登机牌信息要素及其布局研究

随着民航行业的快速发展,飞机登机牌的使用率越来越高,而不同航空公司所采用的登机牌在信息内容和布局设计等方面均缺乏相关的设计规范,因此有必要从可用性角度对登机牌进行系统的研究.首先,采用KANO问卷法对登机牌上的文字信息要素进行研究,并基于研究结果设计出新登机牌;然后,从搜索绩效和主观偏好两个方面对新旧登机牌进行比较评价研究.结果显示：①登机牌上必须呈现的信息主要包括登机时间、登机口、航班号、座位号、姓名、日期和目的地七项必要信息,以及可提高旅客使用体验的预计飞行时间信息,但登机牌上不能呈现旅客身份证号码等个人隐私信息;②基于信息要素研究结果重新布局设计的新登机牌在搜索绩效和主观偏好方面均显著优于现有登机牌.本研究结果可为将来的登机牌设计提供科学依据.     

The Name-Pronunciation Effect: Further Evidence from Chinese

This study examined the Chinese name-pronunciation effect. The easy-to-pronounce and difficult-to-pronounce Chinese names were created using the same characters in order to control for visual perceptual and conceptual fluency. In Experiment 1, participants rated each name in terms of liking, electability as a state leader, income level, and baby name preference. An additional rating of prevalence was used to estimate familiarity. In Experiment 2, participants did not read the name aloud before rating and performed intentional recall and recognition tests. In both experiments, the easy-to-pronounce names were rated higher than difficult-to-pronounce names on liking. This effect generalized to judgments of electability and baby name preference but not to prevalence and income level. There were no differences in memory performances between the two types of names. Results are discussed in terms of the boundary condition of the name-pronunciation effect and the advantage of using Chinese names to study this effect.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

当局者迷,旁观者清?自我-他人决策的理性差异及其机制

生活充满抉择,由于知识经验的局限,人们常需寻求他人建议,抑或直接请他人代己决策.诸多研究探讨了自我决策、向他人建议,以及代他人决策之间的差异.探究这种差异的动因之一在于考察何种条件下的决策更优或更“理性”.以往研究表明,自我决策或他人决策(向他人建议或代他人决策)均有可能更易违背理性决策原则,隐含着他人决策优于自我决策的“当局者迷,旁观者清”这一传统智慧有一定的边界条件.研究者一般从认知(建构水平理论)、情绪(类型和卷入度),以及动机(调节聚焦理论)三种视角对自我-他人决策差异进行解释.本文作者提出基于理由的决策(reason-based account)假设来解释自我-他人决策在理性程度上的差异.未来研究可从决策过程及脑机制上深入考察自我-他人决策差异及其机制.     

Development of own-race biases

This review examines the emergence and development of perceptual and social biases towards own-race individuals. We first discuss evidence regarding the early emergence of an own-race bias in facial preferences and face recognition abilities demonstrated by infants with an abundance of visual experience with own-race individuals, but little to no experience with other-race individuals. We then consider perceptual categorization of face race, visual scanning, and differential processing of own- and other-race faces in relation to recognition of face identity. Finally, we review evidence regarding own-race preferences for social partners and own-race biases in social evaluations that emerge during early childhood. Implications of the existing evidence for understanding the role of experience in perceptual development and the emergence of racial preferences and stereotypes are discussed.     

I just love the attention: implicit preference for direct eye contact

Seven studies used the Implicit Association Test to measure preference for gaze direction. For faces with neutral expressions, people clearly preferred eyes looking towards them compared to eyes gazing to the right or left (Experiment 1). This preference remained for faces shown turned to the side (Experiment 2) and upside-down (Experiment 3). Even angry faces were preferred with direct compared to averted gaze (Experiments 4 and 5). Furthermore, preference for eye contact did not correlate to performance on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) or the Autism Quotient (AQ); note performance on the RMET and the AQ was only weakly correlated although both are claimed to measure social cognition. When the faces were replaced by coloured shapes (Experiment 6) or arrows (Experiment 7) people showed a weaker preference for the category label “looking at you” versus “looking to the side”. Overall, people revealed a robust preference for direct rather than averted gaze which generalized across face pose and expression. Together with a weaker preference for arrows pointing towards them, this is consistent with people having an implicit preference for self-directed attention.     

Self-Other Discrepancies in Waiting Time Decisions

Both anecdotal evidence and recently reported research suggest that people are risk-averse when faced with waiting time decisions. Four studies investigate whether there is a self-other discrepancy in how people make waiting time decisions themselves and how they predict others will make similar decisions. People are found to believe that others have valuations of time similar to their own. However, when faced with alternatives that involve risk in the duration of the wait, the results point to a self-other discrepancy, in that people report greater risk-aversion themselves than they think others would. Further, when faced with waiting time gains, people are themselves more risk-averse than they think others would be. Conversely, when faced with waiting time losses, people are themselves more risk-seeking than they think others would be. Overall, the results are consistent with the recently proposed risk-as-feelings hypothesis.     

Limits to preference and the sensitivity of choice to rate and amount of food

Studies of choice holding food‐amount ratio constant while varying food‐rate ratio within sessions showed that local changes in preference depend on relative amount of food. The present study investigated whether sensitivity of choice to food‐rate ratio and sensitivity to food‐amount ratio are independent of one another when food‐rate ratios are varied across sessions and food‐amount ratios are varied within sessions. Food deliveries for rats’ presses on the left and right levers were scheduled according to three different food‐rate ratios of 1:1, 9:1, and 1:9; each food‐rate ratio lasted for 106 sessions and was arranged independently of seven food‐amount ratios (7:1, 6:2, 5:3, 4:4, 3:5, 2:6, and 1:7 food pellets) occurring within sessions in random sequence. Each amount ratio lasted for 10 food deliveries and was separated from another by a 60‐s blackout. Sensitivity to rate ratio was high (1.0) across food deliveries. Sensitivity to amount ratio was low when food rates were equal across alternatives, but was high when rate ratio and amount ratio opposed one another. When rate ratio and amount ratio went in the same direction, choice ratio reached an elevenfold limit which reduced sensitivity to approximately zero. We conclude that three factors affect sensitivity to amount: (1) the limit to preference, (2) the equal effect on preference of amounts greater than four pellets, and (3) the absence of differential effects of switches in amount in the equal‐rates (1:1) condition. Taken together, these findings indicate that rate and amount only sometimes combine independently as additive variables to determine preference when amount ratios vary frequently within sessions.     

Examination of efficacious,efficient, and socially valid error‐correction procedures to teach sight words and prepositions to children with autism spectrum disorder

Prior research shows that learners have idiosyncratic responses to error‐correction procedures during instruction. Thus, assessments that identify error‐correction strategies to include in instruction can aid practitioners in selecting individualized, efficacious, and efficient interventions. The current investigation conducted an assessment to compare 5 error‐correction procedures that have been evaluated in the extant literature and are common in instructional practice for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Results showed that the assessment identified efficacious and efficient error‐correction procedures for all participants, and 1 procedure was efficient for 4 of the 5 participants. To examine the social validity of error‐correction procedures, participants selected among efficacious and efficient interventions in a concurrent‐chains assessment. We discuss the results in relation to prior research on error‐correction procedures and current instructional practices for learners with ASD.     

Stability of daily preference across multiple individuals

Preference stability provides clues about the extent to which a clinician might be able to deliver a particular stimulus contingent on behavior as a reinforcer. Previous research has been somewhat mixed in terms of evidence for preference stability. Results of the current study are consistent with studies that have reported correlations between preference assessments, suggesting that preferences are relatively stable across time.