现代新儒家的易学思想论纲

现代新儒家代表人物特重<易传>,他们借助于诠释<易传>来阐发自己的哲学思想.熊十力的易学是以"乾元"为中心的本体-宇宙论;马一浮的易学是以"性理"为中心的本体-工夫论;方东美的易学是以"生生"为中心的形上学;牟宗三的易学是以"穷神知化"为中心的道德形上学;唐君毅的易学是以"神明之知"为中心的天人内外相生相涵的圆教.他们以现代哲学的观念与问题意识重点阐发了<周易>哲学的宇宙论、本体论、生命论、人性论、境界论、价值论及其间的联系,肯定了中国哲学之不同于西方哲学的特性是生机的自然观,整体和谐观,自然宇宙和事实世界涵有价值的观念,至美至善的追求,生命的学问和内在性的体验.他们重建了本体论和宇宙论,证成了超越性与内在性的贯通及天与人合德的意义.     

The Wisdom of Administration in The Analects

The basic spirit of administration in The Analects includes the five following aspects: the wisdom of administration regarding humanity as the foundation; the wisdom of leadership with primary virtue; the wisdom of conducting business with righteousness; the wisdom of harmonious organization; and the wisdom of coordination with the mean. Relative to modern Western rational spirit of scientific management, Confucian management focuses on exploring the humanities and shaping human nature, and this has a unique value for contemporary management activities.     

Is Confucianism a religion? Modern Confucian theories on the ethical nature of classical discourses

When dealing with the study of diverse Confucian traditions in eastern Asia, we are often confronted by the issue of the religious dimension of Confucianism and how can it be compared to the Western (or ‘general’) connotations of the term. Proceeding from the basic question as to how Confucianism sees itself, the paper focuses on the approaches of two representatives of the Modern Confucian intellectual movement, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. In addition, we shall also take into consideration the various contemporary Confucian interpretations of the previously delineated problems, for instance Liu Shu-hsien’s or Chen Lai’s. Based on these discourses, the paper clarifies the reasons for Modern Confucian interpretations, according to which Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense but a discourse that represents both a practical moral teaching and an abstract philosophy of immanent transcendence.     

先秦法家法治思想的衍变——以《管子》、《商君书》和《韩非子》为中心

中国的“法治”思想源远流长,始于先秦法家,从春秋时期的管仲提出“以法治国”的主张,到战国时期的商鞅治国重“法”,再到韩非“法术势”相结合的法治理论的构建,先秦法家的法治思想经历了一个从萌芽到发展再到成熟的衍变过程,但法家的法治思想始终没有脱出君主专制下“以法治国”的巢臼。     

A Right of Rebellion in the Mengzi?

Mengzi believed that tyrannical rulers can be justifiably deposed, and many contemporary scholars see this as grounding a right of popular rebellion. I argue that the text of the Mengzi reveals a more mixed view, and does so in two respects. First, it suggests that the people are sometimes permitted to participate in a rebellion but not permitted to decide for themselves when rebellion is warranted. Second, it gives appropriate moral weight not to the people’s judgments about the justifiability of rebelling, but rather to certain affections and behaviors that closely track their life satisfaction. I contend that in both respects the permissions Mengzi grants the people fall short of a proper right of rebellion. I conclude that the more historical account of Mengzi’s “just revolt theory” suggests an intriguing division of deliberative labor, and note some of the advantages of this account.     

论"观物"与"观无"——儒学与现象学的一种融通

In traditional Chinese expressions, guannian 观念 (ideas) are results of guan 观 (viewing). However, viewing can be understood to have two different levels of meanings: one is “viewing things,” that is, viewing with something to view; another is “viewing nothing,” that is, viewing with nothing to view. What are viewed in “viewing things” are either physical beings—all existing things and phenomena—or the metaphysical being (for example, the “Dao as a thing”). In both cases, something is being viewed. What is viewed in “viewing nothing” is the being itself, or “nothing,” in which there is nothing to view. According to Confucianism, the existence of “nothing” manifests itself as life sentiments, especially the sentiment of love, which is the very root and source of benevolence; moreover “viewing nothing” is, in essence, a perception of life. Life sentiments or the perception of life is “the thing itself ” prior to any being or any thing. Translated by Liu Huawei from Sichuan Daxue Xuebao 四川大学学报 (Journal of Sichuan University), 2006, (4): 67–74     

The Musings of a Family Therapist in Asia When COVID-19 Struck

In response to the COVID-19 crisis in Asia, a family therapist in Hong Kong shares her experiences and reflections, both personally and professionally from an Eastern lens. From a state of shock and immobilization to moments of contemplation, she highlights her struggle with being caught between her Eastern roots and Western training, which has become more salient in facing COVID-19. While the latter pulls her toward a more problem resolution stance, the former pulls her toward a more accepting position. As a result, her therapy is shaped in such a way that she tends to raise more questions instead of providing answers.     

冯友兰先生的《中国哲学史》:"同情之了解"与新儒学

冯友兰先生先以中国哲学史家名于世。两卷本《中国哲学史》是其成名的代表作。《中国哲学史》有很多特点,其中最主要的即是"同情之了解"与"新儒学"。"同情之了解"不仅是冯先生成功写作《中国哲学史》的原则和方法,而且也是我们今后弘扬中国优秀传统文化所不可或缺的原则与方法。冯先生后来又成了一位著名的新儒家。作为中国现代学术思潮中新儒家的一位典型代表,冯先生本人以及一般论者都公认为应以其"贞元六书"的"新理学"哲学体系为代表。文章赞同这个共识,但想补充一点,即广而言之,似乎也可以包括冯先生所著的两卷本《中国哲学史》在内。文章从其目录、内容、审查、批评、自觉与自白和"贞元六书"多方面进行了探索与论述。