative strength between a social category and its related stereotypes.     

How to suppress obsessive thoughts

Thought suppression (i.e. consciously trying to avoid certain thoughts from entering consciousness) has been argued to be an inadequate strategy in case of unwanted intrusions. That is, thought suppression seems to result in more rather than less intrusions. Although this experimental finding has been explained in terms of failing attempts to distract oneself from the target thought, the White Bear Suppression Inventory (WBSI; a scale that measures chronic thought suppression tendencies) does not address the means by which respondents try to suppress unwanted thoughts. To examine which strategies of mental control people use to suppress unwanted thoughts, obsessive-compulsive disorder patients (N=47) completed the WBSI, the Thought Control Questionnaire, and two measures of psychopathology. Results suggest that the crucial mechanism in thought suppression may not be distraction, but self-punishment.     

The association between implicit and explicit prejudice: the moderating role of motivation to control prejudiced reactions

The main aim of the present research was to assess the relationship between implicit and explicit ethnic attitude measures and to examine the impact of motivation to control prejudiced reactions on this relation. Implicit ethnic prejudice was assessed by a response latency measure, and a self-report modern prejudice scale was used to assess explicit prejudice. The results showed that an association between implicit and explicit attitudes was observed only when the explicit attitude measure was corrected for motivational bias. The findings are discussed in relation to previous research reporting either association or dissociation between implicit and explicit attitude measures.     

Shock as a signal for shock or no-shock: a feature-negative effect in conditioned suppression.

Rats were trained in conditioned suppression discriminations where shock at the beginning of a trial signaled either shock or no-shock at the end of the trial. In the shock-positive condition, shock at the beginning of a presentation of white noise signaled that noise would end with shock; noise that did not begin with shock did not end with shock. In the shock-negative discrimination, shock at the beginning of noise signaled that noise would not end with shock; presentations of noise that did not begin with shock ended with shock. In shock-random training, shock at the beginning of noise did not reliably signal whether the noise presentation would or would not end with shock. Most subjects in shock-negative training quickly developed a differential pattern of suppression on positive (shock reinforced) trials and no suppression on negative (nonreinforced) trials. The shock-positive discrimination was much more difficult to establish and was not acquired by the majority of the rats. This "feature-negative" effect is a clear exception to the general superiority of feature-positive learning commonly observed in discriminations based on a single distinguishing feature. The results are discussed in terms of Pavlovian stimulus-shock contingencies in the shock-positive and shock-negative paradigms, which appear to favor rapid development of the shock-negative discrimination.     

Can Ethical Ideologies Predict Prejudice?

Idealism and relativism were designed to assess different ethical ideological views. Their relation with attitudes toward a variety of outgroups has not been previously studied. Understanding how concerns over ethical principles and consequences are related to prejudiced attitudes could provide some insight into these constructs and into the nature of prejudice. In two studies totaling 311 participants, participants completed measures on ethical ideologies, right-wing authoritarianism, and attitudes toward various outgroups. The differential predictive validities of ethical ideologies, in comparison to right-wing authoritarianism, on prejudicial attitudes toward dangerous, derogated, and dissident outgroup members were examined. We found that both idealism and relativism contributed to predicting attitudes regarding outgroup members, over and above right-wing authoritarianism. As such, people’s personal moral standards and code of conduct for dealing with interpersonal problems and transgressions can partly explain their negative attitudes toward outgroup members. More research is required to determine the unique influence of ethical ideologies over other constructs previously shown to predict prejudice.     

What do I Think of Others in Relation to Myself? Moral Identity and Moral Inclusion in Explaining Prejudice

The aim of this article is to analyze the effect of moral identity on prejudice in conjunction with moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. In particular, the hypothesis is that even if high moral identity people tend to be less prejudicial than low moral identity people, this result can be explained with reference to moral inclusion/exclusion attitudes. A questionnaire was distributed to 192 Italian subjects. According to the hypothesis, results show that moral identity is negatively correlated with blatant prejudice, but that this effect is completely mediated by the perception of moral inclusion/exclusion with the other groups. These results suggest that it is not how morally you behave (symbolization), or the relevance you give to moral traits for your identity (internalization), that have an effect on prejudice, but rather it is who you include within the moral community within which moral values apply. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patterns of emotion regulation and psychopathology

Abstract

Emotion regulatory strategies such as higher expressive suppression and lower cognitive reappraisal may be associated with increased psychopathology (Gross & John, 2003 Gross, J.J. and John, O.P. 2003. Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: Implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85: 348–362. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Yet, it is unclear whether these strategies represent distinct cognitive styles associated with psychopathology, such that there are individuals who are predominantly “suppressors” or “reappraisers.” Using cluster analysis, we examined whether women with and without exposure to potentially traumatic events evidence distinct patterns of emotion regulation frequency, capacity, suppression, and cognitive reappraisal. Four patterns emerged: high regulators; high reappraisers/low suppressors; moderate reappraisers/low suppressors; and low regulators. Individuals who reported infrequently and ineffectively regulating their emotions (low regulators) also reported higher depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). In contrast, individuals who reported frequently and effectively using reappraisal and low levels of suppression (high reappraisers/low suppressors) reported the lowest levels of these symptoms, suggesting that this specific combination of emotion regulation may be most adaptive. Our findings highlight that the capacity to regulate emotions and the ability to flexibly apply different strategies based on the context and timing may be associated with reduced psychopathology and more adaptive functioning.